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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the analysis of information aggregation pro-
cedures within organizations. Facing uncertainty about the consequences of a
collective decision, information has to be aggregated before making a choice.
Two main questions are addressed. Firstly, how well is an organization suited
for the aggregation of decision-relevant information? Secondly, how should an
organization be designed in order to aggregate information efficiently?
The main part (Chapters 2-4) deals with information aggregation in commit-
tees. A committee is a decision-making institution in which several individuals
take part in the decision procedure and possibly hold private, decision-relevant
information. In Chapter 2, a survey of the recent literature on committees is
provided.
In Chapter 3, we study information aggregation in a committee whose mem-
bers have heterogeneous preferences. Preference heterogeneity may interfere with
information aggregation if the organization members disagree on how the infor-
mation should be mapped into a decision. We study the performance of majority
voting as a mechanism to aggregate information, when agents have the possibil-
ity to publicly announce their information before voting takes place. We identify
conditions under which full information aggregation is possible.
In Chapter 4, we compare the performance of two alternative decision pro-
cedures facing partially conflicting interests among decision makers. The two
decision procedures differ with respect to the extent to which they allow commu-
nication among decision makers. We find that limiting the individuals’ access to
communication may enhance decision quality.
In Chapter 5, we depart from the committee framework. Decision-relevant
information is no longer private, but centrally available. The question is how to
efficiently organize the information aggregation procedure. The organization is
evaluated in terms of two dimensions, speed and quality of decision making. We
assume that it takes time to read information, and that agents make a mistake
with a certain probability when carrying out a processing task. The extent of
parallel information processing affects the time it takes to reach a decision. The
quality of the decision is affected by processing imperfections.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In many organizations, collective decision procedures involve more than one in-
dividual, but less than all the individuals who are affected by the decision. In
most developed countries, decisions which affect the whole population are made
by an elected government. In firms, important decisions are made by the board
of directors. Hiring decisions are made by hiring committees, monetary policy is
conducted by a monetary policy committee and criminal trial juries decide upon
the fate of a defendant.
Why are collective decisions delegated to small groups instead of involving all
individuals or delegating to a single decision maker? We explore an informational
explanation for this question. If the consequences of a collective decision are
uncertain, uncertainty can be reduced by acquiring and processing information.
Consider for instance a decision whether to implement a reform or not, and
suppose that the reform will be welfare-enhancing in some states of the economy,
but detrimental for welfare in others. The better the decision-making institution
is endowed with information which allows to predict the state of the economy
more accurately, the better it will be able to identify the welfare-maximizing
decision.
By involving more than a single decision maker, the collective decision can
potentially be based on more information if the decision makers have private
information which is otherwise not accessible. On the other hand, even if all
the decision-relevant information is centrally available, there may be a role for
the participation of several agents in the decision making procedure because this
7
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
allows for the delegation of information processing tasks.
This dissertation elaborates on both perspectives towards information aggre-
gation, the aggregation of private information in collective decision making pro-
cedures, and the aggregation of centrally available information in a decentralized
manner through the delegation of processing tasks. Two major questions are
addressed: Is it possible to use the collective resources, i.e. individuals’ private
information and information processing capability, efficiently? Are some forms of
organization better suited to use these resources than others?
In Chapters 2-4, we consider the case in which decision-relevant information
is spread among organization members, and study the performance of voting
mechanisms as a means to aggregate this information. In Chapter 5, we study the
case in which information is centrally available, but it needs to be aggregated in
order to understand it. There, the focus is on the optimal aggregation procedure
in the presence of information processing imperfections.
Chapter 2 originates from joint work with Kerstin Gerling, Hans Peter Gru¨ner
and Alexandra Kiel which has been published in the European Journal of Political
Economy (21) in 2005. We provide an overview over the recent game-theoretical
literature on decision making in committees. It is assumed that committee mem-
bers possess private, decision-relevant information. The questions which are ad-
dressed by this literature are twofold: (i) How well is the political process (e.g.
majority voting) suited to aggregate private information, and (ii) How should the
political process be optimally designed in the presence of private information?
These questions are studied in different settings, with exogenous or endogenous
information, with or without conflicting interests among committee members,
and with or without the possibility to communicate. Among other insights, the
literature suggests that information aggregation is severely limited if committee
members have conflicting interests, even if they are allowed to exchange views
prior to casting their votes.
However, this conclusion might be too pessimistic, as it relies crucially on
the specific informational environment which is assumed, namely private infor-
mation being soft. That is, agents can always claim to possess information which
favors their preferred decision, which causes a limit to information aggregation.
In Chapter 3, we suggest an alternative approach, assuming that information is
verifiable. Committee members are allowed to make public speeches, but they
cannot pretend to have information which they in fact do no have. After the
9communication stage, a decision is made by majority voting. We analyze differ-
ent settings, and derive conditions under which full information aggregation is
possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each commit-
tee member is endowed with information full information aggregation is possible
despite preference heterogeneity.
In Chapter 4, we compare two decision procedures, which differ with respect
to the extent to which decision makers can exchange information. In a setting
in which the full information aggregation result of Chapter 3 does not apply,
we allow agents with partially conflicting interests to reveal private, decision-
relevant information either to the entire group of decision makers (open debate),
or only to decision makers with the same interests (group debate). If information
disclosure is observed by all decision makers, agents may strategically withhold
information. As a consequence, individual votes will be less sensitive to observable
information. We show that limiting the individuals’ access to communication may
yield a higher expected social surplus.
Chapter 5 is joint work with Hans Peter Gru¨ner, which has been accepted for
publication in the Journal of Economic Theory. We study a decision problem in
which all the decision-relevant information is centrally available, but it needs to be
aggregated in order to identify the optimal decision. The information aggregation
technology captures two important aspects of human processing ability. First
of all, we assume that it takes time to read an information item. Secondly,
we introduce information processing imperfections. Thus, the evaluation of a
decision making organization is carried out in terms of two dimensions, speed
and quality of decision making. We consider the task to choose an alternative
out of a given set of alternatives. An agent, when choosing between two options,
makes a mistake with a certain (exogenous) probability, and chooses the worse
option. We derive the hierarchical organization in which the best option is chosen
with highest probability.
The thesis is organized in such a way that the chapters can be read indepen-
dently of each other. As the chapters are closely connected, this involves a certain
degree of repetition for readers who read through the entire manuscript at the
benefit of readers who read the chapters selectively. All references are collected
in the bibliography.
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Information Acquisition and
Decision Making in Committees:
A Survey
2.1 Introduction
How do committees work? And how should they be designed? A recent game-
theoretic literature has added useful insights to the theory of committee decision
making. The role of this chapter is to provide an overview over the recent de-
velopments in this field and to relate it to some current debates on the design of
committees for international decision making.
It is not the aim to provide a comprehensive study of all contributions in this
field, but rather to deliver an introduction to this branch of literature, to relate
different results and to unsheathe important assumptions concerning the study
of committees. The focus is on the strategic behavior of committee members
facing decisions that are made only once and that are irreversible. For a survey
of the literature which deals with repeated strategic interaction and political
institutions, see Piketty (1999).
The formal study of committees is old. In his classical contribution Condorcet
(1785) described a committee as a mechanism that efficiently aggregates infor-
mation. In his famous jury theorem he argues that (i) increasing the number of
informed committee members raises the probability that an appropriate decision
is made, and (ii) the probability of making the appropriate decision will converge
11
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to one as the number of committee members goes to infinity.
It is useful to relate the modern literature on committees to Condorcet’s early
insight. Condorcet’s analysis was based on a simple setup where (i) individuals
always base their choice on their information, (ii) individuals obtain their in-
formation at zero cost, (iii) all individuals have the same objective: to make a
correct decision, and (iv) individuals do not exchange views before voting. In
many cases of interest some (or even all) of these assumptions do not hold. Some
voting rules may induce individuals not to vote in accordance with their own in-
formation. When information acquisition is costly, individuals provide less effort
in large committees. Conflicting interests may lead to the misrepresentation of
information. And communication may affect individual voting behavior when in-
formation is distributed asymmetrically. Recent papers have therefore addressed
the issue of committee decision making when one or more of Condorcet’s assump-
tions do not hold.
We first give an introduction to the model setup applied by most of the pa-
pers we survey. In Section 2.3, we briefly turn to the Condorcet Jury Theorem in
this setup and unsheathe the (explicit and implicit) assumptions. We then discuss
contributions which study the role of strategic voting in committees (Section 2.4).
Next we look at papers that analyze incentives for information acquisition (Sec-
tion 2.5). We then turn to the role of differences in preferences (Section 2.6) and
after that to pre-vote communication (Section 2.7). Section 2.8 summarizes some
experimental results on committee decisions and relates them to the theoretical
literature.
Key questions related to committee design are ”How large should a committee
be?”, ”Who should be in a committee?”, ”What is the optimal decision rule?”,
and ”What should the delegating body do with the committee’s decision?”. We
will summarize and compare the answers to these questions in Section 2.9.
2.2 The model setup
In this section, we introduce the model setup applied by most of the papers we
survey. Throughout the chapter, we will refer to this section.
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2.2.1 The basic model
A policy decision x ∈ X has to be made by a group of n agents, called the
committee. This decision is determined by voting. We restrict attention to the
case where the policy decision is binary, i.e. X = {a, b}. Examples are decisions
concerning the implementation of a reform or to maintain the status quo, or the
acquittal or conviction of a defendant.
Each agent i casts a vote vi ∈ {a, b} for one of the alternatives. The voting
rule is characterized by a number of votes k ∈ {1, ...n} needed to implement
alternative a:
x (k, v) =
{
a, if
∑n
i=1 1vi=a ≥ k
b, otherwise.
where 1vi=a = 1 if i votes for a and 0 otherwise. That is, for k =
n+1
2
, alternative
a is implemented if at least a simple majority of the committee members votes
in favor of it, otherwise b is implemented. For k = n, the committee needs a
unanimous agreement in order to implement alternative a.
There exist two possible states of nature s ∈ {A,B}. The utility agents
derive from the implementation of a policy is state-dependent. For example, the
utility from convicting a defendant depends on whether the defendant is guilty
or innocent. We assume that all agents prefer policy x = a in state of the world
s = A and x = b in state of the world s = B. Unfortunately, the state of
the world is not known. Agents share the common belief π = prob {s = A},
0 < π < 1. In the basic version of the model we assume that agents’ preferences
can be represented by the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
u (x, s) =
{
1, if x = s
0, otherwise.
This function captures the following properties: agents suffer symmetrically
from possible wrong decisions and also value correct decisions symmetrically.
Thus, the agents’ common objective is to implement the appropriate policy,1
which amounts to guessing the state of the world. Prior to the voting decisions,
1When agents have homogeneous preferences, the terms ”correct” or ”appropriate” policy
refer to the one that matches the state of the world. When agents’ preferences differ, it is
not straightforward to define what the appropriate policy is. In that case, we need further
assumptions regarding the agents’ preferences to justify the desirability of a certain outcome.
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each agent i receives an imperfect signal σi ∈ {α, β} with the following stochastic
properties:
Assumption 2.1
prob {σi = α |s = A} = prob {σj = α |s = A} := q0 ∀i, j,
prob {σi = β |s = B} = prob {σj = β |s = B} := q1 ∀i, j,
and 1
2
< q0, q1 < 1.
2
Let prob {s = A |σi = α} := qα ∀i, prob {s = 1 |σi = 1} := qβ ∀i, and assume:
Assumption 2.2
1
2
< qα, qβ < 1.
The parameters π, q0 and q1 describe the informational environment. We will
refer to qα and qβ as the quality or the accuracy of the signal.
The timing is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world according to the prior belief π.
2. Nature sends a signal to each agent according to the rules specified above.
3. Agents simultaneously vote for one of the alternatives.
4. The policy is implemented according to the voting rule k and payoffs realize.
In order to capture other important aspects of committee decision making,
such as conflicting interests, costly information acquisition or the possibility to ex-
change information before voting, this framework has to be enriched, as specified
below.
2We restrict attention to the case of equally skilled decision makers. However, the distri-
bution and quality of decision skills matter for committee voting. Two papers that have dealt
with this issue are Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Karotkin and Nitzan (1995). Nitzan and
Paroush (1982) show that with different decision skills the optimal decision rule is a voting rule
that grants more weight to better qualified decision makers.
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2.2.2 Conflicting interests
Agents may have different preferences over the possible outcomes of the game.
Let ui (x, s) ≥ 0 denote the utility agent i derives from the implementation of
policy x in state of the world s. We assume that ui (a, A) ≥ ui (a,B), and
ui (b, B) ≥ ui (b, A), which in a jury setup means that agent i does not derive
higher utility from the acquittal of a defendant if the defendant is guilty rather
than innocent nor from the conviction of an innocent instead of a guilty.3 More
generally speaking: An agent should derive at least as much utility from the
implementation of an ”appropriate” policy as from the same policy, implemented
in a state of the world in which it is not appropriate.
In the case of heterogeneous preferences, it is not straightforward what the
terms ”appropriate” or ”correct” policy mean, nor which outcome of the game
can be valued as desirable. We use these terms in the following sense: For
each state of the world, there exists a policy that would be agreed upon by
the (majority of) agents if the state of the world was known for sure. It is
desirable to choose this ”correct” policy with high probability. If we impose
certain symmetry assumptions on agents’ preferences, this desirability criterion
is equivalent to maximizing Bentham’s welfare function.
Maximizing expected utility, agent i prefers policy a over policy b if
p (·)ui (a, A) + (1− p (·)) ui (a,B) ≥ p (·) ui (b, A) + (1− p (·))ui (b, B) ,
where p (·) denotes i’s assessment of the probability that the state of the world is
A. We have
p (·)ui (a, A) + (1− p (·)) ui (a,B) ≥ p (·)ui (b, A) + (1− p (·))ui (b, B)⇔
p (·) ≥ ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)
ui(a,A)+ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)−ui(b,A) .
Agent i’s preferences can be represented by θi =
ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)
ui(a,A)+ui(1,1)−ui(a,B)−ui(b,A) . Fol-
lowing (among others) Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we will refer to θi as i’s
”threshold of reasonable doubt”. Agent i prefers alternative a to be implemented
as long as he assesses the probability that state A realized to be higher than his
threshold of reasonable doubt.
3In the course of the analysis, we will often refer to the jury interpretation of the informa-
tion aggregation game in order to simplify the exposition. This is not to say that we believe
conflicting interests are especially present in jury trials.
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The assumptions stated above ensure that the denominator is positive. The
nominator is negative, if ui (a,B) > ui (b, B), which means that i prefers to
acquit the defendant even if he was sure that he is guilty. θi is greater than 1, if
ui (b, A) > ui (a, A), which implies that i prefers to convict the defendant even if
he was sure that he is innocent.
If an agent with preferences satisfying either ui (a,B) ≥ ui (b, B) or ui (b, A) ≥
ui (a, A) exists, we call him partisan. All non-partisan voters’ preferences are
characterized by θi ∈ (0, 1).
2.2.3 Information acquisition
If the agents do not receive their signals for free, but each of them has to invest
effort in order to learn something about the state of the world, this will be modeled
by adding another stage to the game in which prior to receiving signals, agents
simultaneously decide about their investment in effort. We will be more specific
about the investment technology in the course of the discussion of papers which
deal with this aspect.
The timing in a model with an information acquisition stage is then as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world according to the prior belief π.
2. Agents simultaneously make their investment decisions.
3. Dependent on the agents’ investment decisions, nature sends signals accord-
ing to the information technology.
4. Agents simultaneously vote for one of the alternatives.
5. The policy is implemented according to the voting rule k and payoffs realize.
2.2.4 Communication
In order to capture the possibility of communication within our model framework,
a cheap talk stage prior to the voting stage is introduced to the game. An agent’s
strategy in this setting is a plan what to report depending on the signal he receives
and for which alternative to vote, depending on the signal he got, the report he
made and the messages he received. As we shall see, the introduction of a cheap
talk stage may considerably complicate the analysis.
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The timing in a model with a communication stage is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world according to the prior belief π.
2. Nature sends signals to the agents.
3. Agents exchange messages.
4. Agents simultaneously vote for one of the alternatives.
5. The policy is implemented according to the voting rule k and payoffs realize.
2.3 The Condorcet Jury Theorem in a nutshell
In this section, we briefly outline the Condorcet Jury Theorem (hereafter CJT).
The model framework is as described in Section 2.2.1. The first part of the
CJT (CJT I) states that the probability of making an appropriate decision in a
committee which decides via simple majority voting is increasing in the number
of informed committee members. The second part (CJT II) states that this
probability converges to one as the number of informed committee members goes
to infinity. Committee members are informed in the sense that every agent is
endowed with a signal which is correlated with the true state of the world as
specified in Section 2.2.1.
We give an example to illustrate the mechanics of the model. Let π = 1
2
, and
let q0 = q1 = q. So we have qα = qβ = q.
Condorcet assumed that each committee member votes according to the signal
he received. Such a voting behavior is called informative voting.4 The probability
that a single committee member makes a correct decision is thus q.
Now consider a committee with three members. The probability that the
majority receives a correct signal (and thus votes in favor of the correct policy)
is
(
3
2
)
q2 (1− q) + q3 = 3q2 − 2q3.
The probability to make a correct decision is higher in the committee consist-
4See e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
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ing of three persons than if one agent determines the policy alone, iff
3q2 − 2q3 > q ⇔(
3q − 2q2 − 1
)
q > 0⇔
(2q − 1) (1− q) q > 0⇔
1
2
< q < 1.
CJT II rests on the law of large numbers: The probability that a fraction q
of committee members receives correct signals converges to one. Since q > 1
2
, the
probability that at least a fraction 1
2
receives correct signals is converging to one,
too.
The explicit and implicit assumptions on which Condorcet’s argumentation
rests are the following:
1. Agents vote according to their information (informative voting).
2. Agents are endowed with information at no cost.
3. Agents’ interests are perfectly aligned.
4. Agents do not exchange their information before voting.
Actually, the third and the fourth assumption do not play a role if the first
one is satisfied. Note that the first assumption implies that the mapping of
information into the decision – and therewith the decision quality – is exogenously
given. As we shall see, conflicting interests and the possibility to communicate
may play a major role for the strategic interaction if this mapping is endogenous.
In the following, the assumptions will be relaxed. We start with dropping the
first one and allow agents to determine their voting choices by themselves, i.e. we
allow for strategic voting.
2.4 Strategic voting
Unsatisfied with the strict behavioral assumptions underlying the CJT, a branch
of the voting literature investigates the features of strategic voting from a game-
theoretic point of view. In fact, restricting the strategy space to informative
voting is not innocuous, since rational voters will generally not vote informatively
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in equilibrium. The reason is that a committee member tends to neglect his
own information, while he tries to deduce other committee members’ private
information from their voting behavior. Then, he might either not vote any
longer according to his own private information or even abstain, if he feels less
informed and shares common values with the electorate.
2.4.1 Rational voting
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) were among the first to unsheathe the implicit
behavioral assumptions that individuals vote sincerely, i.e. as a member of a
collective, each individual selects the alternative he would have selected when
voting alone, and informatively, i.e. each committee member’s decision reflects
the signal he received before.
The authors start from a simple Bayesian game as described in Section 2.2.1.
A strategy for a player in this game is a plan which vote to cast for each signal
he may get. Informative voting requires voting for a after having observed α
and voting b after having observed β. Committee members share homogeneous
preferences for selecting the better of the two alternatives. The decision is taken
by majority vote without abstentions. When making their decision, agents take
into account the common prior probability π in favor of state A and a private,
imperfect signal which they received about the true state of the world. Austen-
Smith and Banks show that it is the structure of individuals’ information that
endogenously generates heterogeneous policy preferences. Based on being pivotal,
a rational voter deduces other individuals’ private signals and by incorporating
this additional equilibrium information into his beliefs, he tends to neglect his
own private information. It follows that informative voting by all individuals is
generally not rational.
We provide an example to illustrate this result. Consider a three person
committee in an informational environment {π, q0, q1} as defined in Section 2.2.1.
To check whether informative voting by all agents constitutes an equilibrium
strategy profile, we need to determine the best response of a player i to the other
players voting informatively. This player needs to worry only about the case in
which he is pivotal, i.e. in case one player votes in favor of alternative a and
the other one in favor of alternative b, otherwise his voting choice will have no
effect on the final outcome and on his utility. Given that the other players vote
20 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY ON COMMITTEE DECISION MAKING
informatively i can infer their signals. He then updates his beliefs about which
state of the world realized according to all the information available to him.
If σi = α, i assesses the probability that the state of the world A realized to be
prob {s = A |σ = (α, α, β)} =
πq20 (1− q0)
πq20 (1− q0) + (1− π) (1− q1)
2 q1
.
If σi = β, i assesses the probability that the state of the world 0 realized to be
prob {s = A |σ = (α, β, β)} =
πq0 (1− q0)
2
πq0 (1− q0)
2 + (1− π) (1− q1) q21
.
His best response is to vote for alternative a iff prob {s = A |·} > 1
2
and for
alternative b otherwise. Thus, informative voting is rational iff the following two
conditions hold:
πq20 (1− q0)
πq20 (1− q0) + (1− π) (1− q1)
2 q1
> 1
2
πq0 (1− q0)
2
πq0 (1− q0)
2 + (1− π) (1− q1) q21
≤ 1
2
.
It should be obvious that these condition hold for some, but not for all param-
eter constellations. For example, for π = .5, q0 = .6 and q1 = .9, we have
piq20(1−q0)
piq20(1−q0)+(1−pi)(1−q1)2q1
> 1
2
and piq0(1−q0)
2
piq0(1−q0)2+(1−pi)(1−q1)q21
> 1
2
. That is, in this infor-
mational environment, i’s best response to the other players’ informative voting
strategies is to vote for alternative a independently of his signal. Thus, informa-
tive voting by all players fails to be an equilibrium strategy profile. In fact, there
is just one exceptional case for which Condorcet’s behavioral assumption is met,
namely if the majority rule k is the optimal method of aggregating individuals’
private information. An aggregation rule is optimal, if and only if, the rule being
used, it is rational for each member to vote informatively if all others do so. In
a second step, the authors allow for variations in the structure of individuals’
information. Specifically, if the decision makers receive two independent private
signals or additionally a public signal, the paper’s main result applies again.
But then, it is no longer assured that majorities invariably do better than
individuals in selecting the better of two alternatives. It is easy to verify that in
the example above the game has an equilibrium in which all players always vote
for alternative a. If we expected this equilibrium strategy profile to be played,
it would be better to delegate the decision to only one agent for whom (this is
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also easy to verify) informative voting would be rational and the probability of
making a correct decision would be higher.
It has to be mentioned that voting games generally have multiple equilibria.
It was not the aim of Austen-Smith and Banks to identify all of them but to show
that informative voting by all agents may fail to be one of them.
As McLennan (1998) argues, this does not imply that the CJT fails to hold
when allowing for strategic voting. Instead, whenever there is a profile of votes
for which, given the voting rule k, the Jury Theorem holds there must also be
a profile of votes which achieves the same and which is a Nash equilibrium of
the voting game. This is due to the fact that the voting game played by agents
with homogeneous preferences constitutes a common interest game in which the
maximizer of the common utility function is also a best response for an agent
with the same objective function.
Given the voting rule, an equilibrium in which all players vote informatively
may not exist, and thus the efficient use of the available information may be
precluded. The information environment crucially affects the outcome of the
game induced by the voting rule. Therefore the appropriateness of the use of
a majority rule hinges upon the characteristics of the encountered situation. In
order to make use of all the information available to the electorate, i.e. to induce
all voters to vote informatively in equilibrium, the voting rule has to be adjusted
to the information environment.
2.4.2 Abstention
In contrast to previous models of voter turnout, which traditionally focus on the
costs and benefits of voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999b) present an
informational explanation for the existence of abstention and roll-off.
Their model considers the behavior of voters with heterogeneous preferences
in a voting game as described in Section 2.2.1. There are three types of voters:
two types of partisans, who, regardless of the state of the world, either prefer
alternative a or b, and independents, who prefer to select the option that matches
the true state of the world. The quality of signals differs across agents: While
some agents get a useless signal, others receive a perfect signal. These informed
agents are certain about the realization of the state variable, which affects the
utility of all voters.
22 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY ON COMMITTEE DECISION MAKING
Applying insights from the theory of auctions, the authors show that with
private information and common values less informed voters have an incentive to
abstain rather than to vote for either alternative even though voting is costless
and though all abstainers strictly prefer one alternative over the other. In fact,
the uninformed independent voters’ reason to cast a vote is to compensate for
the partisans. That is how they maximize the probability that the informed
voters decide the election. Having achieved this compensation, it is optimal to
delegate the decision via abstention to more informed voters.5 An implication of
Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s findings is that differences in information about the
different items on the ballot will make voters abstain on some issues and vote
on others. Hence, the authors also provide an explanation for the existence of
roll-off. Moreover, they go on to show that even though significant abstention
occurs in large elections, the outcome of the election is almost always the same
as with perfect information.6
2.4.3 Unanimity
With the minimization of criminal trials’ expected wrongful verdict costs being
a common social aim, unanimous jury verdicts were usually seen as a means to
reduce the probability of convicting an innocent while increasing the probability
of acquitting a guilty defendant (see e.g. Klaven and Zeisel (1966) or Adler
(1994)). Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998, 1999a) were the first to challenge this
basic intuition by taking into account strategic voting by jurors.
They consider a simple voting game as described in Section 2.2.1, in which
the alternatives a, b are to be interpreted as the acquittal or conviction of a
defendant and the states of the world A,B denote innocence and guilt of the
defendant respectively. Jurors are homogeneous with respect to their preferences,
characterized by a threshold of reasonable doubt θ ∈ (0, 1) as introduced in
Section 2.2.2. A juror prefers the defendant to be sentenced if he believes in
the defendant’s guilt with a probability higher than the threshold of reasonable
doubt.
Each juror behaves as if his vote was pivotal. Under the unanimity rule, this
is the case if all other jurors agree, which reveals additional information about the
5Coupe´ and Noury (2002) provide some empirical support for this ’swing voter’s curse’.
6Fey and Kim (2002) elaborate a correct proof of the first proposition, which does not require
any alteration of the paper’s results.
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true state. Such information may overwhelm the juror’s private assessment of the
case and cause him to vote with the others. As a result and in opposition to the
outcome under naive voting, even in a large jury, the probability of convicting
an innocent defendant must stay bounded away from zero. The information
aggregation potential of a unanimous voting mechanism is bounded.
The rationale causing this result is as follows: In any equilibrium of the voting
game in which the defendant is sometimes convicted and sometimes acquitted,
there must be a jury member who votes to acquit with positive probability, but
not for sure. For this to be equilibrium behavior it must be that the event
of being pivotal does not contain overwhelming evidence of guilt. Hence, the
other agents must vote to convict with high enough probability even if they
receive a signal indicating innocence. Next, note that in the case of a unanimity
requirement for conviction, the difference between the event that any voter i is
pivotal and the event of a conviction is just i’s single vote. Thus, the probability
that a convicted defendant is innocent as well as the probability of convicting an
innocent defendant are bounded away from zero independent of jury size.
The authors also draw comparisons between the unanimity rule and a wide
variety of special majority verdicts of a size less than unanimity, including sim-
ple majority rule. Given any voting rule requiring a fixed fraction of votes to
condemn, Feddersen and Pesendorfer are able to explicitly solve for the corre-
sponding unique symmetric, responsive Bayesian equilibrium. It turns out that
among those voting rules, unanimous jury verdicts may be least appropriate to
track the truth and result in higher probabilities of both kinds of error, i.e. con-
victing the innocent and acquitting the guilty. More precisely, a jury theorem
holds for all voting rules other than unanimity. While with an increasing size of
the jury, the probability of making a mistaken judgement goes to zero for all vot-
ing rules, except for unanimity, even the opposite may be the case for unanimity:
the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may even increase with the
size of the jury. Based on an example confronting different voting rules for a fixed
jury size, the authors finally conclude that in order to reduce the probability of
convicting an innocent defendant, any other super-majority rule with a large jury
is more appropriate than unanimity.
However, the authors admit that the degree to which strategic voting and
private information matter in actual juries is crucial for the ultimate outcome
and thus at last emerges to be an empirical question. Martinelli (2002b) explains
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the inferiority of unanimity by exploiting the analogy between unanimity rule
and a single prize auction. Specifically, in a very general setting, which include
continuous or discrete signals as special cases, a classical paper by Milgrom (1979)
obtains a necessary and sufficient condition for the winning bid to converge to
the true price of an object in a large auction. Martinelli shows that a similar
condition is necessary for full information aggregation in the limit, and that
under this condition the probability of convicting an innocent converges to zero.
The condition is that for every state such that some voter would like to acquit,
there must be signals that make the voter arbitrarily sure of being in that state
rather than in a state in which every voter would like to convict. With a discrete
number of signals and two states, the proposed condition cannot be satisfied if
there are no perfectly informative signals.
Coughlan (2000), on the other hand, argues in favor of unanimity voting by
extending the basic setting to include more realistic features of actual jury trials.
In particular, if a jury faces the risk of a mistrial, i.e. a certain number k of votes(
> n
2
)
is required for both, conviction as well as acquittal, unanimity voting
outperforms majority voting. The reason is that voters have a greater incentive
to vote informatively, because (i) the event of being pivotal does not shape beliefs
systematically into one direction and (ii) with an innocent (guilty) signal a voter
assesses the event to be pivotal for acquittal more likely than for conviction (vice
versa). Coughlan shows that given informative voting, the probability to acquit
the guilty as well as the probability to convict the innocent decrease in k under
mistrial voting.
2.5 Incentives for information acquisition
The analysis of strategic voting points out that committees need not yield better
results than individuals. However, this result is based upon fixed decision rules
which may no longer be appropriate in larger committees. If decision rules are
adjusted properly, then the Condorcet Jury Theorem still holds. Reasons for lim-
its on committee size can be found if one drops the rather harsh assumption that
information comes for free. Obviously, costly information acquisition in a com-
mittee constitutes a public good – it tends to be under-provided. Increasing the
number of committee members reduces the incentives for information acquisition,
because the probability that an individual member is pivotal declines.
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The formal analysis of these incentives yields different results. Papers in which
information acquisition is a discrete choice come to the conclusion that larger com-
mittees may yield poorer decisions and a lower social surplus. On the other hand,
when information acquisition is continuous, larger committees may still yield bet-
ter informed decision making in the aggregate despite lower individual incentives
for information acquisition. After considering these two versions concerning the
information investment technology and the conditions under which the optimal
outcome can be reinstalled, we turn to information acquisition incentives that
arise from the relation between the committee and a parent body with limited
authorization to revise the committee’s decision. Finally, we briefly discuss the
effect committee composition may have on the incentives to acquire information.
2.5.1 Information acquisition: continuous choice
Martinelli (2002a) shows that a large committee may anticipate the true state of
the world with probability close to one, although the committee members do not
know anything about the state of the world ex ante and information acquisition
is costly. This is true if the information cost function satisfies certain conditions.
The paper’s main point is that ”rational ignorance” on the part of committee
members is consistent with a well-informed committee in the sense of forecasting
the correct state of the world with a high probability.
The model framework Martinelli applies is as described in Section 2.2.3. When
an agent invests in information, he receives a signal whose accuracy depends on
the information investment. More precisely, if a voter buys x units of information,
he receives a signal which is correct with probability 1/2 + x. The information
investment costs follow a strictly convex, twice differentiable function.
Both states of the world are equally likely ex ante and payoffs for the imple-
mentation of the correct policy are symmetric for the independents. Moreover,
there are partisans among the voters, who, regardless of the state, either prefer
a or b. The ex ante probability of being a type a partisan is equal to being one
of type b.
The timing is as follows: First, nature selects the voters’ types which are
private information. Second, voters decide simultaneously about the quality of
their information. Information investments are not observable. Then, voters can
either vote for a or b. Majority wins.
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Partisans never acquire information and always vote for their preferred alter-
native. Because of the symmetric structure, there is no problem with insincere
voting among the moderate voters under majority rule (see Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1996).
If marginal information cost at zero information is positive and the number of
voters is large enough, there exists no equilibrium with information acquisition. If
marginal cost is zero at the point of zero information, there exists a unique equi-
librium in which all independent voters acquire the same amount of information,
in turn depending on its marginal benefit, and in which they vote sincerely.
If the second derivative of the information cost function is also zero at the point
of zero information, the probability of choosing the right alternative (in the sense
that alternative X is chosen if the state of the world is X) converges to one as the
number of voters goes to infinity. If it is positive, but bounded, the probability
of choosing the right alternative converges to some value between 1/2 and 1,
depending on the parameters. If the value of the second derivative converges to
infinity as information converges to zero, success probability converges to 1/2 as
the number of voters goes to infinity. Moreover, elections become very close as
the electorate grows.
The intuition for these results is the following: If information is cheap enough
(first and second derivative being zero at zero information), independent voters
will acquire some, because they are pivotal with positive probability. The exis-
tence of partisans and the imposed symmetry ensure that the probability of being
pivotal does not fall too fast as the number of voters grows. Although information
acquisition of the individual moderate voter goes to zero as the number of voters
goes to infinity, it does so slowly enough to allow for the effect of large numbers to
kick in. The poor information of the individual voter does also explain why elec-
tions are close in this setup. Moreover, this feeds back on information acquisition
incentives, since in close elections the probability of being pivotal is high.
2.5.2 Information acquisition: binary choice
For the case of binary information investment decisions, Mukhopadhaya (2003),
Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001) and Persico (2004) show that – due to a free rider
problem in information acquisition – a larger jury may make worse decisions.
This is well in line with Martinelli’s (2002) result since marginal information
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investment costs at the point of zero information are positive in the case of a
binary choice variable.
A nice and intuitive example is Mukhopadhaya’s (2003) two player game with
a perfect signal. Each player may purchase a perfect signal about the state of
the world. Both players share information. The game has two asymmetric pure
strategies Nash equilibria where one of the two jury members acquires the perfect
signal. The other one is a mixed strategies equilibrium in which both players
buy the signal with a positive probability. In the case with one single decision
maker, the decision maker always decides to buy the signal. Hence, in the mixed
strategies equilibrium the probability of making a correct decision is lower than
in the one decision maker case.
Mukhopadhaya’s game with an imperfect signal is as follows: First nature
chooses the true state of the world. Then each agent may decide to invest in the
costly signal. Next, all the jurors pool their information which is possible because
they have a common objective. In the vote they all agree on the decision that
has to be taken.
The game has a symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium. The author shows
that for extreme (high) values of the signal’s precision, one juror is more likely
to reach a correct decision than three jurors. The author provides an example
where the probability of making a correct decision is first increasing and then
monotonously decreasing in the number of jurors.
In a similar setting, Persico (2004) determines the optimal voting mechanism
consisting of the voting rule and the committee size. A voting mechanism has to
aggregate information efficiently as well as to provide proper incentives to acquire
information. The underlying questions are: Under which circumstances should
majority determine collective decisions, when is it better to rely on more stringent
measures of consensus? And how large should a group of decision makers be?
Persico designs the optimal voting mechanism by choosing the number of
committee members n and the plurality rule k needed to implement policy b.
The optimal mechanism maximizes agents’ expected utility from the collective
decision. Costs enter only insofar as a smaller committee is chosen only if this
does not decrease expected utility. To solve the induced game, Persico restricts
attention to pure and monotone strategies equilibria – more precisely, he is only
interested in the most efficient equilibrium in pure and monotone strategies. Vot-
ers are homogeneous and can aggregate information only through their votes,
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communication is considered to be impossible.
Plurality is determined a` la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), i.e. k is chosen
such that the maximum number of agents vote informatively in equilibrium. The
basic trade-off is that by enlarging the committee (combined with an adjustment
of the voting rule k), the decision becomes more accurate, but voters become less
pivotal such that their information acquisition incentive shrinks. If the committee
is too large, no one will acquire information since the probability of deciding the
final outcome is too low. Thus, there exists a bound on n.
There exists a bound on k, too: The optimal fraction of votes k/n needed
to implement policy b can never be greater than approximately the accuracy of
the signal. This is true irrespective of agents’ preferences, i.e. independent of
the agents’ threshold of reasonable doubt θ (see Section 2.2.2). This implies that
large pluralities (in the extreme unanimity) are optimal only if the information
available to committee members is sufficiently accurate.
As n grows, the optimal decision rule k converges to simple majority. The op-
timal number of committee members is non-increasing in information acquisition
cost and ceteris paribus larger if (i) the preference structure is more symmetric,
i.e. the threshold of reasonable doubt is closer to 1/2, (ii) the prior is more diffuse
and (iii) the signal is less accurate.
The above statement, that an increase in committee size decreases the incen-
tives to acquire information, is only one part of the story. The opposite is true
as long as the optimal plurality rule k/n converges to signal accuracy: Because
the optimal decision rule k itself moves with n (and at half speed of the growth
of n, as Persico shows), it creates an opposite-directed effect. An increase in n
associated with a minor increase in k makes the individual voter in fact more
pivotal than in the smaller committee, as long as k/n has not yet reached ap-
proximately signal quality. As k/n converges beyond signal quality to simple
majority, both effects operate in the same direction and information acquisition
incentives indeed decrease with further increases in committee size.
Persico shows that his results also hold for heterogeneous agents by considering
two possible types. If agents’ types are observable and preferences sufficiently
diverging, it is optimal to leave the decision to a group of only one type, using the
optimal rule that would be used if these agents were the only ones the mechanism
designer is interested in. There exists no voting rule which incorporates votes of
both types such that all types vote sincerely. If agents’ types are unobservable
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but the number of agents of each type is common knowledge, again the decision
rule of only one group is used, modified in a way such that the votes of the other
type are ”sterilized”, i.e. in equilibrium the other type votes in order to correct
the voting rule regardless of their signal and the type whose decision rule is used
votes sincerely.
The author admits that the restriction to pure strategies may be critical,
since allowing some agents playing mixed strategies might indeed lead to supe-
rior outcomes, because pure strategy players have stronger incentives to acquire
information. Moreover, the role of communication is entirely neglected.
2.5.3 Relation to the delegating authority
If there is a delegating authority, incentives to acquire information depend upon
the relation between the committee and the delegating authority. Gilligan and
Krehbiel (1987) argue that restricting the ability of the parent body to amend
committee proposals may enhance the informational role of committees. The
model of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) works as follows. There are two players,
the floor and the committee. A policy x has to be chosen, x is a real number.
The desired policy of the committee is larger than the floor’s desired policy, how-
ever the desired policy of both actors is affected in the same way by a shock.
The committee members may acquire costly information about this shock. The
committee reports a bill, then the floor makes a decision. Under the unrestricted
procedure the floor may pick any policy after obtaining the report, under the re-
stricted policy it may either accept the bill or stick to the status quo. Gilligan and
Krehbiel show that restrictions on the ability of the parent body to amend com-
mittee proposals may provide better incentives to acquire information and may
lead to an outcome which is better both for the parent body and the committee.
2.5.4 Committee composition and incentives
A recent literature (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, and Beniers and Swank, 2004)
studies the impact of the composition of committees on incentives for informa-
tion acquisition. Dewatripont and Tirole study a setup where a principal uses
monetary incentives to induce two agents to search for information of opposing
content. Beniers and Swank study a similar setup without monetary transfers.
In this setup, it may be useful to delegate information acquisition to two individ-
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uals with biased - and opposing - interests. This provides them with incentives
to acquire information. Delegation to individuals with unbiased preferences is
optimal when costs for information acquisition are low.
2.6 Conflicting interests
Different approaches have recently been developed to study the role of conflicting
interests in committees. In some jury models jurors care differently about wrong-
ful acceptance and wrongful rejection of a hypothesis, i.e. conflicting interests are
modeled in terms of differing thresholds of reasonable doubt as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. It may even be the case that committee members are not completely
aware of their own preferences. Cai (2001) proposes a model in which commit-
tee members learn their preferences by investing costly effort and in Gru¨ner and
Kiel (2004), there is a model in which committee members’ preferences are in-
terdependent but agents are only aware of their own private value component.
Finally, Li et al. (2001) have a model that allows for communication and shows
how the degree of conflicts affects the incentives to exaggerate reports about the
own private information and hence the efficiency of the committee’s decision.
2.6.1 Partially conflicting interests
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) analyze the performance of elections with
heterogeneous voters when there is uncertainty about a one-dimensional state
variable. Despite heterogeneity and a vanishing fraction of informatively voting
agents, large elections perform well. The authors show that the information en-
vironment is crucial in determining the effectiveness of elections as information
aggregation mechanisms.
The model is similar to the one in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), as
introduced in Section 2.4.3, except that the threshold of reasonable doubt is
heterogeneous across agents and constitutes an agent’s private information. We
briefly resume the setup:
A population of n voters has, by a given majority rule k/n, to decide between
two alternatives, a or b, e.g. in the jury interpretation acquittal or conviction of
the defendant. Alternative b is elected if it receives at least a fraction k/n of the
votes. Each voter’s payoff depends on his specific preference type (the threshold
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of reasonable doubt), the true state of nature (innocence or guilt) and the chosen
alternative. Preference types are drawn independently from a commonly known
distribution. Each voter knows his own preference type but does not know the
other voters’ types. Every voter receives a private signal which is correlated with
the true state of nature. Jurors vote strategically, i.e. they condition their vote on
the event of being pivotal, taking into account the other agents’ strategies. They
are not allowed to communicate before voting. Timing is as follows: Nature
draws the agents’ types according to a commonly known distribution and the
state of the world according to the commonly known prior. Agents learn their
type and their private signal, and vote. In order to solve the game, the authors
restrict attention to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which players do not
use weakly dominated strategies.
In equilibrium, preference types can be divided into three groups: those who
always vote for either alternative and those who vote informatively, i.e. condition
their vote on their private signal.
As the size of the electorate goes to infinity, the fraction of players who con-
dition their votes on their private information goes to zero. Nevertheless, voting
fully aggregates information in the sense that with probability close to one the
alternative is elected that would have been chosen if all private information was
common knowledge (the k/n-median’s preferred outcome). Moreover, with prob-
ability close to one, in equilibrium the winning alternative receives a fraction of
votes close to the fraction required to win.
The intuition for the results is the following: Voters condition their voting
strategy on the event of being pivotal. This implies that beliefs about the state
of nature concentrate on the state in which, given the equilibrium strategy profile,
it is most likely that alternative b receives a fraction k/n of votes. As the voting
population grows to infinity, this evidence becomes very strong and the fraction
of voters for whom the own signal is decisive goes to zero. Voters behave as if
they for sure were in the predicted state. Voters with low thresholds of doubt
are very concerned about acquitting the guilty. The information they can infer
out of their signal and the event of being pivotal does not convince them of the
defendant’s innocence beyond their threshold of doubt, so they vote to convict
him. A similar argument holds for voters with high thresholds. They are so
concerned about convicting the innocent, that equilibrium information does not
convince them of the defendant’s guilt. Medium types are convinced by their
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signal and use it for their decision. Although there is only a vanishing fraction
of voters who condition their votes on information, the number of them goes to
infinity. Since these are the voters who determine the outcome of the election,
the election performs well in the limit.
Gerardi (2000) complements Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1997) analysis by
comparing unanimous and non-unanimous voting rules in the same model setup.
Moreover, his analysis complements the results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998) by taking preference heterogeneity into account. He shows that any non-
unanimous decision rule is asymptotically efficient. In large committees, the
unanimous rule almost never leads to the decision for which unanimity is required.
A symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for any decision rule and any
jury size. Under unanimity, the probability that an innocent is convicted con-
verges to zero as the jury size grows to infinity, but the probability to acquit
the guilty converges to one. Thus, protecting the innocent comes at the prize
of acquitting the guilty. Moreover, the probability that a convicted defendant
is innocent converges to zero. Under any non-unanimous rule, which is defined
as a fraction k/n of voters required to convict the defendant, the probability to
convict the innocent as well as the probability to acquit the guilty converge to
zero.
Gerardi does not propose an optimal voting mechanism, his main points are
that unanimity is not optimal in large juries, whereas non-unanimous rules are
asymptotically efficient. The first result is not surprising, since the existence of
a single voter with sufficiently extreme preferences suffices to free the defendant.
As the jury size converges to infinity, the existence of such a voter will be very
likely, even though evidence of guilt, on its part inferred out of being pivotal,
becomes stronger.
On the other hand, non-unanimous rules, characterized by a fraction of votes
required to convict the defendant, have different asymptotic properties. Take
any super-majority rule. As the jury size becomes larger, the number of acquit-
votes needed to acquit the defendant grows and, at the same time, the interval of
types always voting to acquit shrinks, since the evidence of the defendant’s guilt
becomes stronger. So, the asymptotic efficiency of the non-unanimous rule is not
surprising either.
To sum up, Gerardi’s results strengthen the findings of Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1998, 1999a) about the inefficiency of unanimity.
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2.6.2 Preference uncertainty and committee size
Taking costly information acquisition into account, Cai (2001) develops a model
of committee size when agents are uncertain about the state of the world and in
addition about their own policy preferences. The state of the world is a point
on the real line on which the payoff from the implemented policy (again a point
on the real line) depends. When exerting nonverifiable effort, an agent learns his
policy preferences and receives a noisy signal about the state of the world. Thus,
conflicting interests among committee members arise from information acquisition
in this model.
N agents are selected into a committee by a principal who represents society’s
preferences in the sense that his policy preferences coincide with an uninformed
agent’s expected preferences. The committee members’ task is to acquire costly
information and to report it to the principal who uses it to update his beliefs
about the state of the world and then decides upon the policy variable. Nei-
ther information acquisition decisions nor signals are observable. Updated beliefs
and incentive compatibility conditions for committee members constitute the ele-
ments for a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this multiple stage incomplete
information game for a given committee size N .
Since information is soft and informed committee members know their pol-
icy preference which may differ from the principal’s, there exist incentives for
strategic information manipulation.
The game is solved by backward induction. First, the author characterizes a
reporting equilibrium of the information aggregation stage. Attention is restricted
to strictly monotonic (reversible) reporting strategies. In this equilibrium, com-
mittee members convey all their information (except their policy preferences)
to the principal. Committee members with no policy biases report truthfully,
and those with policy biases exaggerate by a multiple of their policy preference.
Uninformed committee members prefer not to submit any information at all, be-
cause their expected policy preferences coincide with the principal’s and a signal
announcement would only create additional noise.
The principal makes his decision as the (to exaggeration adjusted) mean of
all reports. The author shows that this equilibrium is essentially the unique
equilibrium consisting of reversible reporting strategies, essentially unique in the
sense that all equilibria in fully reversible strategies have identical outcomes.
Moreover, he proves that it is the most efficient among all equilibria. Given this
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reporting equilibrium, the committee members’ incentives to gather information
and the optimal committee size are studied.
Information acquisition incentives limit the size of the committee. The opti-
mal number of committee members is lower than the first best, i.e. if no incentive
problems would exist and any expected gain from additional information is traded
off against participation costs. Heterogeneity of preferences plays the crucial role:
If preferences were identical among all agents and information acquisition costs
did not exceed participation costs, the first best would be attainable since inter-
ests would be completely aligned.
Interestingly, information acquisition incentives and therewith committee size
may increase in preference heterogeneity. Benefits from information acquisition
contain two elements: firstly, the policy becomes more informative and secondly,
the agent learns his policy preferences and gets the chance to manipulate the
policy in his own favor. Information acquisition serves as an insurance facing
preference uncertainty. When information acquisition costs are high, such that
the committee size is limited by members’ shirking tendency, an increase in pref-
erence heterogeneity raises the value of this insurance and mitigates the shirking
problem.
2.6.3 Decision rules with interdependent preferences
Gru¨ner and Kiel (2004) analyze collective decision problems in which individual
bliss points are correlated but not identical. The authors compare the perfor-
mance of two specific decision mechanisms as regards different degrees of corre-
lation.
All agents obtain private information about their most desired policy. How-
ever, the individually preferred decision of a group member does not only depend
on his own private information but also on the other group members’ private in-
formation. The decision problem is characterized by a parameter which measures
the extent to which private information affects all individuals. This specifica-
tion includes the private values case for the lower bound of the interdependency
parameter and the common values case for its upper bound.
Participation in the decision is not voluntary and monetary transfers are ex-
cluded a priori. Instead, the mechanisms maps the profile of individual announce-
ments into the collective decision. Attention is restricted to two specific decision
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mechanisms, the median and the mean mechanism. The main difference between
these two mechanisms is how they weight individual announcements of private
information. Under the median mechanism changes in extreme positions are dis-
regarded, since the median alone determines the final decision. On the contrary,
the nature of the mean mechanism is to take all available information into ac-
count. Therefore, under the mean mechanism extreme positions influence the
decision.
The main result of this paper is the identification of two symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibria of the respective games. The performance of the mechanisms
depends upon the extent to which spill-over effects affect the economy. With
weak interdependencies, the median mechanism dominates the mean mechanism,
whereas with strong interdependencies it is better to use the average as decision
mechanism.
The reason is that for weak interdependencies the equilibrium strategy un-
der the median mechanism implies announcement behavior close to truth-telling
whereas the equilibrium strategy under the mean mechanism leads to strong ex-
aggeration of private information. Therefore, average taking is outperformed by
ignoring some of the information. Since the degree to which interdependencies
influence untruthful announcement behavior is stronger under the mean mech-
anism, this intuition holds for a wide range of interdependencies, only for very
high degrees it is reversed.
There are two main points that remain unconsidered in this paper. First, the
authors abstract from individual rationality considerations. It should be noted
that even individuals who do not participate in the mechanism would be affected
by the collective decision. Allowing for voluntary participation would require
to take into account endogenous participation constraints. Another question is
the design of an optimal mechanism for the class of collective decision problems
studied.
2.6.4 Partially conflicting interests and information
sharing
Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) analyze committee decisions when members have par-
tially conflicting interests and possess private information. The decision variable
is binary and private information is a continuous variable. Interests are partially
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conflicting in the sense that there is an area of disagreement for some values of
information, i.e. an area for which one voter prefers alternative a but the other
one prefers b. Preferences are common knowledge. The paper’s main result is that
information cannot be fully shared and voting procedures arise as the equilibrium
method of information aggregation.
Since information is private, committee decisions are made on the basis of
the members’ reports of their private data. The authors show that under these
circumstances, information cannot be fully shared among committee members in
the sense that it is not possible to exactly deduce private signals from reports.
Efficient (or full) sharing requires that the committee decision responds to small
changes in any members’ data. This property fails in any Bayesian equilibrium of
any decision-making procedure. Incentive compatibility implies that continuous
data observed by each member are partitioned and transformed into rank order
categories. In equilibrium, personal thresholds are chosen to undo the presumed
biases of other committee members, but not by enough to completely nullify the
information of the others. The coarsening of information balances incentives to
exaggerate information and incentives to share information. Nevertheless, incen-
tives for manipulation and counter-manipulation generate a larger area of dis-
agreement among committee members than is implied by their inherent conflicts
in preferences.
It is shown that the greater the latent consensus among members, the greater
are the opportunities for presenting private data in finer categories. On the other
hand, conflicting interests among committee members impose an upper bound on
how fine information partitions can be. Indeed, the quality of committee decisions
improves with the degree of consensus.
The authors demonstrate that delegation to one single member is Pareto dom-
inated by committee decision-making. When the committee rule is chosen appro-
priately, gains from sharing information outweigh distortions from information
manipulation regardless of the extent of conflicts in the committee. The reason is
that committee members are more cautious when casting the decisive vote than
if they were to make the decision alone in order to take advantage of the other
members’ data. Moreover, if one member is known to have data of higher quality,
the others cast their decisive votes less frequently. The coarsening of information
implies that the committee decision rule is ex post inefficient.7
7Another model in which voters receive signals from a continuous distribution, but do not
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2.7 Communication
Most of the models we have discussed so far rely upon Condorcet’s original as-
sumption that individuals in a committee do not communicate before they cast
their votes. One might argue that this whole branch of literature bears use-
less results when extensive discussion and exchange of information precedes the
votes, hence reducing incentives for strategic voting a` la Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996). Indeed, in models with homogeneous preferences it is the restriction of
the information transmission via votes which causes the inefficient usage of the in-
formation. However, as we have seen in the model of Li, Rosen and Suen (2001),
jury members might only make very limited use of the possibility of informa-
tion transmission when conflicts of interest are present. Hence, studying pre-vote
communication seems a worthwhile task.
Recent theoretical work indeed proves that pre-vote communication gives rise
to a new kind of equilibrium, since first-stage mutual pre-vote revelation of im-
pressions about the true state of the world replaces the need for committee mem-
bers to augment private information by deducing other members’ information
from their voting behavior. Then, in the voting stage, all voters - provided the
absence of preference heterogeneity - agree on the preferred alternative: the one
that matches the state of the world with highest probability given the signal
vector. This voting behavior in the second stage is obviously an equilibrium.
Moreover, given the second stage voting behavior and given truthful revelation,
it is optimal to reveal the own information truthfully in the first stage.
In this section, we review the (small) literature on pre-vote communication in
collective decision making, resulting in significant alterations of the results of pre-
viously discussed committee voting models. After having presented how Gerardi
and Yariv (2003a) derive the irrelevance of voting rules for the equilibrium out-
come ensued from pre-vote communication and costless information, we further
follow them to demonstrate the need for a limited optimal committee size when
information becomes costly (Gerardi and Yariv, 2003b). Moreover, Doraszelski
et al. (2003) show that pre-vote exchange of views improves the decision in the
presence of conflicting interests.
have the option to communicate before voting, was developed by Duggan and Martinelli (2001).
They show that in this setting the probability of making a wrong decision converges to zero as
the jury size goes to infinity for every voting rule other than unanimity rule.
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2.7.1 Irrelevance of voting rules
Gerardi and Yariv (2003a) consider a voting game where committee members may
communicate before they cast their votes. The role of communication is studied
in a setup where individuals obtain their information without investing effort,
as described in Section 2.2.4. In the first stage, each individual obtains a signal
which is his private information. His utility is a function of the collective action
– which may again take two values – and of the vector of signals. Preferences
are homogeneous. In the second stage, the cheap talk stage, individuals may
communicate. In the third stage, individuals cast their votes. The voting rule
maps the vector of votes into the set of outcomes. The voting rule is characterized
by the number of votes k required to implement a certain decision. The main
result is that with cheap talk, the set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of
the voting rule. As we have seen above, this is not the case in models without
cheap talk.
2.7.2 Imperfect aggregation and incentives
Gerardi and Yariv (2003b) introduce a stage of costly information acquisition.
Each individual may purchase a signal which is correlated with the true state of
the world. Moreover, in this setup they are interested in the optimal information
aggregation mechanism. Thus, the game contains three stages. In the first stage,
the designer chooses an extended mechanism which consists of the size of the com-
mittee, the voting rule and a rule which specifies how the players can exchange
messages before voting. In the second stage, the agents observe the mechanism
and decide whether to purchase the signal. These choices are made simultane-
ously. In the third stage, members of the committee communicate according to
the pre-specified rules and vote.
The main results are the following. First, the authors show that the optimal
committee is of bounded size – as before. Second, they show that imperfect
aggregation of the available information may yield a higher overall expected utility
level than perfect aggregation. The reason is that imperfect aggregation induces
more players to acquire information. The positive incentive effect may dominate
the negative effect of wasting some information.
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2.7.3 Communication and conflicting interests
Doraszelski et al. (2003) also analyze a voting game which includes a communi-
cation stage prior to voting. They consider a two person committee which has
to decide whether to change the status quo or not. The status quo is optimal in
one state of the world, changing it in the other one. Agents differ with respect to
their threshold of reasonable doubt. Hence, there are conflicting interests in the
committee. Preferences are the agents’ private information.
The game proceeds as follows. Nature draws the agents’ types according to a
commonly known distribution. Agents receive a private signal which is correlated
with the true state. In the one sender version of the game, one of the agents sends
a message to the other one, in the two sender game both agents simultaneously
send messages to each other. Both agents vote simultaneously and the collective
decision is implemented. The status quo is maintained unless both vote in favor
of changing it.
The authors look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with the additional require-
ment that agents do not use weakly dominated strategies. In order to explore the
interaction of communication and voting, they restrict attention to responsive
robust cutoff equilibria, i.e. equilibrium strategies which imply that the receiver
and the sender condition their votes on their types, their signals and the sender’s
message. The authors provide a complete characterization of these equilibria and
show that communication is beneficial. The main purpose of communication is to
serve as a ”double-check”: If a player’s information conflicts with his preferences,
he uses the submitted information of the other player to confirm his own.
In a one sender version of the game in which agents possess information of
different quality, the identity of the sender is irrelevant. The game in which
the better-informed agent is the sender is outcome-equivalent to the game in
which he is the receiver. After observing the signal the better-informed sender
conditions the message decision on an event that has the same probability as the
event on which the better-informed receiver conditions the voting decision after
observing the message and the signal. The authors conclude that communication
and voting are perfect substitutes in the sense that information not transmitted
in the communication phase will be aggregated in the voting stage.
The authors compute ex ante expected utilities for the pure voting game, the
one sender and the two sender game for a uniform type distribution. Agents’ ex
ante utility is larger with two senders than with one sender. And it is larger with
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one sender than with no sender. However, this is due to decreasing returns to
scale.
Since adding communication complicates the analysis considerably, the au-
thors concentrate on a framework with two players, two states and two signals.
So, there is scope for future research to generalize this setup. For example, adding
players would allow to compare different voting rules.
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) analyze the effects of the order of statements
on the effectiveness of information transmission when speakers care about their
reputation of expertise, but not about the decision. They show that sequential
statements may lead to herding behavior and that expected decision quality may
decrease when information quality of a committee member increases. However,
the sequential statement mechanism can outperform simultaneous announcing if
the prior is sufficiently unbalanced.
2.8 Experimental results
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) provide a first experimental study of
jury decision making. The experimental setup is identical to the one described in
models of voting under imperfect information such as the ones by Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) or Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998, 1999a). Individuals were
informed about the existence of a true state of nature and they were given a signal
with known stochastic properties. This setup is used to test for the presence of
strategic voting. It turns out that individuals indeed vote strategically.
In addition, the authors conducted a so-called straw poll experiment. In this
experiment, individuals were asked for the simultaneous announcement of a signal
after which the vote takes place. As argued in Section 2.7, there is an equilibrium
of this game where all individuals announce their signal correctly in the first round
and then cast identical votes in the second round. It turned out that over 90 %
of the individuals revealed their signal in the first round. In the second round,
about 84 % or more voters voted in a way consistent with the outcome of the
first round. Voting with a straw poll improves results in one respect: In the
experiment, the probability of one type of error was reduced while the other was
not affected.
There are other results in the paper by Guarnaschelli et al. which are at
odds with theoretical predictions. For example, inconsistent with the theoretical
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findings of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), in an experiment with unanimity
rule, the probability of convicting an innocent defendant declines with jury size.
The authors also find that voting behavior might be consistent with jury
members playing a mixed strategies equilibrium. Actually, the Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) game has mixed strategies equilibria. Whereas some individuals
vote sincerely, others always vote to convict and others mix. It should be noted
that in this experiment payoffs from correct predictions and from incorrect ones
are the same for all individuals. Individuals received 50 US cents if the group
decision was correct and five cents if it was incorrect.
Blinder and Morgan (2000) present experimental research on the quality of
group decision making. The setup of their basic experiment is the following:
Individuals (or groups of individuals) are confronted with the result of a binary
lottery. The lottery has an initial probability of 50 % for both possible states.
The individuals were told that the probabilities would change at some randomly
selected point of time during the experiment. The change would either go up to
70 % or down to 30 % for each of the events. The individuals were asked for
a guess of the point of time when the random process was changed. They were
punished for a decision that has been made too late and they received a reward
for a decision that was correct.
Group members were presented exactly the same information as an individual
decision maker: the outcome of the random draw. The first hypothesis that has
been tested was that groups make decisions more slowly than single individu-
als. However, the hypothesis that the decision takes as much time in a group
as individual decision making could not be rejected. The hypothesis that groups
outperform individuals was instead strongly supported by the experimental data.
The third hypothesis concerned the speed of group decisions with different deci-
sion rules. The authors compared majority and unanimity rule. It turned out
that unanimity rule worked faster than majority rule. Moreover, under majority
rule individuals tended to reach unanimous agreements.
The experimental results by Blinder and Morgan are very useful because they
show that a group may indeed perform better than individuals in analyzing the
same information set (the series of random draws). The fact that decisions do not
seem to take more time when a group decides under unanimity rule is somewhat
surprising. Further theoretical and experimental research on the issue of timing
might help to clarify this issue.
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2.9 Summary of the theoretical results
Actually, it is needless to say that the applicability of the theoretical results to
the real world depends on the specific features of the encountered situation. As
one will realistically expect to face e.g. a combination of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem’s underlying assumptions to be violated to various degrees or further
complications, the results derived in this literature can only serve as a rough, but
sound guideline.
Nevertheless, the review of this literature allows drawing some general con-
clusions on the optimal organization of committees. These insights will guide
our discussion of actual committee decision making concerning the optimal size,
composition and decision rule.
2.9.1 How large should a committee be?
The optimal size of a committee depends upon several issues. First, it plays an
important role whether individual information is exogenous or endogenous. In
Condorcet’s ideal world information is exogenous, i.e. individuals do not need
to invest costly effort in order to obtain information. Moreover, all agents share
a common objective. In such a setup, larger committees always lead to better
results.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) confirm this result when the majority rule is
adjusted properly to the information environment. Insincere voting is not a prob-
lem in such situations and information is aggregated efficiently. As McLennan
(1998) shows, if a ”naive” version of the CJT in this setup holds, there always
exists an equilibrium of the voting game played by strategically acting agents
with the same properties. However, efficient information aggregation requires to
adopt the decision rule a` la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
When information acquisition is costly, the optimal committee size is finite.
This result is derived in Mukhopadhaya (2003), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001),
and Persico (2004). According to Persico (2004), the optimal number of commit-
tee members is non-increasing in information acquisition costs and ceteris paribus
larger if (i) the threshold of reasonable doubt is closer to 1/2, (ii) the prior is more
diffuse, and (iii) the signals are less accurate.
In a setup with conflicting interests, Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) demonstrate
that delegation to one single member is Pareto dominated by committee decision-
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making. When the committee rule is chosen appropriately, gains from sharing
information outweigh distortions from information manipulation regardless of the
extent of conflicts in the committee.
According to Cai (2001), when information acquisition is costly and unob-
servable and agents may become aware of conflicting preferences, the optimal
committee size is always smaller than in the absence of incentive problems. The
reason is that noisy reports by committee members with policy biases are not as
informative as if there were no incentives to distort information.
2.9.2 Who should be in a committee?
According to Li, Rosen and Suen (2001), committee decisions are better the
more similar the committee members’ preferences. With increasing conflicts of
interest, the area of disagreement becomes larger. This, in turn, leads to stronger
incentives for strategic manipulation of private information and thus to a decrease
in expected decision quality.
Contrary to this result, Cai (2001) shows that – once there are conflicting
interests among committee members – total social surplus may increase in prefer-
ence heterogeneity. This can happen when moral hazard problems in information
gathering severely limit the feasible committee size. Recall that information ac-
quisition has two components in Cai’s model: firstly, agents receive a signal about
the state of the world and secondly, they become aware of their own preferences.
In this model, two opposing effects are present: Heterogeneity in preferences has
a direct negative effect on total social surplus, because it increases the noisiness
of information on which the collective decision is based. This effect is comparable
to the one in Li, Rosen and Suen (2001). On the other hand, heterogeneity here
provides additional incentives to gather information, since agents can manipulate
policy in their ideal way. Thus, when the positive participation effect dominates
the negative noisiness effect, increasing heterogeneity can increase total social
surplus.
With regard to the quality of signals, committee decisions improve with the
quality of individual information. If one committee member has access to data of
higher quality the other in the setting used by Li, Rosen and Suen (2001), then
the other member takes advantage of the improved information by changing his
voting threshold in order to defer the decision to the informed member. Thus,
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better-informed members are decisive more often. When communication takes
place, it is irrelevant whether it is the sender or the receiver of information who
has data of higher quality (Doraszelski et al. (2003)).
2.9.3 What is the optimal decision rule?
This survey of the game-theoretic literature on committee decision making has
made clear that the decision rule has to be adapted to the specific problem at
hand. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) have shown that in order to make effi-
cient use of the available information, the majority rule has to be adjusted to
the distribution of signals and the initial prior distribution of states of the world.
However, as the number of jury members grows, the optimal decision rule con-
verges to simple majority (see Persico, 2004).
According to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Gerardi (2000), unanimity
and the absence of communication lead to biased and socially undesired decisions
in large committees. If voters’ preferences are homogeneous, the probability to
convict an innocent stays bounded away from zero independently of jury size.
When jurors differ with respect to their thresholds of reasonable doubt, the prob-
ability that an innocent is convicted with a unanimous verdict converges to zero
as jury size grows to infinity, but the probability to acquit the guilty converges
to one. So, protecting the innocent comes at the prize of acquitting the guilty.
Under any non-unanimous rule, the probability to convict the innocent as well
as the probability to acquit the guilty converge to zero.
The introduction of pre-vote communication among committee members al-
ters some of these results. Gerardi and Yariv (2003a) show that if pre-vote com-
munication is introduced into the basic model (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4), the
voting rule becomes unimportant. Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani (2003)
show that even if agents have partially conflicting interests, voting outcomes im-
prove when pre-vote communication is allowed. Moreover, it is irrelevant if it is
the better or the worse informed agent who sends a message prior to voting. The
authors conclude that pre-vote communication and voting are perfect substitutes
in the sense that the information not transmitted in the communication phase
will be aggregated in the voting stage.
Gerardi and Yariv (2003b) show that imperfect aggregation of the available
information may yield a higher overall expected utility level than perfect ag-
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gregation. The reason is that imperfect aggregation induces more players to
acquire information. The positive effect of this may dominate the negative effect
of wasting some information. However, imperfect aggregation mechanisms face a
time-consistency problem. At the stage when the decision is to be made, commit-
tee members may agree not to stick to the decision procedure and to aggregate
information efficiently. The use of imperfect mechanisms necessitates the ability
to stick to the procedure.
Committee design has also been studied without paying attention the role of
strategic voting, i.e. under the assumption that agents to vote sincerely. In some
situations the optimal decision rule induces a behavior where everybody indeed
votes sincerely. In those cases results from the literature on optimal decision rules
under sincere voting also become relevant in settings where individuals have the
option to vote insincerely. Major contributions on the optimal institutional design
under sincere voting are Sah and Stiglitz (1988) Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997),
Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2001), and Koh (1994, 2004a,b).
Sah and Stiglitz (1988) analyze different majority rules in a setting with sym-
metric abilities of committee members to identify the true state of the world.
Moreover, they discuss the role of sequential voting in what they call a hierarchy.
In such a hierarchy a project is accepted only if it is accepted on all hierarchy lay-
ers. Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) have generalized their analysis by admitting
different abilities, different payoffs from type 1, and type 2 errors, different pri-
ors, and state-dependent decision skills. They derive a general voting rule which
weights votes according to these parameters. Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2001)
provide a further generalization with respect to the choice among more than
two alternatives. In a similar setting Koh (2004a) studies the optimal amount
of information acquired when information acquisition is costly. Koh (1994) ana-
lyzes optimal decision rules with more than two possible realizations of individual
signals. These rules may be interpreted as evaluation standards.
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Chapter 3
Information Aggregation and
Preference Heterogeneity in
Committees
3.1 Introduction
Decision-making entities are often comprised of agents who represent different
interests. The most obvious example of such a decision-making institution is the
government in a representative democracy. If the consequences of the decision
are uncertain, the quality of the decision benefits from exchanging information
prior to making a choice. However, in case committee members’ interests are not
completely aligned, we cannot take information exchange for granted. Should we
worry about preference heterogeneity interfering with information aggregation?
This is the question the chapter is concerned with.
The idea that committee members pool private information relevant for the
decision, and therewith make use of a broader information base than a single
decision maker could access, dates back at least to Condorcet (1785). The ad-
vantage of involving a higher number of informed agents in the decision process
is intuitive if the committee indeed makes use of the individual members’ pri-
vate information. However, if committee members’ interests are not completely
aligned, this cannot be taken for granted.
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A recent game-theoretic literature has shown that we cannot take efficient
information aggregation for granted even if preferences are perfectly aligned (e.g.
Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; for a survey see Chapter 2). The reason is that
the individual voter cares only about his vote when it is pivotal. Obviously, there
exist equilibria in which no single vote ever affects the outcome and voters do not
use their information. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) show (in a voting setting
without communication) that the exploitation of all available information is gen-
erally not possible in equilibrium. But Condorcet’s jury theorem may still apply
to strategically acting agents with completely aligned preferences (McLennan,
1998), since they play a common interest game.
Conflicting interests among committee members may limit their ability to
pool their information efficiently. When preferences are heterogeneous, it is not
straightforward to decide how decision quality should be measured. One such
measure used in the literature (e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, 1998; Ger-
ardi 2000) is the extent of information aggregation, i.e. the probability with
which the collective decision would be the same if all the information was com-
mon knowledge. In this paper, we will also use this benchmark. Full information
aggregation is desirable if committee members agree on which decision to make if
the state of the world is known. Then, preferences are heterogeneous in the sense
that voters differ with respect to their ’thresholds of doubt’, i.e. with respect to
how convinced a voter must be that a certain alternative is the correct choice in
order to support that alternative.
In voting games without communication, full information aggregation requires
that private information is transmitted via individual votes. If preferences are too
heterogeneous, then full information aggregation via majority voting is impossi-
ble because beliefs concentrate around the threshold of doubt of the politically
decisive voter, the median preference type. Voters whose thresholds are too far
away from the median do not condition their votes on information (see Feddersen
and Pesendorfer 1997).
On the other hand, committee members – at least in small committees – gen-
erally have access to another instrument to pool their information other than
individual votes: they may exchange views prior to making a decision. In this
regard, the information aggregation potential of committees is still not well un-
derstood. Most papers restrict attention to voting and neglect the role of com-
munication within the committee. Exceptions are Coughlan (2000), Doraszelski
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et al. (2003), Gerardi and Yariv (2003a, b), and Austen-Smith and Feddersen
(2002). Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi and Yariv (2003b) deal with committees
composed of agents with homogeneous preferences for which complete informa-
tion aggregation is possible because agents share a common goal.
The papers by Doraszelski et al. (2003) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen
(2002) indicate that in committees with heterogeneous preferences, information
aggregation is severely limited even if pre-vote communication is allowed. In these
papers, information is soft and preferences are assumed to be private information.
In such a setting, agents with extreme preferences always make statements which
favor their preferred decision. Hence, in equilibrium, the information content of
a statement is limited. Austen-Smith (1990a,b) studies information transmis-
sion in an agenda-setting game where preferences are common knowledge and
information is soft. Information transmission is possible only if preferences are
sufficiently aligned.
Chwe (1999), Persico (2004), Gerardi et al. (2005), and Chwe (2006) propose
information eliciting by means of distorting the decision or manipulating agents’
payoffs via a bet on the state of the world. In this chapter, we are not interested
in optimal mechanisms. Instead, we want to study a widely used one: discussions
followed by majority voting. We identify conditions for the existence of equilibria
in which information is fully aggregated, i.e in which the decision is the same as
if all signals were common knowledge.
The papers discussed above share the common finding that full information
aggregation is impossible if preferences in the committee are too heterogeneous.
One conclusion one might be tempted to draw from this result is that a small
group of decision makers with aligned interests can make better decisions than a
larger group of decision makers with conflicting interests. This conclusion would
imply that a representative democracy might be an inferior decision-making insti-
tution. The present chapter suggests that this view on representative democracies
is too pessimistic. We show that full information aggregation can be possible in
spite of preference heterogeneity.
We follow the existing literature and model the decision procedure as a delib-
erating process followed by a voting phase, but we study a different information
environment. We assume that the decision-relevant private information is verifi-
able. That is, committee members are assumed to be aware of facts which can
be proven. This assumption corresponds well to committees whose members are
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experts on the issue. An example would be a board of examiners who have to
propose a candidate for a grant. Decision-relevant facts could for instance be
the candidate’s performance in individual examiners’ courses which is verifiable,
but private information.1 We provide more examples for our setting in the next
section. Transmission of verifiable information has been studied e.g. in Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), where an informed
party or several informed parties try to influence a decision maker by revealing
information. In contrast to these papers, informed parties participate in the de-
cision process. Moreover, their preferred decision may also depend on the other
agents’ information. One could presume that players are able to force each other
to reveal verifiable information. In our model, there is no means for players to
affect each other’s payoffs except for the decision they collectively make.
In the basic model, we assume that preferences are common knowledge. This
assumption is well in accordance with situations in which decision makers are
elected in order to represent different interests (like in a representative democ-
racy), or with situations in which members are sent into the committee as a rep-
resentative of an affected group (like in hiring committees). Our analysis provides
a more optimistic view on the information aggregation potential of heterogeneous
committees than previous work does. We show that an equilibrium exists in which
information is perfectly aggregated. This is not the case in the games studied by
Doraszelski et al. (2003) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002). The reason
is that in our set-up, committee members may be able to perfectly deduce the
information of a voter who does not reveal it voluntarily. By not communicating
his private information, a voter reveals that he possesses information he does
not want to reveal. This contains exactly the same information as revealing the
information itself. If information is soft (see also Austen-Smith (1990a,b)) the
option to report false information destroys the opportunity to credibly transmit
this information if it is indeed the truth.
Private information concerning preferences and soft information concerning
the quality of the decision are good assumptions for novel and rare decision sit-
uations, whereas the approach in our basic model is well in accordance with
1It is likely that in reality, there is soft information on top of that. In this paper, we deal only
with the aggregation of hard information. As soft information communication games always
have babbling equilibria, we could argue that if there was soft information which somebody
tried to communicate, nobody would listen.
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committees consisting of experts who know each other, or whose interests can be
inferred from their role in the committee. Examples are representative govern-
ments, hiring committees, or boards of directors.
We extent our basic model into two directions and derive conditions for full in-
formation aggregation in each extended set-up. First, we allow for the possibility
that some agents are not endowed with decision-relevant information. Moreover,
we examine an environment in which preferences are private information. Last,
we combine these two modifications and consider a framework in which prefer-
ences are private information and in which there is the possibility that agents are
not endowed with information.
In the modified versions of the model, full information aggregation is possible
only if the preference parameter range is restricted. If committee members are
not endowed with information with certainty, full information revelation in the
communication stage is possible if and only if interests are completely aligned.
The reason is that committee members with information which is unfavorable
for their favorite decision can pretend to have no information. Strongly biased
committee members prefer to conceal such information. However, we can show
that there exists an equilibrium in which every committee member reveals at
least one type of information, and each type of information is revealed by more
than half of the committee members (if they possess such information) for cases
in which the probability of receiving information is high enough.
If preferences are private information, there exists an equilibrium in which in-
formation is completely revealed if preference diversity is not too extreme. Com-
mittee members are uncertain about the majority’s preferred alternative. As it
is possible that the majority’s interests are aligned with their own, committee
members have an incentive to provide information. This is supported by a belief
system with the property that information revelation does not harm in cases in
which the majority’s preferred decision deviates from one’s own. Uncertainty
about the majority’s preferences may provide incentives for information revela-
tion if committee members do not possess information with certainty. There exist
equilibria with full information revelation for preference parameter constellations
for which this is not the case if preferences are common knowledge.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section the model setup is
presented. We derive the full information aggregation result of the basic model
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 the extensions to the basic model are analyzed and
52 CHAPTER 3. PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY
conditions are derived under which full information aggregation is possible. In
the final section we conclude and outline possible directions for future research.
3.2 The basic model
A collective decision x ∈ {a, b} is made by majority voting without abstentions in
a committee consisting of n members. For the ease of exposition (to avoid ties),
let n be an odd number. Utility from the decision is state-dependent. There are
two possible states of nature ω ∈ {A,B}, and uncertainty about its realization.
Ex ante both states are equally likely.
Each agent i receives a signal σi ∈ {α, β} which is correlated with the true
state of the world:
prob {σi = α |ω = A} = prob {σi = β |ω = B} = q,
1
2
< q < 1 ∀i.
The signals are drawn independently conditional on the state. A signal contains
verifiable information. Prior to voting, there is the possibility to communicate
within the committee. Verifiability of information implies that committee mem-
bers cannot invent information: they can either report the information they are
endowed with or stay silent.
Examples for this decision environment are the following:
• x ∈ {stick to the status quo, implement a reform}; ω ∈ {the reform
causes higher costs than benefits, the benefits outweigh the costs}; σi ∈
{presumptive evidence for either state: a certain group looses surely but
little, the reform worked in a neighbor state, etc.}.
• x ∈ {hire a new researcher, not}; ω ∈ {researcher is brilliant, researcher
is mediocre}; σi ∈ {presumptive evidence for either state: researcher has
a joint paper in a leading field journal; researcher performed badly at a
conference, etc.}.
• x ∈ {conviction of a defendant; acquittal}; ω ∈ {defendant is guilty, defen-
dant is innocent}; σi ∈ {presumptive evidence for either state: defendant
would have had a good reason to commit the crime, defendant has never
been conspicuous so far, etc.}.
The timing is as follows:
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1. Nature draws the state of the world and an imperfect signal for every agent.
2. Agents may reveal their signal to the other agents.
3. Agents vote. The alternative which receives the most votes is implemented.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, at each
possible node of the game in which a player is asked to take an action, the action
is required to be a best response to the other players’ strategies given the beliefs,
and beliefs shall be consistent with equilibrium strategies.
3.2.1 Agents
Agents derive state-dependent utility from the collective decision, Ui = ui (x, ω).
They are Bayesians and seek to maximize expected utility taking into account
all available information. Let pi (ω = A) denote the probability which agent i
assigns to state of the world A given the information available to him.
Agent i’s expected utility from decision a is:
pi (ω = A) ui (a, A) + (1− pi (ω = A))ui (a,B) ,
and from b :
(1− pi (ω = A))ui (b, B) + pi (ω = A) ui (b, A) .
Throughout the analysis, we assume a certain degree of homogeneity in pref-
erences, which ensures that the desirability of decision a weakly increases in the
probability that state A realized for each agent.2
Assumption 3.1 ui (a, A) + ui (b, B)− ui (a,B)− ui (b, A) > 0 ∀i.
Agent i prefers the implementation of a over b, iff
pi (ω = A) >
ui (b, B)− ui (a,B)
ui (a, A) + ui (b, B)− ui (a,B)− ui (b, A)
. (3.1)
Denote θi =
ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)
ui(a,A)+ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)−ui(b,A) . Arrange the names of agents i =
1, . . . n such that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θn, and denote the median type, θn+1
2
, with
2If Assumption 3.1 does not hold, the number of voters who prefer decision a over decision
b may not be monotone in the probability that state A has realized. The analysis then requires
to consider all possible shapes which this relationship may have.
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θm. Following (among others) Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), θi is called
i’s threshold of doubt. Agent i prefers a over b if and only if he assesses the
probability that the state of the world is A higher than his threshold of doubt.
Agents i : θi < 0 prefer decision a in both states of the world, and agents j : θj > 1
prefer decision b in both states of the world. The present paper allows for a larger
preference parameter range than most of the existing literature (e.g. Fedderson
and Pesendorfer (1998) or Doraszelski et al. (2003)), where attention is restricted
to the case θi ∈ [0, 1].
Agents l : θl ∈ [0, 1] agree on the decision that should be made under certainty.
Hence there are incentives to pool private information in order to get a better
estimate about the true state of the world. However, heterogeneous thresholds
of doubt potentially cause disagreement at the time the decision has to be taken.
Therefore, agents may not want to reveal their information if this could cause the
politically decisive voter to vote against their preferred alternative.
Preferences are common knowledge. We preclude the implementation of trans-
fer schemes. Reasons for this restriction are that either (i) there exists no au-
thority which is able to collect the transfers after the decision was implemented
and the state of the world was learned, (ii) the state of the world is not verifi-
able, and/or (iii) individual rationality and budget constraints cannot be satisfied
simultaneously.3
3.2.2 Information processing
As utility is state-dependent, agents would like to condition their choice on the
state of the world. The state of the world is not observable, but correlated with
individual signals. Agents use the information about the realization of the sig-
nals for updating their beliefs concerning the realization of the state of the world.
Firstly, each agent observes a signal, which alters his beliefs about the state and
about the distribution of signals held by the other committee members. Sec-
ondly, agents observe the communication outcome and therewith the realization
of a subset of the signals. Moreover, they are able to interpret the actions of
those committee members who did not reveal their information. Last, each agent
3If we could align preferences over the collective decision by a payoff manipulation ui (x, ω)
via a transfer scheme {ti (x, ω) , x = a, b;ω = A,B; i = 1, . . . n}, beneficial information aggrega-
tion would be no problem.
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Figure 3.1: Probability that the state of the world is A given the evidence k.
is aware of the fact that in equilibrium his vote affects the outcome only for
particular realizations of the other voters’ signals.
Suppose for the moment that the realization of private information σi, i =
1, . . . n is common knowledge. Since the information environment is symmetric
(i.e. p(A) = 1/2, prob(σi = α|ω = A) = prob(σi = β|ω = B) ∀i), the only
information which matters for updating beliefs with respect to the realization
of the state of the world is the difference between the number of α-signals and
β-signals.4 Denote this random variable with κ. We have κ =
∑n
i=1 1σi=α−1σi=β,
where 1σi=σˆ = 1 if σi = σˆ and 0 else. Bayesian updating yields:
p (A |κ = k ) =
qk
qk + (1− q)k
. (3.2)
Figure 3.1 depicts the probability that the state of the world is A given there are
k more α-signals than β-signals.5
If the realization of some σj , j = 1, . . . n, (and hence of κ) is not known, agent
i has to form beliefs µi(σj), i 6= j, with respect to these realizations, incorporating
all available information. We denote with κ−i the difference between the number
of α-signals and β-signals held by committee members except for i. The beliefs
4See Appendix A.
5Note that (as n is an odd number) κ assumes even values with positive probability only if
some agents do not receive information, see Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3.
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held with respect to the other agents’ signals can be transformed into a belief
regarding κ−i.6
µi(κ−i = k) =


∑
J⊆{1,...n}\{i}:|J |=n−1+k
2
∏
j∈J
µi(σj = α)
∏
l∈{1,...n}\{J∪i}
µi(σl = β),
for k ∈ E{−n + 1, ..., n− 1}
0, for k /∈ {−n + 1, ..., n− 1},
(3.3)
where E{x, ..., y} denotes the set of even integers between (including) x and y.
Taking his own signal and κ = κ−i+1σi=α−1σi=β into account, i’s belief regarding
κ is given by:
µi(κ = k) =
{
µi(κ−i = k + 1), if σi = α
µi(κ−i = k − 1), if σi = β.
(3.4)
Agent i’s belief regarding the state of the world is then given by:
pi(ω = A) =
∑
k∈O{−n,...,n}
µi(κ = k)p (A |κ = k ) , (3.5)
where O{−n, ...n} is the set of odd integers between −n and n, and µi(κ) is
updated whenever the agent receives new information. There are several stages
at which the beliefs can be updated.7 Firstly, the agent learns his own signal σi.
Secondly, the other agents’ observed communication actions contain information.
Moreover, agents may be able to deduce information through equilibrium voting
strategies. They care only about their vote when it is pivotal, hence they update
their beliefs using the information contained in this event. If the event that i is
pivotal never occurs in equilibrium, basically any beliefs can be assigned, provided
that they do not contradict Bayes’ Law.
Figure 3.2 depicts a possible path of belief-updating for an agent in a com-
mittee with five agents. The illustrations represent agent i’s beliefs with respect
to κ at different stages of the game. Note that positive probability is assigned
only to odd values for κ because there is an odd number of signals. Ex ante,
the probability that kα agents receive α-signals and kβ = n − kα agents receive
β-signals is given by
(
n
kα
)
(1
2
qkα(1 − q)kβ + 1
2
qkβ(1 − q)kα). That is, prior to the
receipt of information, probability is assigned to κ = k according to:(
n
n+k
2
)
(1
2
q
n+k
2 (1− q)
n−k
2 + 1
2
q
n−k
2 (1− q)
n+k
2 ),
6See Appendix A.
7For convenience, we use the term ’updating’ even if the updating does not change an agents’
assessment.
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Figure 3.2: Possible path of updating in the course of the game with 5 players.
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where k ∈ O{−n, . . . n}.
After having learned that his signal is α, i assigns positive probability only to
κ ∈ O{−n+ 2, . . . n}, and assigns probability to κ = k according to:(
n−1
n+k
2
−1
)
(q
n+k
2 (1− q)
n−k
2 + q
n−k
2 (1− q)
n+k
2 )∑
k′∈O{−n+2,...n}
(
n−1
n+k′
2
−1
)
(q
n+k′
2 (1− q)
n−k′
2 + q
n−k′
2 (1− q)
n+k′
2 )
.
Suppose that i was shown one β in the communication stage, and that those who
stayed silent planned to do so for both types of signals.8 Then, i can exclude
κ = 5 and conclude pi(ω = A) = 1/2. At the stage of voting, he again updates
his beliefs, assigning positive probability only to those κ which – given the voting
strategy profile – may render his vote decisive. Suppose that the voter who
revealed the β-signal votes for b, that one of the remaining voters votes for a
irrespective of his information, and that the other two voters vote informatively,
that is each of them votes for a if his signal is α, and votes for b if his signal
is β. Then, i’s vote is decisive if and only if those who vote informatively have
opposing signals.
3.2.3 The communication stage
The agents are allowed to reveal the signal they received from nature prior to
the voting stage. As a signal contains verifiable information, agents cannot lie
about their information. A communication strategy γi for an agent i is a plan
whether to report his information (σi) or to remain silent (s) for each signal he
may receive. Communication takes place simultaneously and is observed by all
voters.9
Let C denote the set of possible outcomes of the communication stage. An
outcome of the communication stage is denoted c = (c1, c2, . . . cn), where ci ∈
{α, β, s} ∀i = 1, . . . n. Denote with A(c) the set of agents who revealed α-signals,
A(c) = {i ∈ {1, . . . n} : ci = α}. Define B(c) and S(c) analogously. The most
important summaries of the information provided in the communication stage
are the number of revealed α-signals, kα(c) = |A(c)|, the number of revealed
8If a voter j reveals an α-signal with a higher probability than a β-signal, beliefs formed
after observing j’s silence would take this into account, assigning higher probability to σj = β.
9The full information aggregation result (Proposition 3.1) does not hinge upon the assump-
tion of simultaneous communication.
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β-signals, kβ(c) = |B(c)|, and the number of unrevealed signals, ks(c) = |S(c)|.
Denote with k(c) = kα(c) − kβ(c) the number of revealed α-signals in excess of
the number of β-signals. We call k(c) evidence, and say that the communication
stage produced evidence for A if k(c) > 0, evidence for B if k(c) < 0 and no
evidence if k(c) = 0.
Having observed j’s communication action, i updates his belief regarding the
realization of j’s signal. Denote with µi(σj = α|cj = cˆ) the probability which
i assigns to σj = α given j’s communication action cˆ. Because communication
strategies are restricted to either truthful revelation or no revelation, we have that
µi(σj = α|cj = α) = 1, and µi(σj = α|cj = β) = 0. Beliefs regarding the signals
of voters j : j ∈ S(c) must be consistent with these agents’ communication
strategies along the equilibrium path, and have to respect Bayes’ Rule off the
equilibrium path.
3.2.4 The voting stage
Agents vote simultaneously and without abstentions for an alternative to be im-
plemented. The alternative which gets the most votes is implemented. Every
agent takes into account all the information available to him, that is the own sig-
nal σi, the communication outcome c, and what he can learn through equilibrium
play. In particular, agents base their votes on being pivotal.
A voting strategy vi for agent i is a plan for which alternative to vote, for all
possible outcomes of the communication stage and for each signal he may receive.
Allowing for mixed voting strategies, we have vi : {α, β}×C → [0, 1], where vi(.)
denotes the probability to vote for a.
Definition 3.1 A voting strategy which satisfies
vi (.) =
{
1, if pi (ω = A) > θi
0, if pi (ω = A) < θi
is called Bayesian sincere voting.
Recalling (3.1), it is easy to see that a Bayesian sincere voting strategy max-
imizes i’s expected utility. Moreover, if the voting strategy profile allows the
event that i is pivotal to occur, the beliefs µi(κ) are well-defined and Bayesian
sincere voting is the only utility-maximizing strategy. However, if an agent is
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vi
1
pi(ω = A)
θi
Figure 3.3: Bayesian sincere voting strategy
never pivotal, any voting action is utility-maximizing, since none has an effect.
Therefore, Bayesian sincere voting is always in the best response set at the stage
of voting for every player. Figure 3.3 depicts a Bayesian sincere voting strategy
for voter i. Assume again that the realization of the signals – and hence the
realization k of κ – is common knowledge. Then, using Bayesian sincere voting
strategies, agents i with thresholds of doubt θi < p(A|κ = k) vote for a, and
agents j : θi > p(A|κ = k) vote for b. An agent’s threshold of doubt reflects
how much evidence for state of the world A must be presented to the agent such
that he supports alternative a. For convenience, we assume that the voter with
the median preference type is never indifferent between a and b if the realization
of κ is known with certainty. This assumption is made without loss of general-
ity to avoid case differentiations. Alternatively, if he is indifferent between the
two alternatives, we could restrict attention to equilibria in which the median
preference type takes a particular action, say vote for a.
Assumption 3.2 ∃km ∈ {−n, . . . n} such that p(A|κ = km) < θm < p(A|κ =
km + 1).
3.3 Full information aggregation
Both, preferences over the set of alternatives and beliefs regarding the state of the
world may differ among voters. Voter i with preferences θi does not want alter-
native a to be implemented as long as he assesses the probability that the state of
the world is A to be smaller than θi. Communication allows for the possibility to
influence the politically decisive voter – and consequently the collective decision
– in one’s own favor. Whether or not a voter has the possibility to influence
the decision in his favor depends on the kind of information he is endowed with.
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Thus, the mere possibility to communicate may cause information exchange, even
if the committee members do not talk to each other.
It is easy to see that an equilibrium exists in which the information is fully
revealed and taken into account by every voter when making the voting choice.
The result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 The following strategy profile is a Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the communication-and-voting-game: All agents reveal their informa-
tion in the communication stage. All agents assign probability 1 to κ = k(c).
Agents whose thresholds of doubt are smaller than p(A|κ = k(c)) vote a, the
other agents vote b. If ci = s is observed, and θi ≥ θm, voters j 6= i assign
probability 1 to σi = α and play voting strategies as if i had revealed α. If ci = s
is observed, and θi < θm, voters j 6= i assign probability 0 to σi = α and play
voting strategies as if i had revealed β.
Proof. We have to distinguish two cases: (i) km is odd, and (ii) km is even.
Consider agent i : θi ≥ θm. The only deviation in the communication stage which
has an effect is to conceal β. In case (i), this deviation will change the outcome
only if κ−i = km+1. If i sticks to his equilibrium communication action, all voters
believe (know) that κ = km, and assess the probability that the state of the world
is A to be p(A|κ = km). As θm > p(A|κ = km), a majority votes for b. If i conceals
β, the other agents believe that κ = km+2 and consequently that the probability
that the state of the world is A is p(A|κ = km + 2). θm < p(A|κ = km + 1),
hence a majority votes for a. In case (ii), i’s revelation affects the outcome only
if κ−i = km. If i sticks to his equilibrium communication action, all voters believe
that κ = km − 1, and a majority votes for b. If i conceals β, the other agents
believe that κ = km + 1 and consequently a majority votes for a. Since θi ≥ θm,
agent i prefers b over a in case his deviation has an effect. Thus, i has no incentive
to deviate in the communication stage. The voting strategy is Bayesian sincere.
Thus, there exists no profitable deviation. A similar argument applies to the case
θi < θm. Note that beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ Rule. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Full information revelation is possible
because committee members may apply the following reasoning: I know who you
are, I know what you want, and I know that you know something. If you don’t tell
me what you know, then I suppose that you have information which is unfavorable
for your favorite decision because otherwise you would have told me.
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In equilibrium, every agent has an incentive to reveal at least one type of
information, given he possesses it: Agents who are more biased towards a than
the median preference type prefer alternative a whenever the majority prefers
a. Hence, they have an incentive to reveal α-signals in order to convince the
majority of alternative a. Agents who are biased towards b have an incentive to
provide β-signals. By not revealing what he knows, an agent reveals that he does
not know anything he wants to reveal. As all agents know something, staying
silent reveals exactly the same information as the revelation of the information
itself, and turns out to be an inconsequential action.
3.4 Extensions to the basic model
In this section, we modify the basic setting along two dimensions and identify
conditions under which full information revelation in the communication stage is
possible. First we allow for the possibility that agents do not possess decision-
relevant information with a certain probability. In this case, agents with unfa-
vorable information can pool with agents who have no information. Hence, it
may not always be possible to perfectly deduce the information endowment of a
committee member who does not talk. Next, we consider the case that prefer-
ences are private information. Then it is impossible to assume ’worst news’ in
case of a player’s silence because what would be bad news is private information.
In both modifications of the basic model, full information aggregation is possible
only if committee members’ preferences are sufficiently aligned. However, there
may still be a large range of preference parameters for which full information
aggregation is possible. Interestingly, if there is the possibility that agents do not
receive information, then a full information aggregation equilibrium exists for a
larger preference parameter range if preferences are private information then if
they are common knowledge.
We identify conditions for the existence of equilibria in which all signals are
revealed in the communication stage and call these equilibria full information
revelation equilibria. One could presume that the existence of such an equilibrium
is not necessary for full information aggregation, as non-revealed information may
still be aggregated in the voting stage. We will show that if the extended model
does not have a full information revelation equilibrium, then there neither exists
a full information aggregation equilibrium.
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3.4.1 Possibility of receiving no signal
In the basic model, full information aggregation is possible because committee
members may apply the reasoning ”I know what you want, and I know that you
know something. If you don’t tell me what you know, then I suppose that you have
information which is unfavorable for your favorite decision.” Here, we eliminate
the ”I know that you know something” part from this line of argumentation. We
assume that each committee member receives a signal with probability δ < 1.
If a voter is not endowed with information, we denote σi = ∅. We assume that
it is impossible to verify σi = ∅, and that this event is equally likely in both
states of the world. That is, the message spaces remain the same as in the basic
model for those agents who receive information, whereas those who do not receive
information are restricted to staying silent.
We modify nature’s moves in the following way:
1. Nature determines the set of agents ∆ ⊆ {1, . . . n} that she will endow with
signals.
2. Nature draws the state of the world.
3. Nature draws a signal for each agent i ∈ ∆.
Suppose that full information revelation as in Proposition 3.1 was part of an
equilibrium in this game as well. Then, in this equilibrium, if a voter i does not
reveal information in the communication stage, the only admissible belief for the
other voters is to assign probability 1 to σi = ∅. In an equilibrium in which all
the available information is revealed in the communication stage, µi(κ) assigns
probability 1 to κ = k(c) for all agents i. Hence, it is rational for voter i to vote
for a if p(A|κ = k(c)) > θi, and to vote for b if p(A|κ = k(c)) < θi.
Consider agent i, σi = α, and assume that agents −i reveal any signal they
receive from nature, and hold the belief that if ci = s, then σi = ∅ with probability
1. Agent i is pivotal with signal α if and only if κ−i = km. In this case the
revelation would cause a majority to vote for a, while a majority votes for b given
only the evidence κ−i. If agents −i expect i to reveal any information nature
endows him with, they think he has no information if he stays silent, and assign
probability 1 to κ = km in case i deviates. A concealment would not be noticed.
However, whether or not he reveals his own signal to the other agents, i would
know that κ = km + 1, and assign probability p(A|κ = km + 1) to state of the
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world A. Hence, he prefers the revelation of α if and only if θi < p(A|κ = km+1).
With the same line of reasoning, we conclude that an agent i : σi = β reveals his
signal if and only if all the other agents reveal their signals if θi > p(A|κ = km).
Proposition 3.2 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter
is endowed with information with probability δ < 1. There exists a full informa-
tion revelation equilibrium if and only if θi ∈ [p(A|κ = km), p(A|κ = km + 1)] ∀i.
Full information revelation is possible if and only if all committee members
agree with the median preference type which decision should be made given the
presented evidence, i.e. if there is essentially no preference heterogeneity. How-
ever, there may still be considerable information aggregation even in the presence
of strongly diverging interests. Suppose that there is an agent i : θi < p(A|κ =
km). Agent i disagrees with the majority only insofar as they implement b in
some cases in which i would better like a. This is why i does not want to show
a β-signal if he is endowed with it. However, agent i might be willing to reveal
an α-signal. The following proposition states that the existence of an equilibrium
with considerable information aggregation is guaranteed if δ is high enough.
Proposition 3.3 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter
is endowed with information with probability δ < 1. There is a lower bound on δ,
δ′ < 1, such that for all δ > δ′, there is a k with |k| < |km| such that, an equilib-
rium exists in which at least n+1
2
agents reveal α-signals if they are endowed with
them, at least n+1
2
agents reveal β-signals if they are endowed with them, and all
agents vote for a if k(c) ≥ k + 1 and vote for b if k(c) ≤ k.
We present the proof of Proposition 3.3 in Appendix A. We show that given
the beliefs induced by a certain strategy profile, it is possible to construct this
strategy profile such that the strategies are mutually best responses and beliefs
are indeed correct. For small values of δ, the construction is possible for some
preference parameter constellations, but cannot be applied for the general case.
The reason is that as δ goes to zero, beliefs conditional on providing decisive
information converge to p(ω = A|κ = k) and p(ω = A|κ = k + 1), but are also
sensitive to the communication strategy profile. Hence, we cannot guarantee that
an equilibrium exists in which equilibrium beliefs concentrate around the median
preference type. The equilibrium identified in Proposition 3.3 has the property
that more than half of the agents reveal α-signals if they are endowed with them,
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and more than half of the agents reveal β-signals if they are endowed with them.
The decision rule is such that less extreme evidence has to be presented in order
to change the decision as is necessary for the median preference type to change
his mind in the full information case. The reason is that the revelation of an
additional α-signal affects beliefs in two ways, directly via the correlation, and
indirectly because less unrevealed information remains.
As δ → 1, k → km/2 for the class of equilibria identified in Proposition
3.3. Note that for δ = 1, if half of the agents reveal either type of information,
and the communication stage yields evidence k(c), it follows that κ = 2k(c).
Hence, for δ = 1, the decision will be a if and only if κ > km, which implies
full information aggregation as in Proposition 3.1 also in this class of equilibria.
Although we may have considerable information aggregation in the absence of a
full information revelation equilibrium, full information aggregation is impossible
for δ < 1.
Proposition 3.4 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter
is endowed with information with probability δ < 1. If a full information revela-
tion equilibrium does not exist, then there exists no full information aggregation
equilibrium.
Proof. Full information aggregation requires the following. If κ ≤ km, then
there must be at least n+1
2
b-votes. If κ > km, then there must be at least
n+1
2
a-votes. This in turn is feasible only (i) if a voter who did not reveal β votes b and
would have voted a if σi = ∅, and (ii) a voter who did not reveal α votes a and
would have voted b if σi = ∅. As beliefs must be consistent, an agent who votes
b anticipates that in case his vote is pivotal, then κ = km, and a pivotal agent
who votes a infers that κ = km + 1. Hence, the required voting strategies are
consistent with equilibrium play only if θi ∈ [p(A|κ = km), p(A|κ = km + 1)] ∀i.
Then a full information revelation equilibrium exists. Q.E.D.
3.4.2 Private information concerning preferences
In this section, we assume that not only individual signals but also preferences are
private information. Therewith, we eliminate the ”I know what you want”-part
from the line of argumentation underlying Proposition 3.1. Agent i’s preference
parameter θi is drawn according to a commonly known probability function φ(θi),
which is assumed to be identical for all i = 1, . . . n. The realization of θi is i’s
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private information. We denote the distribution function of individual types with
Φ(θi).
Nature’s moves are now as follows:
1. Nature draws the agents’ types.
2. Nature draws the state of the world.
3. Nature draws a signal for each committee member.
We are interested in conditions for the existence of a full information revelation
equilibrium. Clearly, agents with types above 1 (respectively below 0) would
never reveal information which makes the choice of a (respectively b) more likely.
If all the other agents reveal their information and vote Bayesian sincerely, the
revelation of an α-signal (respectively the revelation of a β-signal) necessarily has
this effect (if any). Hence, in order that a full information revelation equilibrium
exists, the support of φ(θi) must be bounded. That is, there must exist θmin > 0,
θmax < 1 such that θi ∈ [θmin, θmax] ∀i. In particular, for every i, there must be
an integer kθi ∈ E{−n + 1, . . . , n− 1} such that θi ∈ [p(A|κ = kθi − 1), p(A|κ =
kθi + 1)], i.e. such that agent i prefers decision a for all κ−i > kθi and prefers
decision b for all κ−i < kθi. For κ−i = kθi, he prefers a if his own signal is α, and
b if his own signal is β.
In the following, we assume the existence of a full information revelation equi-
librium in which all agents vote Bayesian sincerely (which implies full information
aggregation). If all the information is revealed during the communication stage,
then pi(ω = A) = p(A|κ = k(c)) ∀i, and hence the agents’ Bayesian sincere voting
strategies are unique. In case of remaining uncertainty about decision-relevant
information, Bayesian sincere voting strategies are determined by the belief sys-
tem µ. Hence, the incentive to reveal information - and therewith full information
revelation in equilibrium - hinges upon the beliefs agents hold in case of a devia-
tion (i.e. a concealment of information). To derive conditions for the existence of
a full information revelation equilibrium, we specify beliefs µ which best support
the full information revelation equilibrium. It suffices to specify these beliefs for
the case that a single agent conceals his information in the communication stage.
Given that preferences are private information, it does not make sense to
condition the beliefs in case of i’s silence on i’s name. However, beliefs can
be conditioned on the communication outcome k(c). Denote with µ−i(k(c)) =
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κ
−i
revelation
of α
has an effect
iff θm ∈
benefits/
harms i iff
< kθmin no effect - -
kθmin b→ a
[p(A|µ(kθmin)),
p(A|κ = kθmin + 1)]
kθi < kθmin + 1
kθi > kθmin + 1
kˆ b→ a
[p(A|µ(kˆ)),
p(A|κ = kˆ + 1)]
kθi < kˆ + 1
kθi > kˆ + 1
kθmax b→ a
[p(A|κ = µ(kθmax)),
p(A|κ = kθmax + 1)]
kθi < kθmax + 1
kθi > kθmax + 1
> kmax no effect - -
κ
−i
revelation
of β
has an effect
iff θm ∈
benefits/
harms i iff
< kθmin no effect - -
kθmin a→ b
[p(A|kθmin − 1),
p(A|µ(kθmin))]
kθi > kθmin − 1
kθi < kθmin − 1
kˆ a→ b
[p(A|κ = kˆ − 1),
p(A|µ(kˆ))]
kθi > kˆ − 1
kθi < kˆ − 1
kθmax a→ b
[p(A|κ = kθmax − 1),
p(A|µ(kθmax))]
kθi > kθmax − 1
kθi < kθmax − 1
> kmax no effect - -
Figure 3.4: Possible effects of i’s revelation given information revelation by agents
−i.
µ−i (κ = k(c) + 1|κ−i = k(c), ci = s) the out-of-equilibrium-belief agents j 6= i as-
sign to σi = α in case of i’s silence given the communication outcome k(c).
To see how these beliefs best support a full information revelation equilibrium,
consider the possible effects of i’s revelation of the two types of signals given
agents −i reveal their signals, and given beliefs µ−i(k(c)). These are illustrated
in Figure 3.4. In this figure beliefs with respect to the state of the world given
the communication outcome c and information revelation by all agents but i are
(with slight abuse of notation) denoted with p(A|µ(k(c)) = (1−µ−i(k(c)))p(A|κ =
k(c)− 1) + µ−i(k(c))p(A|κ = k(c) + 1). Consider agent i : θi = θmin. Whenever
this agent’s revelation of an α-signal has an effect, this effect is beneficial for
agent i. The reason is that (as i is most biased towards a) whenever the majority
prefers a over b given all the available information, then i likes a better than b
as well. However, the revelation of a β-signal can have a beneficial effect for i
only if κ−i = kθmin . For κ−i < kθmin , all agents agree that b is the best choice,
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regardless of i’s signal. For all κ−i > kθmin the revelation of a β-signal can
only harm i. Given the realization of the other agents’ signals, κ−i = kˆ, the
revelation of a β-signal will change the majority decision from a to b if and only
if the median of the preference types θm realized within the interval [p(A|κ =
kˆ−1), (1−µ−i(kˆ))p(A|κ = kˆ−1)+µ−i(kˆ)p(A|κ = kˆ+1)], that is if the Bayesian
sincere voting strategies for the majority prescribe to vote for b in case i reveals a
β-signal, and prescribe to vote for a given the beliefs µ−i(k(c)) if agent i conceals
his information. Note that the probability that the median voter’s preference
type realizes in the relevant range is highest, and hence the incentive to reveal
a β-signal is strongest for agent i : θi = θmin if out-of-equilibrium-beliefs assign
probability 1 to κ = kmin + 1 if κ−i = kmin. Note also that given this belief, i’s
revelation of an α-signal has no effect on expected utility for κ−i = kmin.
We now quantify the effect of information revelation versus information con-
cealment in a full information revelation equilibrium on i’s expected utility. First,
we fix the realizations of the random variables and suppose that the revelation of
a β-signal changes the majority decision from a to b, given κ−i = kˆ. The effect
on i’s expected utility is:
(1− p(A|κ = kˆ − 1))(ui(b, B)− ui(a,B))
−p(A|κ = kˆ − 1)(ui(a, A)− ui(b, A))
= (ui(b, B)− ui(a,B) + ui(a, A)− ui(b, A))(θi − p(A|κ = kˆ − 1)), (3.6)
which is positive for (θi > p(A|κ = kˆ−1)) and proportional to (θi−p(A|κ = kˆ−1)).
This implies that whenever the smallest preference type gains from the revelation
of a β-signal, then every other type gains as well. Symmetrically, whenever the
highest preference type gains from the revelation of an α-signal, then every other
type does so.
The probability which agent i assigns to the effect (3.6) on his expected utility
(i.e. the probability assigned to the joint events κ = kˆ − 1 and θm ∈ [p(A|κ =
kˆ − 1), (1− µ−i(kˆ))p(A|κ = kˆ − 1) + µ−i(kˆ)p(A|κ = kˆ + 1)]) depends on his own
private information, σi and θi.
Let φmi (θ
′) denote the probability which agent i assigns to the event that the
median voter has a type θ′ given his own preference type θi. It depends on his
own type θi because i is part of the sample drawn from φ(θ). φ
m
i (θ
′) is given by
(A.7)–(A.9) which are stated in Appendix A and depicted in Figure 3.5 for n = 5,
and a uniform distribution on [0.1, 0.9] of individual preference types. The figure
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Figure 3.5: φmi (θ), for n = 5, φ(θ) = U [0.1, 0.9], θi = 0.9 (solid), and θi = 0.1
(dashed).
shows φmi (θ) for θi = 0.1 and θi = 0.9.
Let µi(κ−i = k|σi) denote the probability which agent i assigns to the event
that the realization of the other agents’ signals yield κ−i = k given his own signal
σi. Note that an agent with an α-signal assigns a higher probability to high
realizations of κ−i than an agent with a β-signal because individual signals are
correlated via the state of the world. µi(κ−i = k|σi) is given by (A.10) and (A.11)
in Appendix A and depicted in Figure 3.6 for n = 5 and q = 0.8. The figure shows
µi(κ−i = k|σi) for σi = α and σi = β.
Given that all agents −i reveal their information and hold beliefs µ(k(c)), the
effect of i’s revelation of a β-signal on expected utility is proportional to:
kθmax∑
k=kθmin
µi(κ−i = k|β)(θi − p(A|κ = k − 1))
(1−µ−i(k))p(A|κ=k−1)+µ−i(k)p(A|κ=k+1)∫
p(A|κ=k−1)
φmi (θ)dθ, (3.7)
and the effect of the revelation of an α-signal on i’s expected utility is proportional
to:
kθmax∑
k=kθmin
µi(κ−i = k|α)(p(A|κ = k + 1)− θi)
p(A|κ=k+1)∫
(1−µ−i(k))p(A|κ=k−1)+µ−i(k)p(A|κ=k+1)
φmi (θ)dθ. (3.8)
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Figure 3.6: Beliefs regarding the other agents’ signals given the own signal (n =
5, q = 0.8).
As argued above, (3.8) is unambiguously positive for θi = θmin. Similarly,
(3.7) is positive for θi = θmax. In the following we derive conditions under which
(3.7) is non-negative for θi = θmin, and (3.8) is non-negative for θi = θmax.
(3.7) is non-negative for θi = θmin iff
µi(κ−i = kθmin |β)(θmin − p(A|κ = kθmin − 1))
(1−µ−i(kθmin ))p(A|κ=kmin−1)+µ−i(kθmin )p(A|κ=kθmin+1)∫
p(A|κ=kθmin−1)
φmmin(θ)dθ
≥
kθmax∑
k=kθmin+2
µi(κ−i = k|β)(p(A|κ = k − 1)− θmin)
(1−µ−i(k))p(A|κ=k−1)+µ(k)p(A|κ=k+1)∫
p(A|κ=k)
φmmin(θ)dθ, (3.9)
and (3.8) is non-negative for θi = θmax iff
µi(κ−i = kθmax|α)(p(A|κ = kθmax + 1)− θmax)
p(A|κ=kθmax+1)∫
(1−µ−i(kθmax ))p(A|κ=kθmax−1)+µ−i(kθmax )p(A|κ=kθmax+1)
φmmax(θ)dθ
≥
kθmax−2∑
k=kθmin
µi(κ−i = k|α)(θmax − p(A|κ = k))
p(A|κ=k+1)∫
(1−µ−i(k))p(A|κ=k−1)+µ−i(k)p(A|κ=k+1)
φmmax(θ)dθ, (3.10)
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where φmmin(θ) is given by (A.9), φ
m
max(θ) is given by (A.7), µi(κ−i = k|β) is given
by (A.11), and µi(κ−i = k|α) is given by (A.10).
Obviously, (3.9) and (3.10) are necessary conditions for the existence of a full
information revelation equilibrium. Note that in case agent i’s expected utility
is higher if he reveals β (α) than if he conceals the information, then the same
is true for agent j : θj > θi (θj < θi) because j benefits relatively more and
looses relatively less than agent i whenever the revelation has an effect. Hence,
conditions (3.9) and (3.10) are also sufficient for the existence of a full information
revelation equilibrium. That is, for the existence of a full information revelation
equilibrium in which agents vote Bayesian sincerely, it suffices to make sure that
the type who is most biased towards alternative a is willing to reveal a β-signal
and that the type who is most biased towards alternative b is willing to reveal an
α-signal.
If kθmin = kθmax , then (3.9) and (3.10) hold for any µ−i(k(c)), as the left-hand-
sides are zero. It should be intuitively clear that there is no incentive to conceal
information in this case because kθmin = kθmax implies that there is essentially no
preference heterogeneity, i.e. voters agree on the mapping of information into the
decision.
If kθmin < kθmax , then the right-hand-side of (3.9) increases, and the left-hand-
side of (3.10) decreases in µ−i(kmin). Hence, out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ−i(k(c))
best support the full information revelation equilibrium if µ−i(kθmin) = 1. Simi-
larly, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs best support the full information revelation equi-
librium if µ−i(kθmax) = 0.
This observation yields sufficient conditions for the existence of a full infor-
mation revelation equilibrium, stated in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which the pref-
erence parameters θi are private information.
(i) There exists a full information revelation equilibrium if the preference param-
eters are drawn from [p(A|κ = k − 1), p(A|κ = k + 3)] for all agents i and some
even integer k ∈ {−n+ 1, . . . , n− 3}.
(ii) There exists a full information revelation equilibrium if the preference param-
eters are drawn from [p(A|kθmin−1), p(A|kθmin+1)]∪[p(A|kθmax−1), p(A|kθmax+1)]
for all agents i and some even integers kθmin , kθmax ∈ {−n + 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Hence, full information aggregation is possible in heterogeneous committees
if preference heterogeneity is not too severe. For q = 0.8, a sufficient condition
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ffµ−i(k) ↓ -µ−i(k) ↑
p(A|µ−i(k))
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︷ ︸︸ ︷︸ ︷︷ ︸︷ ︸︸ ︷
θmin’s loss if θm ∈
θmax’s lossif θm ∈
Figure 3.7: µ−i(k) determines the probabilities with which i looses from signal
revelation.
for the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium is that preference
types are drawn from the interval [0.2, 0.985]. That is, the committee may have
members who need to be at least 80% sure that the state of the world is B in
order to support alternative b as well as agents who need to be 98.5% sure that
the state of the world is A in order to support decision a (and any preference
type in between). Moreover, full information aggregation is possible regardless
of the quality of the signal if preference types assume only two values between
0 and 1, provided that there exist realizations of the signals for each type which
convinces him of either alternative (this can be achieved by increasing the number
of committee members).
If the conditions stated in Proposition 3.5 hold, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs can
be defined such that a revelation has an effect only if the preferences of the
median voter are aligned with the own preferences. However, even if information
revelation has unfavorable effects in some cases, the effect may still be favorable
in expectation, such that (3.9) and (3.10) hold for more heterogeneous preferences
(as measured by θmax−θmin) than in part (i) of the proposition and more general
preference distributions than in part (ii). It is difficult to identify the out-of-
equilibrium-beliefs which best support a full information revelation equilibrium.
Figure 3.7 illustrates how the out-of-equilibrium-beliefs affect the incentives for
information revelation for the most biased committee members for κ−i = k 6=
kθmin , kθmax. By decreasing µ−i(k) for some k 6= kmin, kmax, the incentive to reveal
a β-signal increases for type θmin because the probability that he will incur the
loss p(A|κ = k−1)−θmin decreases. At the same time, the incentive for type θmax
to reveal an α-signal decreases because he will incur the loss θmax−p(A|κ = k+1)
with a higher probability. The smaller (higher) k, the higher the loss incurred by
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type θmax (θmin) in case the revelation of a β-signal (α-signal) has an effect. From
this point of view, µ−i(k) should be high for small realizations of κ−i, and low for
high values. However, type θmin, endowed with a β-signal, assigns less probability
to both events than type θmax with an α-signal, (i) the realization of a high κ−i,
and (ii) the realization of the median type in the relevant range (see Figures
3.5 and 3.6). Which of the two forces is stronger depends on the parameters of
the model. As the necessary conditions for the existence of a full information
revelation equilibrium can only be derived with knowledge of the most favorable
out-of-equilibrium-beliefs, they cannot be stated without further specification of
the model. We provide an example in Appendix A, where we show that the
sufficient conditions for the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium
stated in Proposition 3.5 are not necessary.
We can again exclude other full information aggregation equilibria, if the full
information revelation equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 3.6 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which the pref-
erence parameters θi are private information. If a full information revelation
equilibrium does not exist, then there exists no full information aggregation equi-
librium.
Proof. A necessary condition for a strategy profile to be a full information
aggregation equilibrium is that the decision is responsive to each signal. This
requires informative voting by those who did not reveal their signals. Then, all
a-voters draw the same inferences out of being pivotal, and all b-voters draw the
same inferences when they are pivotal. Hence, there is a k such that p(A|κ =
k− 1) ≤ θi ≤ p(A|κ = k+1) ∀i. A full information revelation equilibrium exists.
Q.E.D.
If preferences are private information, the preference parameter range for
which a full information revelation equilibrium exists is smaller than in the com-
mon knowledge case (where it is unbounded), but larger than in the case in which
committee members are informed about other members’ preferences but can pre-
tend to have no information. The reason is that the median voter may agree
even with the most biased committee members. In the next section we show that
this effect may allow for a larger preference parameter range in case committee
members can pretend to have no information.
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3.4.3 Private preferences, possibility of receiving no signal
If there is the possibility of receiving no signal, we cannot support the full infor-
mation revelation equilibrium with out-of-equilibrium-beliefs anymore, because
no action can be identified as being out-of-equilibrium. As pointed out in Sec-
tion 3.4.1, in a full information revelation equilibrium the only admissible belief
regarding i’s signal when observing ci = s is σi = ∅. The necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium are
– analogously to (3.9) and (3.10):
µi(κ−i = kmin + 1|β)(θmin − p(A|κ = kmin))
p(A|κ=kmin+1)∫
p(A|κ=kmin)
φmmin(θ)dθ
≥
kmax+1∑
k=kmin+2
µi(κ−i = k|β)(p(A|κ = k − 1)− θmin)
p(A|κ=k)∫
p(A|κ=k−1)
φmmin(θ)dθ,
µi(κ−i = kmax|α)(p(A|κ = kmax + 1)− θmax)
p(A|κ=kmax+1)∫
p(A|κ=kmax)
φmmax(θ)dθ
≥
kmax−1∑
k=kmin
µi(κ−i = k|α)(θmax − p(A|κ = k + 1))
p(A|κ=k+1)∫
p(A|κ=k)
φmmax(θ)dθ,
and θmin ∈ [p(A|kmin), p(A|kmin + 1)] and θmax ∈ [p(A|kmax), p(A|kmax + 1)].
Note that the necessary condition for the existence of a full information reve-
lation equilibrium in case preferences are common knowledge, kmin = kmax, (see
Proposition 3.2) is sufficient here. As in the previous section, committee members
are uncertain about the median voter’s preferences. If the probability that the
majority has the same interests as one’s own is high enough, committee mem-
bers have an incentive to reveal their information even if there are (potentially)
conflicts of interest. We illustrate this possibility by means of an example.
Consider a committee with three members, and suppose each of them receives
a signal from nature with probability δ. If an agent receives a signal, the signal
is correct with probability 0.8. Preference parameters θi are drawn from [0.2 +
ǫ, 0.8−ǫ] according to a uniform distribution. Suppose agents 1 and 2 reveal their
information. If both reveal an α-signal, then all agents agree the decision should
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be a regardless of agent 3’s information. If both reveal a β-signal, then all agents
agree the decision should be b regardless of agent 3’s information. Suppose agent
3 is endowed with a β-signal. This information will be pivotal if (i) θm ∈ [0.2, 0.5]
and (a) agents 1 and 2 reveal different signals, or (b) none of the other agents
received information, or (ii) θm ∈ [0.5, 0.8] and one of the other agents revealed
an α-signal and the other agent did not receive information. If θ3 ∈ [0.2, 0.5],
the revelation of the β-signal is beneficial in case (i), but not in case (ii). If
θ3 ∈ [0.5, 0.8], the revelation is beneficial in both cases. Agent 3 : θ3 = 0.2 + ǫ
(and hence all other types) has an incentive to reveal a β-signal if
ǫ · 3
4
(δ2 · 2 · 0.8 · 0.2 + (1− δ)2) > (0.3− ǫ) · 1
4
· 2δ(1− δ)2 · 0.8 · 0.2
⇔ ǫ >
δ(1− δ)
5δ2 + 125
8
(1− δ)2 + 10
3
δ(1− δ)
.
Because of the symmetry of the parameter constellation, the condition for the
revelation of an α-signal for preference type 0.8− ǫ is the same.
For values of δ close to 0 or 1, a full information revelation equilibrium exists
for very small ǫ. Independently of δ, the existence of a full information revelation
equilibrium in this example is guaranteed if θmin = 0.25, and θmax = 0.75. Note
that for this preference parameter range, there exists no full information reve-
lation equilibrium in case preferences are common knowledge. Summing up, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7 Consider two communication-and-voting-games Γc,Γp in which
each voter is endowed with a signal with probability δ < 1. The games are identi-
cal except that in Γc, preferences are common knowledge, and in Γp, preferences
are private information.
(i) If Γc has a full information revelation equilibrium, then Γp has a full infor-
mation revelation equilibrium.
(ii) There are parameter constellations such that Γp has a full information rev-
elation equilibrium, whereas no full information revelation equilibrium exists for
Γc.
For δ < 1 the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium hinges
upon voluntary information revelation by the players. As we have shown, the
incentive to do so may be greater in the light of uncertainty about the majority’s
preferences. For δ = 1, the event that a committee member does not reveal infor-
mation arises in a full information revelation equilibrium only off the equilibrium
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path. Information revelation can be supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. If
preferences are common knowledge, out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be conditioned
on the preferences of the deviating player, whereas in the private information
case, this is impossible.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a first step towards the analysis of committees who deal
with verifiable information, and whose members have conflicting interests. We
identified conditions under which all decision-relevant information is revealed at
the communication stage and taken into account at the stage of voting. If pref-
erences are common knowledge, and every committee member is endowed with
information with certainty, then there exists an equilibrium with these properties
independently of the extent of preference heterogeneity.
If preferences are private information, then there exists a full information
revelation equilibrium if preference heterogeneity is not too severe. If preferences
are common knowledge, but agents are endowed with information only with a
certain probability, then full information aggregation is possible if and only if
all voters agree how the information should be mapped into a decision, i.e. if
there are no conflicts of interest. Moreover, if there is the possibility of receiving
no signal then preferences being private information allows for a larger extent
of preference heterogeneity than the common knowledge case. The reason is the
possibility that the majority can have the same interests as oneself.
Our results may be used to analyze the quality of collective decisions in several
extended frameworks. First of all, it is worth studying incentives for information
acquisition. In the present paper, information comes for free and in the basic
model every committee member possesses private information with certainty. The
impossibility to lie about the realization of private signals allows the committee to
deduce a member’s information even if this member does not want the committee
to be aware of it. This could weaken incentives to acquire information in the first
place beyond the usually found free riding problem.
If preferences are homogeneous ’enough’, we can expect efficient information
aggregation. However, information aggregation may be a problem if preferences
are too heterogeneous (if there is the possibility that some agents are not endowed
with information and/or preferences are private information). Agents might want
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to exclude agents who have preferences which are too distinct from their own from
communication, while sharing their information with more like-minded. There
may be demand for a device which allows agents to match into a homogeneous
subgroup in order to pool information more efficiently. It would be interesting
to compare the efficiency of a system in which information is pooled within sub-
groups (which may be interpreted as political parties) who are represented by a
single voice in the voting stage to the efficiency of information aggregation within
a direct democracy.
We used the simple majority rule as the decision mechanism. For homoge-
neous preferences, there exists a unique best decision rule (Costinot and Kartik,
2006). An interesting extension would be to take a mechanism design perspective
in a setting with heterogeneous preferences. Suppose for instance an alternative
needs a fraction q > 1/2 of the votes in order to be implemented. If no alterna-
tive gets this fraction, then the status quo is maintained. Then, information α
is pivotal in two cases: for changing the decision from status quo to a, and for
changing it from b to status quo. Full information revelation might be possible for
parameter ranges for which it is impossible using simple majority rule. The op-
timal mechanism must trade-off the provision of incentives to reveal information
versus the risk of maintaining the status quo to often.
In our model, individual signals are – conditional on the state of the world –
independent random variables. This is a good assumption if committee members
have different areas of expertise. In other cases, it might be more appropriate
to allow for the possibility that the information contained in the agents’ signals
partially overlaps. An example would be the hiring committee, where some of
the candidates’ characteristics are more easily observable than others. The in-
formation environment could be modeled as a set of verifiable signals, containing
information about the alternatives at hand, out of which nature draws a subset for
each committee member. In such a setting (again referring to the hiring commit-
tee), it would be particularly interesting to allow for a manipulation of nature’s
moves (influenced by the candidates’ actions) and to study the interaction with
committee members’ information acquisition efforts.
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Chapter 4
Communication in Committees:
Who should listen?
4.1 Introduction
When a firm decides whether to enter a new market or not, it usually faces
uncertainty about costs and benefits of market entry. If costs and benefits accrue
asymmetrically to decision makers and may be observed privately, an information
aggregation problem arises. If the marketing division reaps the largest part of the
benefits from market success, and the other decision makers (e.g. the production
unit) bear most of the costs, the marketing division might be reluctant to inform
the other decision makers about high costs. How should the information flow
within the group of decision makers be organized in order to make use of private
information, and to enter the market when it is worth entering and to stay out
when it is not?
In this paper, we compare two alternative decision procedures. One of them
allows decision makers to make public speeches before they decide via majority
voting. In the other one, communication takes place within groups of decision
makers with the same interests (for instance the marketing division) before the
representatives of the groups make a decision via majority vote. We call the first
decision procedure the open debate mechanism, and the latter the group debate
mechanism. In a political economy context, we can think of the former as a
parliament, and the latter as a party system. We are interested in the decision
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quality induced by the two mechanisms, measured in terms of expected social
surplus.
The main difference between the two decision procedures is that members of
one group have no access to the information which is revealed within the other
group in the group debate, whereas they do have access to this information in
the open debate. Although restricting access to communication seems to be a
waste of information given that it is accessible, it might not have been accessible
if everybody had listened. If some decision makers strongly favor one alternative,
then an individual who is less biased towards that alternative may be cautious to
reveal information which makes their votes for the alternative even more likely.
Moreover, as committee members anticipate that information in favor of their
preferred alternative will be concealed, they presume that an agent who does not
talk probably has information which confirms their predisposition. As a conse-
quence, choices are less sensitive to information in the open debate mechanism
than in the group debate mechanism.
Our framework can be applied to collective decision frameworks in which the
consequences of the decision are borne asymmetrically by the decision makers.
Consider for instance decisions concerning public good provision, say a munici-
pality’s decision whether to build a dyke or not. If the dyke is financed by taxes,
all decision makers are affected symmetrically by the costs. However, those who
live near to the coast enjoy larger benefits if the dyke is built than those living in
the inland. Another example is a faculty’s decision whether to hire a researcher
with a focus on applied econometrics or on economic theory. The costs of the
hiring decision will be borne symmetrically by the faculty members. However,
benefits may accrue asymmetrically to the decision makers, depending on their
own research interests. Conflicting interests among decision makers may hinder
the information exchange within the decision-making institution, and the efficient
aggregation of decision-relevant information.
There is a growing literature on information aggregation in committees (for
a survey, see Chapter 2). If communication among committee members is pos-
sible prior to making a choice, the committee is able to make (weakly) better
decisions than without the possibility to communicate. In fact, a committee of
homogeneous members can make efficient use of the available information (see
e.g. Coughlan (2000)). If preferences are heterogeneous, the possibility to com-
municate still (weakly) increases decision quality (Doraszelski et al. (2003)). One
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may presume that the more communication possibilities there are, the better the
decision quality. In this chapter, we show that this intuition may be mislead-
ing. If committee members have heterogeneous preferences, decision quality may
be higher when the decision makers exchange information within a subgroup of
members with aligned interests rather than if they talk to the entire committee.
Previous work has emphasized that information sharing during debate is prob-
lematic if committee members have conflicting interests (see e.g. Austen-Smith
(1990a,b), Doraszelski et al. (2003), and Meirowitz (2005)). Piketty (1999) pro-
vides a survey on the role of political institutions for information aggregation
in the political process. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) study the impact
of the voting rule on the extent of information sharing in debate. In Ottaviani
and Sorensen (2001), the optimal sequence of statements is derived in a setting
in which decision makers want to appear well-informed. So far, the question to
whom the debate should be addressed has not received attention. In the present
chapter, we explore this question.
There are several contributions which study the question with whom to com-
municate prior to making a choice, when the informed agent does not take part
in the decision process (e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Dur and Swank
(2005), and Gerardi et al. (2005)). Wolinsky (2002) allows for communication
among experts with identical interests which differ from those of the decision
maker. He shows that it may be beneficial for the decision maker to allow only
partial communication among the experts. In contrast to these papers, we study
a decision framework in which decision makers themselves may be (partially) in-
formed about the state of the world, and have to decide whether to share their
information with other decision makers.
Maug and Yilmaz (2002) study the performance of a two-class voting mecha-
nism compared to voting within the entire group. They also find that a separa-
tion of the committee into homogeneous subgroups may increase decision quality.
Maug and Yilmaz (2002) do not allow for communication, hence votes must re-
flect private information in order to make use of it. A two-class voting mechanism
performs better in case of preference heterogeneity than voting within the whole
committee because more voters base their decisions on information. The reason
is that an individual vote is pivotal only if a majority of the other group votes in
favor. Therewith, equilibrium information can be transmitted via the majority
rules to make voters, who otherwise do not respond to their private information,
82 CHAPTER 4. COMMUNICATION IN COMMITTEES
more responsive. In the model presented in this chapter, communication is pos-
sible. Here, too much information is transmitted through equilibrium strategies
in the open debate in the sense that a committee member’s silence is interpreted
as a signal against his predisposition. By precluding the interpretation of com-
munication actions (by preventing their observation), individual votes are more
responsive to information in the group debate mechanism.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a parsimo-
nious model of the decision environment within which the two mechanisms are
studied. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 the equilibria and the induced decision quality
in the group debate mechanism and in the open debate mechanism are derived.
We compare the two mechanisms and state our main result in Section 4.5. We
conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 The model
A group of four individuals has to decide whether to implement a project (enter
a market, buy a public good, reform the welfare state) or not. (Per capita)
costs (c) and benefits (b) arising from implementation are uncertain, and accrue
asymmetrically to the committee members. We assume that there are two types
of committee members. Committee members 1 and 2 are ”low types” whose
preferences can be represented by the following utility function:
Ul =
{
(1− α)b− c, if the reform is implemented
0, else.
Committee members 3 and 4 are ”high types” whose preferences can be repre-
sented by the following utility function:
Uh =
{
(1 + α)b− c, if the reform is implemented
0, else.
We assume that α > 0. Hence, high types reap higher benefits from the
project than low types do, and costs are shared equally. This fits for instance the
dyke-building decision, where people who live near to the coast benefit more than
people in the inland. In the market entry example, the marketing division might
benefit more from market entry than the production division. The parameter α
will be our measure of preference heterogeneity.
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Costs and benefits can be either high or low, giving rise to four possible states
of the world, (bl, cl), (bl, ch), (bh, cl), (bh, ch), which are equally likely ex ante. Let
bl = cl = 1 and bh = ch = h > 1. To make it a decision problem with only partially
conflicting interests, we assume that α < h−1
h
. All players agree to implement the
project in state (bh, cl), and not to implement in state (bl, ch). Low types prefer
implementation only in state (bh, cl), and high types prefer implementation in all
states except for (bl, ch). The stochastic structure implies that ex ante, high types
are in favor of implementation, and low types are against implementation.
Prior to entering the decision procedure, an agent may receive a signal from
nature, which contains perfect information about either the costs or the benefits,
and can be credibly transmitted to other agents (depending on the decision proce-
dure). Let δ be the probability to receive a signal, which is the same for all agents,
and assume 0 < δ < 1. If an agent receives a signal, he will be informed about
the costs or the benefits with equal probability. Individuals can infer information
from the other players’ actions during the game. Let µi(c
l) denote the probability
agent i assigns to c = cl, and let µi(b
h) be be the probability agent i assigns to
b = bh. Figure 4.1 summarizes the agents’ expected payoffs from implementation
for the cases of imperfect information about the state of the world.
We consider two decision procedures, the open debate mechanism, and the
group debate mechanism. The open debate mechanism works as follows. In
a communication stage, each committee member has the opportunity to reveal
his signal (if endowed with one) to the other committee members. After the
communication stage, each committee member casts a vote for or against imple-
mentation. Majority wins. In case of a tie, a fair coin is tossed. The group debate
mechanism works as follows. In a communication stage, the low types have the
opportunity to reveal their signals to each other, and the high types have the
opportunity to reveal their signals to each other. After the communication stage,
a representative of each group (say agent 1 for the low type group and agent
3 for the high type group) casts a vote for or against implementation. Again,
majority wins, and in case of a tie, a fair coin is tossed. The two mechanisms are
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Information revelation is observed by members inside
the same box, but not outside the box.
In these games, a strategy for a player i consists of a revelation strategy γi,
i.e. a plan which prescribes which signals to reveal if endowed with them, and – if
i is supposed to cast a vote – a voting strategy vi, i.e. a plan which vote to cast,
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A low type i’s conditional expected utility from implementation:
Observed info Conditional expected payoff positive iff
bl −α− (1− µi(cl))(h− 1) never
bh (1 − α)h− µi(cl)− (1− µi(cl))h µi(cl) >
αh
h−1
cl (1 − α)
(
µi(b
h)h+ (1 − µi(b
h))
)
− 1 µi(b
h) > α(1−α)(h−1)
ch (1− α)
(
µi(b
h)h+ (1 − µi(bh))
)
− h never
∅ (h− 1)(µi(b
h)(1− α)h− 1 + µi(c
l)) − α µi(c
l) > h−1−α
h−1 − µi(b
h)(1− α)
A high type i’s conditional expected utility from implementation:
Observed info Conditional expected payoff positive iff
bl α− (1− µi(cl))(h− 1) µi(cl) >
h−1−α
h−1
bh (1 + α)h− p(cl)− (1 − µi(c
l))h always
cl (1 + α)
(
µi(b
h)h+ (1− µi(bh))
)
− 1 always
ch (1− α)
(
µi(b
h)h+ (1− µi(bh))
)
− h µi(bh) >
h−1−α
(h−1)(1+α)
∅ (h− 1)(µi(b
h)(1 + α)h− 1 + p(cl))− α µi(c
l) > h−1+α
h−1 − µi(b
h)(1 + α)
Figure 4.1: Conditional expected payoffs from implementation.
Open debate mechanism: Group debate mechanism:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
? ? ? ?
votes
decision
A
A
A
A
A
AU






votes
decision
Figure 4.2: Open debate and group debate mechanism.
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for each signal he may get and each communication outcome he might observe.
Denote with γ a revelation profile, and with v a voting profile.
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, at each
possible node of the game in which a player is asked to take an action, the action
is required to be a best response to the other players’ strategies given the beliefs.
Beliefs shall be consistent with equilibrium strategies and Bayes’ Rule on the
equilibrium path, and shall not violate Bayes’ Rule off the equilibrium path.
We measure decision quality in terms of expected social surplus, which is
defined as the expected sum of payoffs. Expected social surplus depends only on
the probability of implementation in state (bh, cl) and the probability of rejection
in state (bl, ch). In the other states, committee members disagree, and the social
surplus is zero for both decisions.
4.3 The group debate mechanism
In the voting stage, each of the two representatives casts a vote for or against
implementation. A vote for (against) implementation increases (decreases) the
probability of implementation by 1
2
independently of the other representative’s
vote. Hence, a representative cannot infer any information from casting a pivotal
vote. He votes for implementation if and only if the conditional expected payoff
from implementation is positive, given the beliefs about the state of the world
which were generated in the communication stage.
Group members have the same preferences. Given that the representative’s
vote maximizes his expected payoff, there is no incentive for a group member to
conceal information. There may be equilibria in which some information is not
revealed. Suppose for instance that α is so high that the low type representative
votes for implementation only if he is sure that the state of the world is (bh, cl).
Then, there is no need to report bl because the representative will vote against
implementation anyway. In that sense, the information is decision-irrelevant.
However, there is no equilibrium in which decision-relevant information is not
reported to the representative. Because a signal can only be revealed by a player
who possesses that signal, the only admissible belief for the representative when
observing an out-of-equilibrium revelation is to believe it. Thus, for any puta-
tive equilibrium in which decision-relevant information is concealed, revealing the
information is a profitable deviation.
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Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to the equilibrium in which
information is fully revealed within the groups. For communication outcomes
which do not allow the identification of the state of the world, expected payoffs
from implementation are given in Figure 1, where the beliefs µi(.) coincide with
the priors for all communication outcomes. The equilibria of the group debate
mechanism are characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Consider the group debate mechanism. Any equilibrium has the
following properties.
The representative of the low type group votes for implementation (i) if he has
observed bh and cl, and (ii) if he has observed cl, and α ≤ h−1
h+1
, (iii) if he has
observed bh, and α ≤ h−1
2h
. Otherwise, he votes against implementation.
The representative of the high type group votes against implementation (i) if he
has observed bl and ch, (ii) if he has observed bl, and α ≤ h−1
2
, and (iii) if he has
observed ch, and α ≤ (h−1)
h+1
. Otherwise, he votes in favor of implementation.
We are interested in the probability of implementation if the state of the
world is (bh, cl). Given that benefits are high and costs are low, whatever the
representative of the high type group might learn during the communication
stage, he will vote in favor of the project. Hence, if the representative of the low
type group votes in favor of implementation, the probability of implementation
is 1. Otherwise, it is 1
2
. If α ≤ h−1
2h
, the low type representative votes in favor
of implementation if and only if at least one of the agents in the low type group
receives a signal. If h−1
2h
< α ≤ h−1
h+1
, the low type representative votes in favor of
implementation if and only if at least one of them receives the information that
costs are low. In case α > h−1
h+1
, the representative votes for implementation if
and only if the group receives information about both, costs and benefits. The
following lemma quantifies the probability of implementation in state (bh, cl) for
the three cases.
Lemma 4.2 Consider the group debate mechanism, and suppose that benefits are
high and costs are low.
(i) If α ≤ h−1
2h
, the probability of implementation is
1− 1
2
(1− δ)2.
(ii) If (h−1)
2h
< α ≤ (h−1)
h+1
, the probability of implementation is
1− 1
2
(
1− δ
2
)2
.
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(iii) If α > h−1
h+1
, the probability of implementation is
1
2
+
(
δ
2
)2
.
Now, consider the case that benefits are low and costs are high. The rep-
resentative of the low type group votes against implementation for any possible
communication outcome. For α ≤ h−1
h+1
, the representative of the high type group
votes against implementation if and only if the group receives at least one signal.
If h−1
h+1
< α ≤ h−1
2
, he votes against implementation if and only if at least one of
the group members receives the information that benefits are low. If α > h−1
2
,
he votes against implementation if and only if the group learns the state of the
world. Lemma 4.3 quantifies the probability of rejection for the three cases.
Lemma 4.3 Consider the group debate mechanism, and suppose that benefits are
low and costs are high.
(i) If α ≤ h−1
h+1
, the probability of rejection is
1− 1
2
(1− δ)2.
(ii) If h−1
h+1
< α ≤ h−1
2
, the probability of rejection is
1− 1
2
(
1− δ
2
)2
.
(iii) If α > h−1
2
, the probability of rejection is
1
2
+
(
δ
2
)2
.
From Lemmata 4.2 and 4.3, we can infer decision quality for the group debate
mechanism, stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Expected social surplus generated in the group debate mecha-
nism is:
(h− 1)(1− (1− δ)2), if α ≤ h−1
2h
(h− 1)(1− 1
2
((
1− δ
2
)2
+ (1− δ)2)
)
, if (h−1)
2h
< α ≤ (h−1)
h+1
(h− 1)1
2
(
δ +
(
δ
2
)2)
, if h−1
h+1
< α ≤ h−1
2
(h− 1)2
(
δ
2
)2
, if α > h−1
2
.
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4.4 The open debate mechanism
In this section, we analyze the strategic interaction in the open debate mechanism.
There is a class of equilibria in which all players vote for (against) implementation
regardless of the communication outcome. Voting strategies are mutually best
responses, because no single vote has an effect on the decision. It follows that
any communication strategy is part of a best response. In this class of equilibria,
the probability of implementation is 1 (0) in any state of the world. The group
debate mechanism obviously yields a lower (higher) probability of implementation
in state (bh, cl), and a higher (lower) probability of rejection in state (bl, ch).
Because all states are equally likely ex ante, expected social surplus is higher in
the group debate mechanism.
For a more convincing statement concerning the superiority of the group de-
bate mechanism, however, we should compare the best equilibrium outcome of the
open debate mechanism to the equilibrium outcome in the group debate mech-
anism. Hence, in the following we restrict attention to equilibria in which each
voter votes for the alternative which maximizes his expected utility conditional
on the information available to him. The term ”equilibrium” will refer only to
those strategy profiles which satisfy this additional criterion. Given that all play-
ers take into account all the available information at the stage of voting, decision
quality will be the higher, the more information is revealed in the communication
stage. Hence, we further restrict attention to equilibria that are most revealing.
Definition 4.1 An equilibrium (γ∗, v∗) is most revealing if there is no equilib-
rium (γ′, v′) in which all players reveal all signals which they reveal in γ∗, and at
least one player reveals a signal which he conceals in γ∗.
With open debate, information revelation is observed by all players. Hence,
a player’s statement does not only affect the behavior of the like-minded player,
but also that of the players who have different interests. Therefore, players may
prefer to conceal information. In equilibrium, each player i’s beliefs at the stage
of voting µi(c
l), µi(b
h) take into account equilibrium revelation strategies as well
as equilibrium voting strategies. Note that whenever i finds himself in an infor-
mation set in which any player has revealed cl, whether on or off the equilibrium
path, the only admissible belief for i yields µi(c
l) = 1, because cl can be revealed
only by a player who has observed cl, and cl can only be observed if c = cl.
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Analogously, we have µi(c
l) = 0 in an information set in which ch was revealed,
µi(b
h) = 1 if bh was revealed, and µi(b
h) = 0 if bl was revealed.
Restricting attention to most revealing equilibria, we presume that a player i
conceals information only if it is a profitable deviation from a putative equilibrium
in which players −i play the same revelation strategies, and i is assumed to
reveal the information. In order to identify such a profitable deviation in the
communication stage, we have to study the effect of the deviation on the other
individuals’ actions in the voting stage. If a player i conceals information in the
communication stage, this has an effect on i’s expected payoff only if there is
at least one voter j, a signal for this voter j, and announcements by players −i
such that if i reveals his information, j chooses a different voting action than if
i stays silent. Obviously – as all players cast expected payoff maximizing votes
in equilibrium – this can only be the case if the announcements by players −i
do not yield perfect information about the state of the world. Consider the
players’ expected payoffs for communication outcomes in which a concealment of
information can possibly have an effect (see Figure 4.1).
A low type j’s vote can be affected by concealing information only if an
information set is reached in which (i) j has observed only bh, (ii) j has observed
only cl, or (iii) j has observed nothing at all. Denote these information sets with
Il(b
h), Il(c
l), and Il(∅), respectively. Similarly, a high type j’s vote can be affected
by concealing information only if an information set is reached in which (a) j has
observed only bl, (b) j has observed only ch, or (c) j has observed nothing at
all. Denote these information sets with Ih(b
l), Ih(c
h), and Ih(∅), respectively.
It is intuitive that no player has an incentive to conceal information in favor of
his preferred alternative. This is stated in the following lemma. A proof of the
lemma can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.4 Consider the open debate mechanism. In a most revealing equilib-
rium, low types reveal bl and ch, and high types reveal bh and cl.
High types conceal at most bl and ch in a most revealing equilibrium, and low
types conceal at most bh and cl. As high types have the same preferences, a high
type’s intention when concealing information can only be to trigger a vote for
implementation by a low type, and a low type’s intention can only be to trigger
a vote against implementation by a high type. An immediate consequence of
Lemma 4.4 is that these effects on a player’s vote cannot be achieved if the player
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is uninformed at the stage of voting. This is stated in the following lemma. A
proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.5 In a most revealing equilibrium of the open debate mechanism, if a
low (high) type has not observed any information – neither privately nor during
the communication stage – he votes against (in favor of) implementation.
Concealing information has an effect only if it has a sufficient impact on a
player’s beliefs at the stage of voting. A high type’s non-disclosure of ch can
have a desired effect on a low type j’s vote only if j reaches an information set
Il(b
h), and µj(c
l) > αh
h−1 at this information set. However, the non-disclosure can
also affect the other high type k’s vote, namely if he reaches an information set
Ih(b
l) and µk(c
l) > h−1−α
h−1 at this information set. Similarly, a low type’s non-
disclosure of cl can have a desired effect on a low type j’s vote only if j reaches
an information set Ih(b
l), and µj(c
l) < h−1−α
h−1 at this information set. The non-
disclosure affects the other low type k’s vote, if k reaches an information set Il(b
h)
and µk(c
l) < αh
h−1 at this information set.
If no player conceals any information about the costs in a putative equilibrium,
µi(c
l) = 1
2
∀i in any information set in which i is not perfectly informed about
the costs. There is no incentive for any player to deviate from the putative
equilibrium by concealing information about the costs, if 1
2
< αh
h−1 , and
1
2
> h−1−α
h−1 .
Note that both inequalities hold for α > h−1
2
. We summarize the consequences
for equilibrium behavior in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 In a most responsive equilibrium of the open debate mechanism,
players conceal information about the cost only if α < h−1
2
.
The intuition for Lemma 4.6 is straightforward. If conflicts of interests are strong,
high types are against implementation only if they know that costs are high, and
low types are in favor of implementation only if they know that costs are low.
Hence, if players do not learn information about the costs, they will not change
their minds. Concealing information about the costs has no effect on individual
votes and hence no effect on expected payoffs.
A similar line of reasoning applies to the non-disclosure of information about
the benefits. Concealing bl has an effect on a low type j’s vote only if j reaches
an information set Il(c
l), and j’s belief at this information set satisfies µj(b
h) >
α
(1−α)(h−1) . The concealment affects a high type k’s vote if k reaches an information
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set Ih(c
h) and µk(b
h) > h−1−α
(1+α)(h−1) at this information set. Concealing b
h has an
effect on a high type j’s vote only if j reaches an information set Ih(c
h), and j’s
belief in this information set satisfies µj(b
h) < h−1−α
(1+α)(h−1) . The concealment affects
a low type k’s vote if k reaches an information set Il(c
l) and µk(b
h) < α
(1−α)(h−1)
at this information set.
In a putative equilibrium in which no player conceals information about the
benefits, no player has an incentive to deviate by concealing information about
the benefits, if 1
2
< α
(1−α)(h−1) , and
1
2
> h−1−α
(1+α)(h−1) . Both inequalities are satisfied
if α < h−1
h+1
.
Lemma 4.7 In a most responsive equilibrium of the open debate mechanism,
players conceal information about the benefits only if α < h−1
h+1
.
For α ≥ h−1
2
, there is no incentive to deviate from full information revelation.
Hence, we are ready to identify the most revealing equilibrium for this parameter
range, and to quantify induced the decision quality.
Lemma 4.8 Consider the open debate mechanism. If α ≥ h−1
2
, there is an equi-
librium in which every committee member reveals the information he is endowed
with. Low types vote against implementation unless they observe bh and cl. High
types vote for implementation unless they observe bl and ch.
Proof. There is obviously no profitable deviation in the voting stage. Revelation
strategies follow from Lemmata 4.6 and 4.7. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.2 Consider the most revealing equilibrium of the open debate
mechanism for α > h−1
2
.
(i) In state (bh, cl), the probability of implementation is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
(ii) In state (bl, ch), the probability of rejection is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
(iii) Expected social surplus is
(h− 1)
(
δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
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The proof of Proposition 4.2 can be found in Appendix B. Remember our
initial assumption α < h−1
h
. Hence, the previously discussed parameter range is
relevant only if h ≤ 2. Note that in the equilibrium identified in Lemma 4.8,
players are indifferent between sticking to their equilibrium revelation strategy
and a possible deviation to conceal information which triggers a certain vote for
(respectively against) implementation by the other types. Consider a low type’s
incentive to reveal cl. As high types vote for implementation anyway (because
they will not learn ch), i can make sure that the project is implemented by voting
for it if one of the other players reveals bh. The probability of implementation
will be the same, whether he conceals the information or he reveals it. Incentives
to conceal information arise if the information makes the choice of the disliked
alternative in the states in which players disagree more likely. If α < h−1
2
, there
is an incentive for a low type to deviate from full information revelation. If the
other players expect him to fully reveal his information, high types would vote
against implementation in case only bl is revealed in the communication stage.
Hence, an equilibrium in which all players reveal their information exists only if
α > h−1
2
.
We already observed that there may be an incentive for low types to conceal
cl if α < h−1
2
. The following lemma states that in fact both low types conceal cl
in the most revealing equilibrium for h−1
h+1
< α < h−1
2
. A proof of the lemma can
be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.9 Consider the open debate mechanism and suppose h−1
h+1
< α < h−1
2
.
The most revealing equilibrium has the following properties. Low types conceal cl.
Each low type votes against implementation unless he observes bh and cl. High
types vote for implementation unless they observe bl and ch, or if bl is revealed
in the communication stage, and (i) both low types have revealed bl, (ii) only one
low type revealed bl, and δ ≤ h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
, or (iii) none of the low types revealed bl,
and δ ≤
√
h−1−α−√α√
h−1−α−
√
α
2
.
Proposition 4.3 quantifies the highest decision quality which is attainable in
equilibrium in the open debate mechanism for α ∈
[
h−1
h+1
, h−1
2
]
.
Proposition 4.3 Consider the most revealing equilibrium of the open debate
mechanism for h−1
h+1
< α < h−1
2
.
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(i) In state (bh, cl), the probability of implementation is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
(ii) In state (bl, ch), the probability of rejection is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
13
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
, if δ > δ′′
1
2
(
1 + δ
(
1 + 5
4
δ − 2δ2 + 11
16
δ3
))
, if δ′ < δ ≤ δ′′, and
1− 1
2
(
1−
(
δ
2
))4
, if δ ≤ δ′,
where δ′ =
√
h−1−α−√α√
h−1−α−
√
α
2
, and δ′′ = h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
.
(iii) Expected social surplus is
(h− 1)1
2
δ2
((
δ
2
)2
+ 25
4
(
1− δ
2
)2)
,
if δ > δ′′
(h− 1)1
2
(
δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2)
+ δ
(
1 + 5
4
δ − 2δ2 + 11
16
δ3
))
,
if δ′ < δ ≤ δ′′, and
(h− 1)1
2
((
δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
−
(
1−
(
δ
2
))4)
,
if δ ≤ δ′.
For the purpose of this chapter it is not necessary to derive the set of equilibria
for the entire parameter range. We now turn to the comparison of the two
mechanisms, where we can already show for the previously discussed parameter
range that the group debate mechanism may yield higher expected social surplus.
4.5 Comparison
If conflicts of interests are strong, i.e. α > h−1
2
, full information revelation is
possible in the open debate (see Lemma 4.8). Hence, voters can base their decision
on more information than in the group debate, and the states in which they agree
will be identified with a higher probability. Therefore, the open debate mechanism
performs strictly better than the group debate mechanism.
For smaller conflicts of interests, h−1
h+1
< α < h−1
2
, in the group debate mech-
anism, high types vote against implementation if they observe low benefits and
are uninformed about the costs. With open debate, low types have an incen-
tive to conceal cl. As a consequence, in case of a low type’s silence, high types
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suspect him to conceal information. Then, they may refrain from voting against
implementation although they know that benefits are low. This case arises if the
probability with which a voter is endowed with information is not too low. If at
the same time the probability of receiving information is low enough, it is likely
that low types do not receive information, which will trigger the high types’ sus-
picion in the open debate. Then, the group debate mechanism performs better in
terms of the probability to reject the project in state (bl, ch). Overall, the group
debate mechanism may yield a higher expected social surplus than the open de-
bate mechanism. This is stated in the following proposition. A proof can be
found in Appendix B.
Proposition 4.4 Consider the case h−1
h+1
< α < h−1
2
and suppose δ > h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
,
and h < 5
3
.
(i) There exists a δ∗ such that for δ ∈ [ h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
, δ∗] the probability of rejection
in state (bl, ch) is higher in the group debate mechanism than in the open debate
mechanism.
(ii) There exist α∗ and δ∗∗, such that for all α ∈ [α∗, h−1
2
], expected social surplus
is higher in the group debate mechanism than in the open debate mechanism if
δ ∈ [ h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
, δ∗∗].
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed that it may be beneficial to restrict communication
among decision makers with conflicting interests. When communication is al-
lowed, committee members become suspicious when a member with different
interests does not talk. The consequence is that agents react less to observable
information than they would do if communication with committee members with
conflicting interests was impossible. If decision makers possess information only
with a small probability, the incidence that one of them does not talk arises with
a high probability. Benefits from sharing (some) information are then outweighed
by the inefficient usage of available information due to committee members’ sus-
picion. If decision makers are restricted to communicate within groups of agents
with aligned interests, a higher expected social surplus can be achieved.
We derived this result in a parsimonious model of a collective decision prob-
lem, which may be extended into several directions. In our model, it is crucial
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that communication between the groups is impossible. If decision makers could
freely decide whom to inform, a decision maker would again make inferences
when he is not informed by another agent. It would be interesting to see whether
the group debate may endogenously arise in a model in which communication
with other players is costly. Suppose for instance that a decision maker has to
establish a costly link to another decision maker in order to send a message to
him, and that this link has to be established before the decision makers are en-
dowed with information. Another interesting extension would be to allow for
endogenous information endowment. If information acquisition is costly, a deci-
sion maker’s incentives to acquire information depend on with whom he can share
the information, and whether other players will be listening.
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Chapter 5
Speed and Quality of Collective
Decision Making: Imperfect
Information Processing
5.1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Radner (1993) studies the efficient design of hierarchical
structures when information processing takes time. Radner departs from the
conventional assumption that individuals process information at infinite speed.
He studies the problem of aggregating n data items at maximum speed when
P information processors are available. This leads him to propose a hierarchical
structure within which information is processed at maximum speed, the ”reduced
tree”.1 The virtue of the reduced tree is that processors on all levels simultane-
ously process information. This minimizes the delay of the entire information pro-
cessing procedure. Radner’s model can be applied to any information processing
problem which requires repetitions of associative and commutative operations.
One is the ”max”-operation used in the collective decision problem which we
consider in this chapter. Information processing in this case implies the pairwise
comparison of possible alternatives and the identification of the best one.
Radner’s analysis is focused on the efficient organization of information pro-
1The reduced tree will be described in greater detail in Section 5.2.3.
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cessing with respect to three dimensions: (i) the size of the information processing
task, (ii) the size of the organization, and (iii) the delay within which the task
is completed. An organizational form is considered to be efficient, if given the
number of processors involved, the delay cannot be reduced, and at the same
time this delay cannot be achieved with a smaller number of processors.
In this paper, we add a new dimension to this evaluation of hierarchies: the
quality of a decision. In Radner’s original paper, which draws on a model brought
forward by computer scientists (e.g. Gibbons and Rytter (1988)), it is assumed
that processors work perfectly when they perform their task. But, in many real
life situations individuals may make mistakes. In our analysis, we study a hierar-
chy which is composed of agents with imperfect calculation ability. Consequently,
the evaluation of a hierarchy is carried out in terms of three dimensions: (i) the
speed as well as (ii) the cost of information processing (i.e. the number of agents
involved), and (iii) the quality of the decision.
We consider the project selection example proposed by Radner (1993). The
organization’s task is to select one item out of a class of n items. This corresponds,
for example, to the choice of an investment project out of a set of competing
investment opportunities.
Our mathematical analysis focuses on two measures: the probability that the
best and the probability that the worst object is chosen by the hierarchy. We
take these to be our measures of quality. Our main result is that reduced trees
maximize quality for any number of data items, any number of processors and
any potential for making mistakes. Thus, the reduced tree is efficient in terms of
all three dimensions, speed, cost, and decision quality. Consequently, no trade-off
exists between decision speed and decision quality in hierarchy design.
This chapter is related to a recent literature that extends Radner’s framework
into various directions. The reduced tree is designed for one-shot problems (to
which we restrict attention). These are problems in which there is only one set
of data to be processed, or in which the processing of the data is finished before
another calculation task occurs. There are several contributions which assess
the design of a hierarchy, or more generally a network of agents, when this is
not the case (e.g. Van Zandt (1997, 1998); Meagher, Orbay and Van Zandt
(2001)). Meagher and Van Zandt (1998) modify Radner’s work with respect to
the payment of managers. Orbay (2002) adds the frequency with which new data
arrives as a new dimension to the analysis of efficient hierarchies. Prat (1997)
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studies hierarchies in which some managers are able to work faster than others
and the wage a manager is paid is a function of his ability. It turns out that with
these modifications – except for the one made by Prat (1997) – the reduced tree
is still (close to) efficient.
To our knowledge, all previous models of time consuming information pro-
cessing in hierarchies treat the information processing agents more or less like
machines, which perfectly do what they are programmed to do. The value added
of our work is to take into account the fact that human beings may make mis-
takes.2
In this regard, the problem studied in this chapter has certain similarities to
that in Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Sah and Stiglitz assess the relative performance
of two economic systems, namely a hierarchy and a polyarchy, when agents make
mistakes in the assessment of projects. They find that a hierarchy is less likely
to accept both bad projects and good projects than the polyarchy because the
polyarchy gives a second chance to rejected projects and the hierarchy performs
a second test on accepted projects. Sah and Stiglitz assume that agents use some
benchmark for the assessment of projects and that they may implement as many
projects as they like. Whereas in our model, the objective is to choose the best
object out of a given set.
Another analysis of the quality of hierarchical decision processes has previ-
ously been carried out in Jehiel (1999). Jehiel considers the case where some
information is lost during the aggregation procedure. With a certain probability,
which depends on the size of a hierarchical unit, information aggregation within
this unit is imperfect. Jehiel’s measure of quality is the probability of perfect
information aggregation. Optimal organizations consist of units with the same
number of members.
Our formal analysis uses some results on the optimal (quality-maximizing)
allocation of calculation tasks in van Zandt (2003). Van Zandt also studies the
way in which the allocation of calculation tasks affects decision quality. In his
setup, information aggregation is perfect, while the underlying information is
changing over time. Delay generates costs because the decision becomes less and
less appropriate over time. As in our model, this creates a cost when information
2One can argue that machines may make mistakes as well. In a companion paper, we study
organization design in a moral hazard setup, where agents are free to decide whether to obey
the program. Interestingly, the efficiency result extends to this setup.
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is processed unequally. Van Zandt shows that the highest decision quality can
be achieved with a balanced calculation tree, i.e. a sequence of calculation steps
that guarantees a symmetric treatment of all objects.
The corresponding lemma and some further results on the optimal organiza-
tion of calculation tasks will be briefly presented in Section 5.3 of this paper.
In Section 5.4, we use these results to study the quality-maximizing structure of
the hierarchical network, taking resource constraints into account. Based on the
results on optimal calculation trees, we derive a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for maximum quality networks with a given number of processors and
objects. We then show that these conditions are satisfied by all reduced trees.
Since they also minimize delay, we conclude that reduced trees are efficient. More-
over, any outcome of an efficient organization can be achieved by a reduced tree.
5.2 The Model
The aim of this paper is to identify the quality-maximizing organization of infor-
mation processing tasks for a given number of managers with imperfect informa-
tion processing ability and to relate this design to the organizational form that
completes the task fastest (Radner, 1993).
We first describe the decision problem and the limitations of agents’ ability
to deal with information. Next, we introduce our notion of hierarchies as well
as their representation in trees and briefly recall Radner’s (1992, 1993) result
regarding the optimal organizational form with respect to the dimension of time.
5.2.1 The decision problem
We consider a decision problem in which one out of a set of n alternatives has
to be chosen by a group of P identical agents. The alternatives (objects) are
indexed by i = 1, . . . n and the agents (managers) are indexed by p = 1, . . . P .
The alternatives differ only with respect to quality. Ex ante (prior to informa-
tion processing) the n objects are not distinguishable. However, there exists an
objective ranking of the objects according to quality. We assume that quality
is distributed in a such way that ties never occur, i.e. for two objects i and j,
either i is of higher quality than j or vice versa. All managers have identical
monotonous preferences regarding quality. In order to find the best alternative,
5.2. THE MODEL 101
the objects have to be compared. This is the information processing task that we
study in this chapter. Agents are endowed with an inbox, a processing unit and
a memory. In order to learn which alternative is the best one, an agent compares
the objects pairwise. He reads an object from his inbox into his processing unit
and compares it to the object in the memory. If the memory is empty, he stores
the first object he reads without processing.
An information processing task, i.e. the comparison of two objects i and j,
will be denoted i⊗ j. The result of the calculation, denoted (i⊗ j), is meant to
be the better of the two objects. However, information processing is imperfect:
with probability (1− q) < 1/2, the agent makes a mistake3 such that (i⊗ j) = i,
although j is better than i. With probability q, no mistake is made and the agent
correctly calculates (i⊗ j) = j.
Memory capacity is limited. In particular, an agent can store only one object.
After having performed an operation, the agent stores the object he assesses to
be the better one in his memory and takes the other one out of the set of possible
alternatives.
Time enters the analysis in the following way: It takes a manager one unit
of time to read an object he is supposed to process. We assume that neither the
operation itself, nor sending a report (i.e. submitting a partial result to another
agent) takes time. Thus, in one unit of time, a manager can perform the following
tasks: (i) taking an object out of the inbox into the processing unit, (ii) comparing
an object in the processing unit to the one in the memory (given that there are
objects in both), and (iii) sending a message to the superior.
We do not introduce any assumptions about agents’ preferences except for
monotonicity in the chosen object’s quality. Instead, we focus on the two extreme
outcomes, which are of relevance for all quality distributions and for all von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions: the event that the best object is chosen
and the event that the worst object is chosen. Since it is the hierarchy’s task
to find the best alternative, it is natural to measure quality in terms of the
probability that the best (worst) object will be the final outcome, i.e. in terms of
the probability of success and the probability of complete failure. Accordingly,
these probability measures quantify the quality of a decision in this chapter.4
3Another interpretation of the assumption that agents make mistakes is that they receive
an imperfect signal about which object is better suited to fit their needs.
4In particular, these measures deliver a complete description of situations in which the
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5.2.2 Trees
We restrict attention to hierarchical organizations. We follow Radner (1993) in
defining a hierarchy (an organizational tree) as follows:
Definition 5.1 A hierarchy H is a collection of objects (n data items and P
managers), together with a relation among them, called ”superior to”. The rela-
tion has the following properties:
1. Transitivity: If p is superior to p′, and p′ is superior to p′′, then p is superior
to p′′.
2. Antisymmetry: If p is superior to p′, then p′ is not superior to p. p′ is called
p’s subordinate.
3. There is exactly one object, called the root, that is superior to all the other
objects.
4. Except for the root, every object has exactly one immediate superior.
Figure 5.1 illustrates an example for an organizational hierarchy H that pro-
cesses 6 objects and the calculation tree T (H) induced by the program.5 In this
figure (as in those following), p represents manager p, and the objects are rep-
resented by their indices, 1, . . . 6. The ”superior to” relation is represented by a
link between the objects. A link from an object i to a manager p means that p
reads object i, a link from a manager p to p′ means that p reports the result of
his calculation activities to p′.
The organizational hierarchy determines who performs which task and who
reports to whom. We refer to the assignment of processing tasks as the program
and call the organization a programmed hierarchy. The program gives rise to a
calculation tree, illustrating the operations to be performed on the objects. There
are n objects (represented as the leaves in the tree) to be processed, i.e. (n− 1)
operations to be performed until the final result is obtained.
The program which underlies the trees depicted in Figure 5.1 gives the fol-
lowing instructions. In the first unit of time: agent 1, read object 1; agent 2,
read object 3; agent 3, read object 5. In the second unit of time: agent 1, read
2, perform 1 ⊗ 2, report (1⊗ 2) to agent 4, and similar instructions for agents
hierarchy’s task is to identify a certain object and there exists only one of its kind, e.g. a
murderer or a thief (whom one would like to choose as a police department – in this case he
represents the best object – and avoid choosing as a recruitment team).
5What we call a ”calculation tree” is called a ”binary tree” in Van Zandt (1993).
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Figure 5.1: Organizational structure and induced calculation structure.
2 and 3. In the third unit of time: agent 4, read agent 1’s report, in the fourth
unit of time, read 2’s report, perform (1⊗ 2) ⊗ (3⊗ 4), and in the fifth unit of
time, read agent 3’s report, perform ((1⊗ 2)⊗ (3⊗ 4))⊗ (5⊗ 6), and report the
result.
Note that a calculation tree can be induced by different organizational struc-
tures. For example, the calculation tree in Figure 5.1 is also obtained if agent 4’s
tasks are performed by one of the managers on the lower hierarchy level. However,
the organizational design matters in terms of speed.
In our setting with imperfect information processing ability, the associative
law of binary operations does not hold anymore. This is why quality depends on
the order of calculations. What matters in terms of quality is the calculation tree.
The particular organizational tree by which it is induced does not matter in our
setup as managers are assumed to be identical with respect to their calculation
ability. Hence, who performs a particular operation is irrelevant for quality. How-
ever, feasibility restrictions with respect to the hierarchical organization (as the
number of managers) limit the set of calculation trees that can be implemented.
5.2.3 Radner’s efficiency result
In this section, we briefly recall Radner’s (1993) results concerning the optimal
organizational design. Decision delay is affected by the extent of parallel compu-
tation, i.e. how much information is handled simultaneously. Radner (1992, 1993)
derives the following delay-minimizing organization of information processing: (i)
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Figure 5.2: Reduced tree.
Number the P managers subsequently from 1 to P and assign n/P objects to each
manager. (If n/P is not an integer, assign ⌊n/P ⌋ to each manager and another
one to the last n mod P ones.)6 (ii) Assign manager i’s partial result to (i− 1),
for each even i. Manager (i− 1) therewith becomes i’s immediate superior and
i is (i− 1)’s subordinate (if P is odd, one manager remains unconnected). (iii)
Rename the managers who are not yet somebody’s subordinate, assigning the
number 1 to the manager with the largest number. Repeat (ii) and (iii) until a
single manager remains (the top manager).7 Figure 5.2 depicts a reduced tree in
which 4 managers process 12 objects.
The virtue of this design is that information is processed in parallel as far
as it is possible. The n objects are aggregated to the final result in ⌊n/P ⌋ +
⌈log2 (P + n mod P )⌉ units of time.
8 Note that in order to maximize the speed
of information processing, the efficient number of managers never exceeds ⌊n/2⌋.
5.3 Calculation trees with maximum quality
In this section, we study the optimal organization of calculation tasks without
paying attention to feasibility constraints with respect to the hierarchical form
by which it could be induced. We are interested in the decision quality associated
6⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer ≤ x, and ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer ≥ x.
7This construction slightly deviates from the one proposed by Radner (1993), which does
not have an effect on speed, but – as will become clear later on – may affect quality.
8See Radner (1993) for the proof that this is indeed the delay minimizing organization.
5.3. CALCULATION TREES WITH MAXIMUM QUALITY 105
with the organization of information processing.9
We take a calculation tree T as given. The calculation tree determines a
calculation path for each object, and in particular how many comparisons an
object has to pass before being selected. Let δ(i, T ) be the length of the path
from leaf i to the root in tree T ,10 and let δT = (δ(1, T ), ..., δ(n, T )). Given that ex
ante the objects are of the same expected quality, the decision quality associated
with T is fully described by δT .
In order to choose the best object, all calculations performed on this object
have to be correct. To choose the worst object, all operations performed on it
have to entail mistakes. Since the combinatorics for choosing the best or the
worst item out of the given set are the same, the calculations are analogous. To
simplify the exposition, we focus on the probability of choosing the best object.
All of our results apply to quality measured in terms of the probability of picking
the worst object as well. This can easily be seen by replacing q with (1 − q) in
the calculations and is therefore omitted.11
If leaf i is the best object and if i is supposed to be processed δ(i, T ) times in
tree T , it will be chosen with probability qδ(i,T ). Object i is the best object with
probability 1/n. Hence, our quality measures can be defined as follows.
Definition 5.2 π (x, n, T ) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 x
δ(i,T ).
Lemma 5.1 With calculation tree T , the probability of choosing the best object
is π(q, n, T ), and the probability of choosing the worst object is π(1− q, n, T ).
Let T denote the set of calculation trees with n leaves. With respect to
decision quality, we use the following optimality criterion.
Definition 5.3 A calculation tree is optimal for the processing of n objects, if it
solves maxT∈T π(q, n, T ) and minT∈T π(1− q, n, T ).
9A different problem with a similar mathematical representation is studied in van Zandt
(2003). We thank a referee for pointing out to us that van Zandt’s results might help us
to generalize our earlier (Schulte and Gru¨ner, 2004) results on the comparison of different
hierarchies.
10When there is no ambiguity, we will suppress the argument T and use the notation δi.
11Note that it is not universally valid that an organization which chooses the best object
with a higher probability than another organization also has a lower chance to pick the worst
object (see Schulte and Gru¨ner (2004)). However, in our model, this is a feature of the optimal
organization.
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Original tree T Tree T ′ after Manipulation (∗)
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Figure 5.3: Calculation tree before and after Manipulation (∗).
Van Zandt (2003) has shown in a different context that calculation trees in
which the distance from a leaf to the root differs too much among the leaves are
dominated by trees in which these distances are more equal. The same is true
in our setup, as we will show in the following. Consider an arbitrary calculation
tree T , characterized by δT . Arrange the tree such that it starts with the deepest
nodes (as shown in Figure 5.3), and label the leaves in descending order as they
appear in the tree. We make use of a quality enhancing reorganization of the
leaves in order to derive the optimal calculation tree.
Manipulation (∗), ”switching” (van Zandt, 2003) :
1. Delete operation n ⊗ (n− 1) and perform the successive operations in
the affected branch on (n− 1) instead of (n⊗ (n− 1)).
2. Add operation 1⊗ n.
Call the new tree T ′. Manipulation (∗) is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
This manipulation has the following effects:
1. object 1 was formerly processed δ(1, T ) times, now it is processed δ(1, T )+1
times,
2. object n was formerly processed δ(n, T ) times, now it is processed δ(1, T )+1
times,
5.3. CALCULATION TREES WITH MAXIMUM QUALITY 107
3. object (n− 1) was formerly processed δ(n, T ) times, now it is processed
δ(n, T )− 1 times.
Thus, the effect of the manipulation on the probability of choosing the best
object is:
π (q, n, T )− π (q, n, T ′) = 1
n
(
−2qδ(n,T ) − qδ(1,T ) + 2qδ(1,T )+1 + qδ(n,T )−1
)
= 1
n
(2q − 1)
(
qδ(1,T ) − qδ(n,T )−1
)
. (5.1)
This expression is positive, if δ(1, T ) < δ(n, T ) − 1. Hence, the proposed ma-
nipulation increases the probability of choosing the best object as long as this
inequality holds. If we replace q with 1 − q in (5.1), the expression is negative,
verifying that Manipulation (∗) leads to a smaller probability of choosing the
worst outcome as well.
The intuition for this effect is the following. In the original tree, object 1 had
the best position concerning the probability of being chosen, because it had to
survive the smallest number of comparisons. Object 1 is the best (worst) object
with probability 1/n. Manipulation (∗) replaces object 1 with an object which
has a higher chance to be the best one and a lower chance to be the worst one.
This is so because processing a subset of items always increases quality as com-
pared to randomly choosing an object. In the other affected branch, the partial
result (n⊗ n− 1) is replaced with object (n− 1), to which a lower probability is
attached that it is the best object and a higher probability that it is the worst
one. But this object’s position is the worst one in the calculation tree concerning
the probability of being chosen. Hence, the first effect dominates the latter.
We now show that by repeatedly applying Manipulation (∗) (with appropri-
ate renaming of the objects) the best (highest quality) calculation tree is ob-
tained. Each manipulation increases (decreases) the probability of choosing the
best (worst) object, as long as δ1 < δn − 1. One can stop this procedure as soon
as δ1 ≥ δn − 1, i.e. when the objects are processed as equally as possible. Equa-
tion (5.1) implies that the calculation tree cannot be improved further with this
manipulation. In particular, applying Manipulation (∗) again only changes the
position of the objects in the tree, but does not affect the probability of choosing
the best object. Following van Zandt (2003), we call the resulting tree a balanced
tree (see Figure 5.4).
Definition 5.4 Consider a calculation tree T with n leaves. Name the leaves
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Figure 5.4: Balanced tree.
i = 1, . . . n such that δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ ... ≤ δn, where δi is the length of the path from i
to the root. A tree with the property δ1 ≥ δn − 1 is called a balanced tree.
Is there now an alternative manipulation that enhances decision quality even
further? Assume that this is the case. Then either (i) the manipulation again
leads to a balanced tree, or (ii) it yields a tree that is not balanced. In case (i),
the manipulation does not increase decision quality because all balanced trees
(given n and q) produce the same quality. In case (ii), the algorithm described
above can be applied to the resulting non-balanced tree, resulting in a balanced
tree which is superior in terms of quality. This implies that the resulting balanced
tree is better than the original balanced tree, and hence a contradiction.
This yields Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2 (van Zandt, 2003) Consider a calculation task on n objects. All
optimal calculation trees are balanced trees, i.e. δi − δj ≤ 1, for all objects i and
j.
We can also reverse the argument applied in this section. It is straightforward
that if one applies a manipulation converse to Manipulation (∗), quality decreases.
By repeatedly doing so, one gets a calculation tree with the property δ1 = 1, δi =
δi−1 + 1 for all i 6= 1, n, and δn = δn−1. Call this tree a serial tree.
Corollary 5.1 Consider a calculation task on n objects. Serial processing yields
the lowest quality.
The serial tree and serial subtrees will play an important role in the our anal-
ysis of efficient organizations. Two further useful results are stated in Lemmata
5.3 and 5.4.
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Figure 5.5: Serial tree.
Lemma 5.3 (van Zandt, 2003) In a serial tree S with n leaves, the probability
of choosing the best object is
π (q, n, S) = 1
n
q
1−q (1 + q
n−2 (1− 2q)) .
To save on notation we introduce Definition 5.
Definition 5.5 s (x) = q
1−q (1 + q
x−2 (1− 2q)).
Consider a partial result, produced by serially processing a subset of np
(out of n) items, e.g. the result of the first three operations in Figure 5.5,
(((7⊗ 6)⊗ 5)⊗ 4).
Lemma 5.4 (i) The probability that the partial result produced in a serial subtree
containing np raw data items is the best object is (1/n)s (np).
Moreover, (ii) for x > 0
s (np + x) = s (np) + q
np−1 (s (x+ 1)− 1) .
Proof. Part (i) follows from Lemma 5.3. To see (ii), note that in two
serial subtrees, one containing np items, and the other one containing np + x
items, where x > 0, the np − 1 items processed last have the same probability of
reaching the root in both trees. The item processed first in the smaller tree is the
best object with probability 1/n. This object is replaced in the larger tree with
a partial result (produced within another serial subtree) which is the best object
with probability (1/n)s (x+ 1). Q.E.D.
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5.4 Efficient organizations
We use the following efficiency criterion in our analysis.
Definition 5.6 A hierarchy is efficient if no alternative organization exists for
processing a given set of n objects which performs better on one of the dimen-
sions (i) quality, (ii) speed, and (iii) cost, and at least equally well on the other
dimensions.
In this section, we show that for a given information processing problem and a
given number of managers P , reduced trees maximize quality. Since the reduced
tree is also the fastest way to deal with n objects, this organization is efficient.
The efficiency of the reduced tree can directly be established for an organiza-
tion with ⌊n/2⌋ managers. Recall the properties of a reduced tree from Section
5.2.3. In the first phase of information aggregation, each manager aggregates the
raw data items assigned directly to his inbox. A manager’s processing activity in
this phase can be depicted by a serial tree. With ⌊n/2⌋ managers, each of the se-
rial trees has two leaves.12 Moreover, the reporting structure induces a balanced
calculation tree, where the ”leaves” are the results of the first aggregation phase.
Hence, a reduced tree with ⌊n/2⌋ managers induces a balanced calculation tree.
Proposition 5.1 A reduced tree with ⌊n/2⌋ managers is efficient.
Consequently, there is a non-trivial upper bound for the size of efficient hier-
archies.
Corollary 5.2 No efficient hierarchy employs more than ⌊n/2⌋ managers.
We now turn to a complete characterization of efficient hierarchies. For this
purpose, it is useful to distinguish between an object that has been compared to
another one and an object that has not yet been processed. We call the former
a partial result and the latter a raw data item. Let np denote the number of
raw data items p is supposed to handle, with
∑P
p=1 np = n. If fewer than ⌊n/2⌋
managers are available, there must be more than one manager p such that np > 2.
In a hierarchy with fewer than ⌊n/2⌋ managers, the balanced calculation tree is
12If n is odd, one of the trees has three leaves.
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in general not implementable. The reason is that limited memory capacity forces
each manager to process the information he is supposed to handle serially.
We now derive the quality-maximizing hierarchy design with fewer than ⌊n/2⌋
managers. As it turns out, reduced trees are optimal. To gain an intuition why
this is the case, consider Figure 5.6, which represents the calculation tree induced
by the reduced tree depicted in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.6: Calculation tree induced by the reduced tree in Figure 5.2.
The calculation tree contains four serial subtrees of equal length, hence any
partial result is the best object with equal probability. We know from the previ-
ous section that there is no better way to organize the processing of the partial
results than a balanced tree. Moreover, given that the partial results are pro-
cessed in a balanced tree, i.e. all partial results have the same distance mp to
the root, a reassignment of raw data items cannot increase quality: Consider a
reassignment of one object from one agent to another. This reorganization affects
two serial subtrees: Both have the same number np of leaves initially. After the
reassignment, one of them has np− 1 leaves, and the other one has np+1 leaves.
The effect on π (.) is
∆π (.) = 1
n
qmp (s (np − 1) + s (np + 1)− 2s (np))
= 1
n
qmp (1− 2q) qnp−1 (1− q) < 0⇔ q > 1
2
.
However, the reasoning above does not tell us anything about the reduced
tree’s performance relative to hierarchies in which neither every agent processes
the same number of raw data items, nor the partial results are aggregated in a
balanced tree. Our strategy to exclude such structures is to consider an arbitrary
hierarchy H and to look for a feasible reorganization of calculation tasks such that
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quality increases. If we find such a reorganization, hierarchyH is not optimal with
respect to quality. This yields necessary conditions for optimal hierarchy design.
Step by step, we restrict attention to hierarchies in which the necessary conditions
are met. We finally show that the set of necessary conditions is sufficient.
Consider a programmed hierarchy H with P < n/2 managers and its calcula-
tion tree T (H). Let np ≥ 0 be the number of raw data items processed by agent
p and let rp ≥ 0 be the number of reports processed by agent p. If p′ reports
to p, we denote by rp′p the report p
′ sends to p. We may restrict attention to
the case that p′ processes strictly more than one object, since otherwise H could
be reprogrammed assigning the object directly to p and firing p′. We denote by
δ (i, T (H)) the length of the path from leaf i to the root in the calculation tree
induced by H, and with δ (rp′p, T (H)) the length of the path from report rp′p to
the root. The first two necessary conditions on quality-maximizing hierarchies
are provided in Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6.
Lemma 5.5 In a quality-maximizing hierarchy with P < n/2 managers, every
agent p, for whom np > 0 and rp > 0, processes the raw data items before pro-
cessing a report.
Proof. Suppose p was processing report rp′p before being finished with the
raw data. Then there exists an object i such that δ (i, T (H)) < δ (rp′p, T (H)).
The probability that i is the best object is 1/n, whereas rp′p – containing more
than one raw data item – is the best object with probability higher than 1/n
and the worst one with probability lower than 1/n. Exchanging the positions of
object i and report rp′p increases the probability that report rp′p will be chosen
from qδ(rp′p,T (H)) to qδ(i,T (H)) (if it is the best object), and vice versa for object i.
Hence, quality increases. Q.E.D.
A consequence of the lemma above is that for any agent p with np > 0 the cal-
culation subtree describing this agent’s task contains a serial subtree connecting
the np raw data items. The reorganization of the hierarchy proposed in the proof
of Lemma 5.5 and the associated effect on the calculation tree are illustrated in
Figure 5.7.
Lemma 5.6 In a quality-maximizing hierarchy with P < n/2 managers, every
agent processes raw data.
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Figure 5.7: Process raw data first. (Lemma 5.5)
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Proof. Suppose np = 0 for some agent p. Assign p’s tasks to one of
his direct subordinates and preserve the order of calculations in this subtree.
Note that quality is unaffected. Look for the agent p′ who processes the largest
amount of raw data. If np′ > 3, assign two items to p and let p report the result
to p′. Let p′ read the report after finishing his raw data. Note that this yields a
manipulation of the calculation tree in the spirit of Manipulation (∗) and hence
increases quality. If np′ = 3, search for another agent p
′′ processing three raw data
items. Assign an item from each of these managers to p. Denote by Np′p′′ the
set of remaining raw data items processed by p′ and p′′. Identify the agent who
processes the object i, for which δ (i,H) = min {δ (j,H)}j∈Np′p′′ , and let p report
to this agent. Let p’s report be read immediately after the raw data. Again,
the reorganization yields a manipulation of the calculation tree in the spirit of
Manipulation (∗) and hence increases quality. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the lemma above is straightforward: By involving more
processors in the processing of raw data items, serial subtrees can be transformed
into ”more balanced” ones. We know from the previous section that this enhances
quality. The reorganization of the hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.9: Reorganization used to prove Lemma 5.7.
From Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6 we know that every quality-maximizing hierarchy
induces a calculation tree containing P serial subtrees. It remains to be studied
(i) how many leaves (np) these subtrees optimally have, (i.e. how many raw data
items shall be assigned to each manager), and (ii) how the serial subtrees are
optimally arranged, (i.e. the optimal reporting structure). Note that with regard
to the arrangement of the P serial subtrees, any tree can be implemented, because
we are endowed with P processors, and there are only P − 1 operations left to
perform.
Let mp denote the distance from p’s result of the raw data processing phase
to the root.
Lemma 5.7 In a quality-maximizing hierarchy, (mp + np)− (mp′ + np′) ≤ 1 for
all p and p′.
Proof. The probability of choosing the best object is π(.) =
∑P
p=1
1
n
qmps(np).
Consider the effect of a reassignment of a raw data item from p to p′. We have:
∆π(.) = (1/n)(qmp(s(np − 1)− s(np)) + q
mp′ (s(np′ + 1)− s(np′)))
= (1/n)(qmp(1− 2q)qnp−2 + qmp′ (2q − 1)qnp′−1)
= (1/n)(2q − 1)(qmp′+np′−1 − qmp+np−2)
> 0 ⇔ mp + np > mp′ + np′ + 1.
Hence, we can increase quality using the proposed reorganization as long as there
exist p and p′ such that (mp + np)− (mp′ + np′) > 1. Q.E.D.
According to Lemma 5.7, the distance from a serial subtree’s deepest leaf
to the root of the calculation tree differs by at most one unit among all serial
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subtrees. The last step is to determine the optimal reporting structure. The
optimal assignment of raw data items then follows from Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.8 In a quality-maximizing hierarchy, for all p and p′, (i) mp−mp′ ≤ 1,
and (ii) np − np′ ≤ 2, where np − np′ = 2 only if mp′ −mp = 1.
Proof. (i) Name the agents such that m1 = m2 ≥ ... ≥ mP . If mp = mp′,
and np < np′, name p and p′ such that p gets the lower number. Hence, agent
1 processes the lowest number of raw data items, and his partial result has the
longest distance to the root. Agent P ’s partial result has the shortest distance to
the root. Note that the serial subtree representing agent 1’s raw data processing
activities must be connected directly to another serial subtree. That is, there
exists an agent p′ such that either agent 1 or agent p′ is engaged only in raw data
processing, and the other agent reads the report immediately after his raw data
items.
Now, assume that mp−mp′ ≤ 1 does not hold for all p, i.e. assume that there
exists an integer k > 1 such that m1 = mP + k. We show that in this case the
following reorganization enhances quality: Reassign a raw data item from agent
P to agent 1. Let agent 1 report the result of his raw data processing activities
to agent P , and let agent P read this report after finishing his remaining raw
data processing activities. Assign agent 1’s remaining tasks (if there are any) to
agent p′. Note that the raw data items processed by p′ move up one position in
the calculation tree when removing agent 1’s partial result.
The effect of this reorganization on quality is the following:
∆π(.) = (1/n){qm1−1((1− q)s(np′)− qs(n1)) (5.2)
+qmP+1(s(n1 + 1)− 1)}. (5.3)
The effect of removing the serial subtree representing agent 1’s raw data pro-
cessing activities is captured by (5.2), and the effect of reattaching it is summa-
rized in (5.3). Note that the serial subtree representing agent 1’s tasks replaces
the raw data item processed last by agent P in the original program. Lemma 5.7
requires that np′ ∈ {n1, n1 + 1}. Let D assume the value 1 if np′ = n1 + 1, and
0 otherwise. We have:
∆π(.) = (1/n){qmP+k−1((1− q)s(n1 +D)− qs(n1))
+qmP+1(s(n1 + 1)− 1)}.
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Figure 5.10: Reorganization used to prove Lemma 5.8.
∆π(.) > 0
⇔ qk−2((1− 2q)s(n1) +Dqn1−1(2q − 1)(1− q)) + qs(n1) + q − 1 > 0
⇔ (1− q)( q
1−q (1 + (1− 2q)q
k−3)s(n1)− 1 +Dqn1+k−3(2q − 1)) > 0
⇔ (1− q)(s(k − 1)s(n1)− 1) +Dq
n1+k−3(2q − 1)(1− q) > 0 (5.4)
The second term in (5.4) is either zero, or positive if q > 1/2, and negative
if q < 1/2. The first term is positive if and only if s(k − 1)s(n1)− 1 is positive.
Note that s(x) > 1 for x ≥ 1 if and only if q > 1/2. Hence, ∆π(.) > 0 if and only
if q > 1/2.
Part (ii) follows from Lemma 5.7 and part (i). Q.E.D.
Note that, if np − np′ = 2 and mp′ −mp = 1, a reassignment of one raw data
item from p to p′ yields a permutation of δT , but has no effect on quality. That is,
a quality-maximizing hierarchy which has the property np − np′ = 2, for some p
and p′, coexists with another quality-maximizing organization with the property
np − np′ ≤ 1, for all p and p′.
Part (i) of Lemma 5.8 states that an optimal hierarchy has a reporting struc-
ture such that the P partial results of the first processing phase are aggregated
in a balanced calculation tree. Part (ii) requires an equal assignment of the raw
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data items (up to ”integer leftovers”). We are in a position to state our main
results.
Proposition 5.2 A hierarchy with P managers maximizes quality if and only if
it has the properties stated in Lemmata 5.5-5.8.
Proof. Necessity has been established already. To verify sufficiency, note
that any feasible reorganization has either no effect on quality or yields a violation
of at least one of the necessary conditions stated in Lemmata 5.5-5.8. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.3 All reduced trees are efficient.
Proof. Reduced trees have the properties described in Lemmata 5.5-5.8,
hence they maximize quality given P . We know from Radner (1993) that a re-
duced tree achieves the minimum delay for a given number of processors. Q.E.D.
As a reduced tree maximizes the speed of the decision procedure given the
number of managers, as well as the quality of the decision, no slower working
hierarchy with the same number of managers can be efficient.
Corollary 5.3 A hierarchy with P managers processing n objects is efficient only
if it achieves minimum delay. Any outcome of an efficient organization can be
achieved by a reduced tree.
5.5 Conclusion
We studied a problem of efficient decentralized information aggregation in a setup
with information processing imperfections. Our results indicate that a hierarchy
designer does not face a trade-off between the speed and the quality of information
aggregation. The reduced tree proposed by Radner (1993) is a hierarchy in which
information processing takes minimum time and delivers maximum quality for a
given number of processors and objects. Moreover, we find that highest quality
can be obtained by the reduced tree with ⌊n/2⌋ managers (which is again the
fastest of its class).
There are several useful extensions of our framework. First, it would be de-
sirable to consider more general measures of decision quality. This would require
118 CHAPTER 5. IMPERFECT INFORMATION PROCESSING
the specification of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, as well as as-
sumptions on the distribution of quality. Our results hold regardless of the form
the utility function takes or how quality is distributed.
As a referee pointed out to us, processing imperfections may have an impact
on the properties of the efficient set of hierarchies only if the associative law of
binary operations does not hold anymore. For combinations of calculation tasks
and processing imperfections other than the ones considered in our paper, it
may still hold. It is worth studying which combinations yield a violation of the
associative law and whether alternative specifications would affect our efficiency
results.
We introduced an information processing imperfection into the analysis of de-
centralized information aggregation by restricting the calculation ability of agents
in an intuitive, but rather simplifying manner. In our setup, agents’ mistakes do
not depend on the quality of the two compared items. Intuitively, mistake making
should depend on the task to be performed. To incorporate this consideration
into our model, one could make use of probabilistic choice models, such as Luce
(1959). Again, this modification would require the specification of the quality
distribution and of the utility function.
One may also allow agents to influence the individual probability of making
a mistake through effort. This issue is addressed in Gru¨ner and Schulte (2004),
where a game-theoretical approach is taken to study the incentives for effort
provision in carrying out a decentralized information processing task.
Finally, we restricted attention to hierarchical organizations. In such an or-
ganization, calculations cannot be repeated and agents make one final report to
their superior. If information processing is imperfect, one would like to repeat
calculations to increase quality. However, the hierarchical structure precludes the
possibility of sending an object to multiple processors. Whether or not a more
general structure is feasible depends on the agents’ information-storing abilities
and on the information structure. For instance, if the objects cannot be copied,
and only one agent can work on an object at any time (e.g. job candidates who
need to be interviewed), then it is impossible to send objects to multiple proces-
sors and hierarchies are the only feasible organization in a setting with limited
memory capacity. In our notion of a hierarchy, we allowed for only one upward
link for each manager. However, one might want to allow a manager to send
more than one report to his superior. With respect to the speed of information
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processing, it is optimal to implement a hierarchical structure as defined in this
paper. In terms of quality, it may make sense to allow for multiple reports to
get closer to the balanced calculation tree. Concerning these modifications, one
would have to specify a different information processing technology. Both modi-
fications – multiple reports and repeated calculations – would involve a trade-off
between speed and quality that does not play a role in our framework.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
Derivation of Equation (3.2)
Given kα α-signals and kβ β-signals, Bayesian updating yields:
p(ω = A|κ = kα − kβ) =
1
2
qkα(1− q)kβ
1
2
qkα(1− q)kβ + 1
2
qkβ(1− q)kα
=
qkα−kβ
qkα−kβ + (1− q)kα−kβ
Defining k = kα − kβ gives us:
p (A |κ = k ) =
qk
qk + (1− q)k
.
Derivation of Equation (3.3)
There are exactly k more α-signals than β-signals (k possibly negative) within
the group of voters except for i if there are exactly n−1+k
2
α-signals, and (the
residuum) n− 1− n−1+k
2
β-signals. We have to sum up all these cases:
µi(κ−i = k) =


∑
J⊆{1,...n}\{i}:|J |=n−1+k
2
∏
j∈J
µi(σj = α)
∏
l∈{1,...n}\{J∪i}
µi(σl = β),
for k ∈ E{−n + 1, . . . , n− 1}
0, for k /∈ {−n + 1, . . . , n− 1}.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
First note that in a unanimous voting strategy profile (conditional on the com-
munication outcome) as in the potential equilibrium, no single vote has an effect
on the outcome. Hence there exists no profitable deviation at the voting stage.
Moreover, the voting strategy profile has the property that no private information
(information which was not revealed in the communication stage) will be aggre-
gated in the voting stage. The collective decision depends only on the evidence
presented in the communication stage: x = a, if k(c) ≥ k + 1, and x = b else.
In the following, we can take the decision rule as given. Note that the reve-
lation of an α-signal can only have the effect to change the decision from b to a,
and vice versa for the revelation of a β-signal.
Agent i has an incentive to reveal an α-signal if and only if he believes that
pi(ω = A) ≥ θi conditional on the event that his revelation changes the decision
from b to a, i.e. conditional on the evidence being k without his revelation. He
has an incentive to reveal a β-signal if and only if he believes that pi(ω = A) ≤ θi
conditional on the event that his revelation changes the decision from a to b, i.e.
conditional on the evidence being k + 1 without his revelation.
γ∗ is a communication equilibrium (given the decision rule) iff
(i) ∀i : γ∗i (σi) =
{
σi, for σi = α
s, for σi = β
:
pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) ≥ θi, and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) > θi,
(ii) ∀i : γ∗i (σi) = σi :
pi(ω = A|σi = α
piv
i ) ≥ θi ≥ pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ), and
(iii) ∀i : γ∗i (σi) =
{
s, for σi = α
σi, for σi = β
:
pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) < θi, and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) ≤ θi,
where pi(ω = A|σˆ
piv
i ) denotes the probability i assigns to ω = A conditional
on the event that his signal σˆi is pivotal for the decision, taking as given the
communication strategies of agents −i and the decision rule. We will have a
closer look at pi(ω = A|σˆpiv). It is convenient to introduce some further notation.
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Consider a (pure) communication strategy profile γ. Denote Nβ(γ) = {i :
γi(β) = β}, nβ(γ) = |Nβ(γ)|, Nα(γ) = {i : γi(α) = α}, nα(γ) = |Nα(γ)|. Denote
with k−i(c) the evidence provided by agents −i in the communication stage.
Given communication strategies γ−i, k−i(c) = k happens if (and only if) there
are k+ l α-signals within the group of committee members other than i planning
to reveal α, i.e. agents j ∈ Nα(γ∗) \ {i}, and l β-signals within the group of
committee members (other than i) planning to reveal β (agents j ∈ Nβ(γ∗)\{i}),
for all l = max{0,−k}, . . . ,min{nα(γ∗)− k − 1γ∗i (α)=α, nβ(γ
∗)− 1γ∗i (β)=β}, where
1x = 1 if x is true and 0 else. Abbreviate L(γ) = {max{0,−k}, . . . ,min{nα(γ∗)−
k − 1γ∗i (α)=α, nβ(γ
∗)− 1γ∗i (β)=β}
An α-signal is pivotal in state A with probability
prob{αpivi |ω = A} = (A.1)∑
l∈L(γ∗)
(nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α
k+l
)
(δq)k+l(1− δq)
nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α−k−l
·
(nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β
l
)
(δ(1− q))l(1− δ(1− q))
nβ(γ
∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β−l.
In state B, an α-signal is pivotal with probability
prob{αpivi |ω = B} = (A.2)∑
l∈L(γ∗)
(nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α
k+l
)
(δ(1− q))k+l(1− δ(1− q))
nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α−k−l
·
(nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β
l
)
(δq)l(1− δq)
nβ(γ
∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β−l.
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have
pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) (A.3)
=
p(ω=A|σi=α)prob{αpivi |ω=A}
p(ω=A|σi=α)prob{αpivi |ω=A}+(1−p(ω=A|σi=α))prob{αpivi |ω=B}
=
qprob{αpivi |ω=A}
qprob{αpivi |ω=A}+(1−q)prob{αpivi |ω=B}
= 1
1+( 1−qq )
k+1
( 1−δ(1−q)1−δq )
nα(γ∗)−nβ (γ∗)−k−1γ∗
i
(α)=α+1γ∗
i
(β)=β
.
Analogously, k−i(c) = k+1 happens if there are k+1+ l α-signals within the
group of committee members other than i planning to reveal α, i.e. agents j ∈
Nα(γ∗)\{i}, and l β-signals within the group of committee members (other than
i) planning to reveal β (agents j ∈ Nβ(γ∗)\{i}), for all l ∈ L(γ∗)\{−k ;nα(γ∗)−
k − 1γ∗i (α)=α}. Denote L
′(γ∗) = L(γ∗) \ {−k ;nα(γ∗)− k − 1γ∗i (α)=α}.
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A β-signal is pivotal in state A with probability
prob{βpivi |ω = A} = (A.4)∑
l∈L′(γ∗)
(nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α
k+1+l
)
(δq)k+1+l(1− δq)
nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α−k−1−l
·
(nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β
l
)
(δ(1− q))l(1− δ(1− q))
nβ(γ
∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β−l.
In state B, a β-signal is pivotal with probability
prob{βpivi |ω = B} = (A.5)∑
l∈L′(γ∗)
(nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β
l
)
(δq)l(1− δq)
nβ(γ
∗)−1γ∗
i
(β)=β−l
·
(nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α
k+1+l
)
(δ(1− q))k+1+l(1− δ(1− q))
nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i
(α)=α−k−1−l
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have
pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) (A.6)
=
p(ω=A|σi=β)prob{βpivi |ω=A}
p(ω=A|σi=β)prob{αpivi |ω=A}+(1−p(ω=A|σi=β))prob{αpivi |ω=B}
=
(1−q)prob{βpivi |ω=A}
(1−q)prob{βpivi |ω=A}+(1−q)prob{βpivi |ω=B}
= 1
1+( 1−qq )
k
( 1−δ(1−q)1−δq )
nα(γ∗)−nβ (γ∗)−k−1γ∗
i
(α)=α+1γ∗
i
(β)=β−1
.
We have that pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) < pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) ∀i. Hence, given the decision rule
k, in any communication equilibrium (in pure strategies) each voter reveals at
least one type of signal. Note that pi(ω = A|σˆ
piv
i ) is ceteris paribus higher (i) the
higher k, (ii) the lower nα(γ), and (iii) the higher nβ(γ). Note also that pi(.) are
the same for i (given k) for communication profiles γ′ and γ′′ if nα(γ′)−nβ(γ′) =
nα(γ
′′)− nβ(γ′′) and γ′i = γ
′′
i . Further note that pi(ω = A|σˆ
piv
i ) = pj(ω = A|σˆ
piv
j )
if γi = γj.
Consider a communication profile γ. Denote the belief pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) of
an agent who reveals both types of signals (if endowed with them), i.e. agent
i : γi(σi) = σi with pα(γ) and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) with pβ(γ). Similarly, denote
the beliefs of an agent who reveals α and conceals β, i.e. agent i : γi(α) =
α, γi(β) = s with p
β−conc
α (γ) and p
β−conc
β (γ), respectively. Denote the beliefs of
agent i : γi(α) = s, γi(β) = β with p
α−conc
α (γ) and p
α−conc
β (γ), respectively. It is
easy to verify that pβ−concσˆ (γ) > pσˆ(γ) > p
α−conc
σˆ (γ), σˆ = α, β. Concerning the
position of pα−concα (γ) and p
β−conc
β (γ), we have to distinguish three cases:
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(i) If δ < δ′(q), we have
pα−concβ (γ) < pβ(γ) < p
β−conc
β (γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc
α (γ),
(ii) if δ′(q) < δ < δ′′(q), we have
pα−concβ (γ) < pβ(γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < p
β−conc
β (γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc
α (γ),
(iii) if δ > δ′′(q), we have
pα−concβ (γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < pβ(γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc
β (γ) < p
β−conc
α (γ),
where δ′(q) =
1−( q1−q )
1/3
1−q(1+( q1−q )
1/3
)
and δ′′(q) =
1−( q1−q )
1/2
1−q(1+( q1−q )
1/2
)
. The three cases are
depicted in Figure A.1. In case (i), the information contained in any committee
member’s silence plays a minor role, because the endowment with information
is relatively unlikely. Hence, beliefs are mainly determined by revealed infor-
mation and the own signal. As the endowment with information becomes more
likely, communication strategies of the other committee members gain impor-
tance whereas the own information endowment becomes relatively unimportant
for the beliefs. As δ → 1, pα − pβ → 0. To see why this is the case, suppose that
δ = 1 and suppose that nα agents other than i reveal α and nβ agents other than
i reveal β. Agent i’s α is pivotal if k + l α-signals and l β-signals are revealed –
which implies that (n− 1− nα − l) α-signals and (n− 1− nβ − k − l) β-signals
are concealed. Hence, i can infer that κ = 2k + nβ − nα − 1. He makes the same
inference if he is pivotal with a β-signal. The two situations differ in that there
must be an agent who has an α in the former, and a β in the latter case. As i
has a β in the former and an α in the latter case, κ is inferred to be the same.
A communication profile γ is a communication equilibrium if
(i) every agent reveals at least one type of signal,
(ii) ∀i : θi < p
α−conc
α (γ
∗) : γ∗i (α) = α,
(iii) ∀i : θi > p
β−conc
β (γ
∗) : γ∗i (β) = β,
(iv) ∀i : θi > pα(γ∗) : γ∗i (α) = s, and
(v) ∀i : θi < pβ(γ∗) : γ∗i (β) = s.
We proof existence by constructing communication profiles together with a deci-
sion rule k such that conditions (i)-(v) are met for cases (ii) and (iii). For case
(i), existence is not guaranteed.
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pα−concβ
⋄
pβ
⋄
pβ−concβ⋄
pα−concα
⋄
pα
⋄
pβ−concα⋄
Case (i): δ < δ′
pα−concβ
⋄
pβ
⋄
pβ−concβ⋄
pα−concα
⋄
pα
⋄
pβ−concα⋄
Case (ii): δ′ < δ < δ′′
pα−concβ
⋄
pβ
⋄
pβ−concβ⋄
pα−concα
⋄
pα
⋄
pβ−concα⋄
Case (iii): δ > δ′′
Figure A.1: Structure of the committee members’ beliefs.
Consider first case (iii). Let k be the integer for which:
1
1 + 1−δq
1−δ(1−q)
(
(1−q)(1−δq)
q(1−δ(1−q))
)k ≤ θm ≤ 1
1 + 1−q
q
(
(1−q)(1−δq)
q(1−δ(1−q))
)k .
The decision rule k is chosen in such a way that the median preference type is
willing to reveal both types of signals if there are as many other agents revealing
α as there are revealing β.1 The above conditions (i)-(v) hold for the following
communication profile: ∀i : θi < θm : γi(α) = α, γi(β) = s; ∀i : θi > θm : γi(α) =
s, γi(β) = β; i : θi = θm : γi(α) = α, γi(β) = β. We have nα(γ) = nβ(γ) =
n+1
2
.
Hence γ is an equilibrium communication profile with the property stated in the
proposition.
Consider case (ii). Let the decision rule k be such that pα−concα ≤ θm ≤ p
β−conc
β
for nα = nβ.
2 The following communication profile is an equilibrium: ∀i : θi <
θm : γi(α) = α, γi(β) = s; ∀i : θi > θm : γi(α) = s, γi(β) = β; i : θi = θm :
1As 1
1+ 1−δq
1−δ(1−q) (
(1−q)(1−δq)
q(1−δ(1−q)) )
k+1 >
1
1+ 1−q
q (
(1−q)(1−δq)
q(1−δ(1−q)) )
k , such a k might not exist. In this case,
we can find a k together with |nα−nβ| = 1 such that the above inequalities hold. The following
arguments are analogous, hence we restrict ourselves to the case that θm is such that a k exists
for which both inequalities hold.
2If such a k does not exist, it exists for |nα − nβ| = 1 or 2.
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γi(α) = α, γi(β) = β. Again, we have nα(γ) = nβ(γ) =
n+1
2
.
Consider case (i). Choose k such that pβ−concβ ≤ θm ≤ p
α−conc
α if nα = nβ.
Construct the communication profile as follows: First, let agents i : θi ≤ pα−concα
reveal α and agents i : θi ≥ p
β−conc
β reveal β, and let all all other information be
concealed. Note that nα, nβ ≥
n+1
2
. If nα = nβ, the communication profile is an
equilibrium. If nα > nβ, modify the communication profile for agents i : pβ ≤ θi ≤
pβ−concβ : let min{nα−nβ, |{i : pβ ≤ θi ≤ p
β−conc
β }|} of them reveal β in addition to
the revelation described above. The new communication profile is an equilibrium
with the properties stated in the proposition if nα−nβ ≤ |{i : pβ ≤ θi ≤ p
β−conc
β }|.
However, we cannot guarantee existence of such a communication equilibrium in
general.
It remains to be shown that |k| < |km|. To see this, note that in equilibrium,
θm ∈ [pβ , pα]. Remember that θm ∈
[
1
1+( 1−qq )
km ,
1
1+( 1−qq )
km+1
]
. Given decision
rule k, for δ → 0, pβ and pα converge to
1
1+( 1−qq )
k and
1
1+( 1−qq )
km+1 , respectively.
For δ → 1, they converge to 1
1+( 1−qq )
2k−nα−nβ+1 . Hence, in the equilibria which we
consider |k| is at most |km| and the lower the higher δ. Q.E.D.
Probability agent i assigns to θm = θ
′
For θ′ < θi :
φmi (θ
′) = (n− 1)
(
n− 2
n−1
2
)
Φ(θ′)
n−1
2 (1− Φ(θ′))
n−3
2 φ(θ′)dθ′, (A.7)
for θ′ = θi :
φmi (θi) =
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
Φ(θi)
n−1
2 (1− Φ(θi))
n−1
2 , (A.8)
and for θ′ > θi :
φmi (θ
′) = (n− 1)
(
n− 2
n−1
2
)
Φ(θ′)
n−3
2 (1− Φ(θ′))
n−1
2 φ(θ′)dθ′. (A.9)
Probability agent i assigns to κ−i given σi
For σi = α:
µi(κ−i = k′|α} =
(
n−1
n−1+k′
2
)((
q
1−q
) k′
2
q +
(
1−q
q
) k′
2
(1− q)
)
∑
kˆ∈E{−n+1,...n−1}
( n−1
n−1+kˆ
2
)((
q
1−q
) kˆ
2
q +
(
1−q
q
) kˆ
2
(1− q)
) , (A.10)
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and for σi = β :
µi(κ−i = k′|β) =
(
n−1
n−1+k′
2
)((
q
1−q
)k′
2
(1− q) +
(
1−q
q
) k′
2
q
)
∑
kˆ∈E{−n+1,...n−1}
( n−1
n−1+kˆ
2
)((
q
1−q
) kˆ
2
q +
(
1−q
q
) kˆ
2
(1− q)
) , (A.11)
where E{−n+1, . . . n−1} is the set of even numbers between (including) −n+1
and n− 1, and µi(κ−i = k′|σi) = 0 for odd values k′.
Sufficient condition for full information revelation: Example
Consider a committee with three members, each of whom receives a signal which
is correct with probability 0.8. We know from Proposition 3.5 that a full infor-
mation revelation equilibrium exists if the preference parameters are drawn from
[0.2, 0.985] or from [0.015, 0.8]. Suppose preferences are drawn from a uniform
distribution which is symmetric with respect to 1/2. We identify the minimum
θmin (and therewith the maximum θmax) for which a full information revelation
equilibrium exists. Existence is guaranteed for θmin ≥ 0.2, and obviously, we
must have θmin > 0.015, otherwise the most biased types’ preferred alternative
does not depend on the realization of the signals. Hence, we consider the case
0.015 < θmin < 0.2 As outlined above, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs best support a
full information equilibrium, if (i) probability 1 is assigned to κ = −1 in case
ci = s and k(c) = −2, and (ii) probability 1 is assigned to κ = 3 in case ci = s
and k(c) = 2. Because of symmetry, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs for the case ci = s
and k(c) = 0 assign equal probability to κ = −1 and κ = 1. Again because
of symmetry, existence is guaranteed if type θmin has an incentive to reveal a
β-signal. Type θmin has an incentive to reveal a β-signal if
(1/2 · 0.83 + 1/2 · 0.23)(θmin − 0.015)Φ(0.2)(1− Φ(0.2))
≥ (1/2 · 0.8 · 0.22 + 1/2 · 0.2 · 0.82)(0.2− θmin)(Φ(0.5)− Φ(0.2)(1− Φ(0.5))
⇔ 0.26(θmin − 0.015)(0.2− θmin)(0.8− θmin)
> 0.08(0.2− θmin)(0.5− (0.2− θmin))0.5
⇔ θmin ≥ 0.10446.
Note that the sufficient condition stated in Proposition 3.5 allows for potential
conflicts of interests (as measured by θmax − θmin) of 0.785 for this example,
whereas the sufficient condition stated here allows for 0.79.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4
We have to show that neither concealing bl nor concealing ch is a profitable
deviation for a low type from a putative equilibrium in which he reveals the
information. Obviously, a low type aims to influence only the high types’ votes
by concealing information, as he shares common interests with the other low
type. When observing ch, a low type does not want implementation. Concealing
ch can have an effect on a high type j’s vote only if j finds himself in information
set Ih(b
l) or Ih(∅). Note that µi(bh) cannot be affected by concealing ch. In
both information sets, µj(c
l) is higher when ch is concealed than if it is revealed.
Hence, the only effect the concealment of ch can have is to cause a vote for
implementation, which is clearly not in the interest of a low type, who prefers
rejection. It is easy to verify that analogous arguments apply for a low type’s
revelation of bl, and a high type’s revelation of bh and cl. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.5
Consider an uninformed low type player i. Given that no player has revealed
information, i can infer (by Lemma 4.4) that neither of the high types has ob-
served bh or cl. The only player who might have information which makes the
state in which i prefers implementation more likely (in the sense of raising µi(c
l)
or µi(b
h) above the prior) is the other low type. If any of the high types pos-
sesses information, i can infer that either c = ch or b = bl, in which case i does
not want implementation. Hence, expected utility from implementation can be
positive only in the case in which neither of the high types has information and
the other low type has information. Agent i’s vote for implementation is pivotal
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only if there is at least one vote against implementation, that is either if (i) the
other low type votes against implementation and one or both high types vote for
implementation, or if (ii) the other low type votes for implementation and at least
one of the high types votes against implementation. We will show that both cases
are incompatible with equilibrium behavior and the low type being informed and
high types being uninformed.
Consider case (i). If expected utility from implementation for agent i is posi-
tive presuming that the other low type has information, then the other low type’s
expected utility is positive if he actually has the information. Hence, voting
against implementation is no equilibrium action for the informed low type.
Consider case (ii). If expected utility from implementation for agent i is pos-
itive, then it must also be positive for an uninformed high type. Voting against
implementation is a contradiction to equilibrium. Thus, i’s vote for implemen-
tation is pivotal only in cases in which expected utility from implementation is
negative.
The proof for the high types is along the same lines. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
(i) In the most revealing equilibrium, the project will be implemented in state
(bh, cl) with probability 1 if at least one committee member receives a signal bh
and at least one committee member receives a signal cl, and with probability 1
2
else. The probability that at least one committee member receives a signal bh
and at least one committee member receives a signal cl is
δ
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)3)
+ (1− δ)
(
δ
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)2)
+ (1− δ)δ δ
2
)
= δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2)
.
Hence, the probability of implementation is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
3
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
(ii) Analogous. (iii) Obvious. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.9
We already noticed that in a putative equilibrium with full information reve-
lation, concealing cl is a profitable deviation for a low type. Note that no other
non-disclosure is a profitable deviation from full information revelation. It re-
mains to be shown that concealing cl is a profitable deviation for low type i from
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a putative equilibrium in which only low type j conceals cl, and that the strategy
profile consists of mutually best responses.
Consider a putative equilibrium in which low type j conceals cl, and low type
i reveals cl, and consider i’s deviation to conceal cl. For h−1
h+1
< α, i does not want
the project to be implemented unless he observes bh and cl. If bh is revealed,
high types vote for implementation, hence i can make sure implementation by
voting for it. Given the putative equilibrium communication strategies, high types
believe that i is uninformed if he does not reveal information. Hence, if j reveals
bl, and no information about the costs is revealed, high types assign probability 1
2
to cl and vote against implementation. They vote in favor of implementation if j
reveals cl. The deviation has a positive effect for some communication outcomes,
and no negative effects. Hence, it is a profitable deviation from the putative
equilibrium.
Given voting strategies, revelation strategies are mutually best responses. Low
types’ voting strategies obviously maximize conditional expected payoff. Note
that the fact that a low type might be concealing cl is decision-irrelevant for the
other low type (Lemma 4.5).
Consider the high types’ voting strategies when reaching an information set
in which only bl was revealed. If both low types reveal bl, high types know
that none of them has observed cl. Implementation yields expected utility α −
1
2
(h− 1), which is negative since α < h−1
2
. If one of the low types has not
revealed any information, high types assign probability
1− δ
2
(1− δ2)+(1−δ)
to c = cl.
Expected utility from implementation is
1− δ
2
(1− δ2)+(1−δ)
α + 1−δ
(1− δ2)+(1−δ)
(1 + α− h),
which is negative if and only if δ < h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
. If none of the low types reveals
any information, high types assign probability
(1− δ2)
2
(1− δ2)
2
+(1−δ)2
to c = cl. Expected
utility from implementation is
(1− δ2)
2
(1− δ2)
2
+(1−δ)2
α + (1−δ)
2
(1− δ2)
2
+(1−δ)2
(1 + α− h), which
is negative if and only if δ <
√
h−1−α−√α√
h−1−α−
√
α
2
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
(i) A low type votes in favor of implementation upon observing bh and cl in
the communication stage or when observing bh in the communication stage and
(privately) observing cl. As high types vote for implementation for all possible
communication outcomes in state (bh, cl), one low type’s vote in favor of imple-
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mentation suffices in order to implement the project with probability 1. Hence,
the same distribution of information yields implementation with certainty as for
α > h−1
2
. The proof of Proposition 4.2(i) applies.
(ii) Concerning the probability of rejection in state (bl, ch) we have to distin-
guish three cases. Low types vote against implementation for any communication
outcome. If δ > h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
, high types vote against implementation only if the state
is revealed or both low types revealed bl. The probability of these events is
δ
(
1
2
(
δ + (1− δ)
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)2))
+ 1
2
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)3))
+(1− δ)
(
δ
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)2)
+ (1− δ)2
(
δ
2
)2)
= δ2
(
13
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2)
.
Hence, the probability of rejection is
1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
13
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
.
If
√
h−1−α−√α√
h−1−α−
√
α
2
< δ ≤ h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
, high types vote against implementation if they learn
the state of the world or if they learn bl and at least one of the low types reveals
information. The probability of these events is
δ
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)3))
+ (1− δ)
(
δ
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(
1−
(
1− δ
2
)2))
+ (1− δ)2
(
δ
2
)2)
= δ
(
1 + 5
4
δ − 2δ2 + 11
16
δ3
)
.
Hence, the probability of rejection is
1
2
(
1 + δ
(
1 + 5
4
δ − 2δ2 + 11
16
δ3
))
.
If δ ≤
√
h−1−α−√α√
h−1−α−
√
α
2
, high types vote against implementation if they learn bl. The
probability of this event is
1−
(
1−
(
δ
2
))4
.
Hence, the probability of rejection is
1− 1
2
(
1−
(
δ
2
))4
.
(iii) Obvious. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4
(i) We have to show that
(a) 1− 1
2
(
1− δ
2
)2
− 1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
13
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
> 0 for δ < δ∗, and
(b) δ∗ > h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
.
(a) 1− 1
2
(
1− δ
2
)2
− 1
2
(
1 + δ2
(
13
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
+ 1
2
(
δ
2
)2))
= δ
2
(
1− 7
2
δ + 13
4
δ2 − 15
16
δ3
)
, which is positive if 1− 7
2
δ+ 13
4
δ2 − 15
16
δ3 > 0. It is
easy to verify that the second factor monotonously decreases in δ and is positive
for δ = 4
9
.
(b) h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
monotonously decreases in α. For the smallest value in the param-
eter range, α = h−1
h+1
, we have h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
= 2
3
(h−1), which is smaller than4
9
for h < 5
3
.
Hence, existence of a parameter range for δ for which the party system performs
better than the parliament is guaranteed for the entire relevant parameter range
if h < 5
3
.
(ii) We have to show that
(h− 1)1
2
(
δ +
(
δ
2
)2)
> (h− 1)1
2
δ2
((
δ
2
)2
+ 25
4
(
1− δ
2
)2)
.
1
4
(h− 1)1
2
(
δ +
(
δ
2
)2)
> 1
4
(h− 1)1
2
δ2
((
δ
2
)2
+ 25
4
(
1− δ
2
)2)
⇔ δ +
(
δ
2
)2
> δ2
((
δ
2
)2
+ 25
4
(
1− δ
2
)2)
⇔ 1 > δ
((
δ
2
)2
+ 25
4
(
1− δ
2
)2
− 1
4
)
.
It is easy to verify that the right-hand-side is smaller than 1 for δ = 1
5
, and
monotonously increasing for smaller values. Existence of the parameter ranges is
obvious, as h−1−2α
h−1− 3
2
α
is zero for α = h−1
2
. Q.E.D.
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